Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was found guilty of aggravated murder and tampering with the evidence. The trial court, however, granted Appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the aggravated-burglary count. The Supreme Court accepted Appellant's appeal to review two questions of law: (1) does a person have standing to object under the fourth Amendment to the retention of a DNA profile by the state and its use in a subsequent criminal investigation when the profile was lawfully created during a previous criminal investigation, but the person was acquitted of the crime; and (2) does the state have the authority to retain a DNA profile that was created during a criminal investigation and use that profile in a subsequent investigation, when the person was acquitted of any crime following the first investigation? The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a person does not have standing to object to the retention of his or her DNA profile or the profile's use in a subsequent criminal investigation; and (2) the state is authorized to retain the DNA profile and to use it in a subsequent investigation even though the profile was obtained from a sample taken during the investigation of the crime of which the person was acquitted. View "State v. Emerson" on Justia Law

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation commenced this foreclosure action before it obtained an assignment of the promissory note and mortgage securing the Plaintiffs' loan. Plaintiffs maintained that Federal Home Loan lacked standing to sue. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Federal Home Loan and entered a decree of foreclosure. The appellate court affirmed, holding that Federal Home Loan had remedied its lack of standing when it obtained an assignment from the real party in interest. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the cause, holding (1) standing is required to invoke the jurisdiction of the common pleas court, and therefore it is determined as of the filing of the complaint; and (2) thus, receiving an assignment of a promissory note and mortgage from the real party in interest subsequent to the filing of an action but prior to the entry of judgment does not cure a lack of standing to file a foreclosure action. View "Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Schwartzwald" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court found juvenile appellant J.V. delinquent and guilty of felonious assault, aggravated robbery, and the attendant firearm and serious-youthful-offender specifications. The court imposed a blended sentence of at least two years of incarceration at the Ohio Department of Youth Services and a stayed adult sentence of three years. Near the end of his sentence, J.V. was involved in a fight that led the trial court to invoke the stayed adult sentence. The court of appeals affirmed the invocation of the stayed adult sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the invocation of the adult prison sentence was constitutional; but (2) a juvenile court does not have the authority to impose criminal punishment, including post-release control, after the delinquent child turns twenty-one, and because the juvenile court imposed the adult sentence and added postrelease control after J.V. turned twenty-one, the court acted outside of its jurisdiction. View "In re J.V." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether an indigent parent whose sentence for civil contempt at a previous hearing for failure to pay child support was suspended on condition that he comply with his child-support obligations for a year, has a right to appointed counsel at a subsequent hearing on a motion to impose the suspended sentence due to noncompliance with the conditions. The court of appeals (1) concluded that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not apply at the hearing, as it was civil in nature, and (2) declined to create a categorical rule that indigent parties previously represented by counsel at a contempt hearing have a due process right to appointed counsel at later purge hearings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because a purge hearing does not amount to a new contempt proceeding, a hearing to determine whether a contemnor has purged himself of civil contempt is a civil proceeding; and (2) the Due Process Clauses of the state and federal Constitutions do not guarantee an indigent parent the right to appointed counsel at a civil-contempt purge hearing. View "Liming v. Damos" on Justia Law

Defendant shot Ulysses Altizer. At issue on appeal was Ohio Rev. Code 2941.146, which states that if a defendant fires shots "from a motor vehicle," he is subject to a mandatory, five-year prison term. During trial, the prosecution stated to the jury that Defendant did not have to be in the vehicle for the specification to apply. The jury convicted Defendant on two counts of felonious assault with two firearm specifications each, including the specification set forth in section 2941.146. The appellate court affirmed, holding (1) the statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Defendant; and (2) section 2941.146 covered Defendant's conduct since the statute did not limit its application to persons engaged in proscribed activity inside a motor vehicle. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) section 2941.146 is not applicable when a defendant fires a weapon while standing with both feet planted on the ground with no substantial physical connection with a motor vehicle; and (2) therefore, the statute did not apply to Defendant, who discharged his weapon while standing outside his vehicle. View "State v. Swidas" on Justia Law

This was an appeal from a judgment of the court of appeals affirming a trial court's judgment granting a motion to suppress. At issue was whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion to suppress after it determined that an officer knowingly and intentionally made false statements in his search-warrant affidavit. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, which upheld the trial court's ruling, holding (1) the officer's statements in his testimony did not amount to his knowingly and intentionally including false information in his search-warrant affidavit; and (2) therefore, the trial court erred in its judgment. Remanded for a new suppression hearing. View "State v. Dibble" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether a juvenile has a statutory right to counsel during a police interrogation conducted before a complaint is filed or an appearance is made in juvenile court. The juvenile in this case was adjudicated delinquent of aggravated robbery with a three-year firearm specification. The juvenile appealed, arguing that the police sergeant violated Ohio Rev. Code 2151.352 in obtaining a written statement before giving the juvenile an opportunity to obtain counsel. The appellate court rejected the juvenile's claim, concluding that a juvenile proceeding does not commence until the filing of a complaint, and because no complaint had been filed against the juvenile at the time he was interrogated and gave the written statement, section 2151.352 did not apply. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) pursuant to section 2151.352, a child is statutorily entitled to representation by legal counsel upon the filing of a complaint in juvenile court or upon initial appearance in the juvenile court; and (2) thus, the right of a juvenile to counsel pursuant to section 2151.352 attaches when the jurisdiction of a juvenile court is properly invoked. View "In re M.W." on Justia Law

This was an original action in mandamus by relator, JobsOhio, asking the Supreme Court to (1) find that legislation authorizing the creation of JobsOhio to promote economic development in the state and to assume responsibility for the merchandising and sale of alcohol in the state was constitutional, and (2) compel respondent, the Ohio Department of Commerce director, to execute an agreement to transfer the state's liquor business to JobsOhio. The Supreme Court dismissed the cause because it did not properly invoke the original jurisdiction of the court, as it essentially sought either a declaratory judgment or an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of the statute rather than presenting a justiciable controversy. View "State ex rel. JobsOhio v. Goodman" on Justia Law

The issue in this appeal was whether a plea agreement between the Summit County prosecuting attorney and Appellant bound the Portage County prosecuting attorney regarding his prosecution of Appellant for crimes that Appellant committed wholly in Portage County. The trial court overruled Defendant's motion to enforce the plea agreement, finding that Defendant failed to prove that the Portage County prosecuting attorney, who was not a party to the agreement, authorized anyone in Summit County to negotiate or contract on his behalf. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a county prosecuting attorney does not have authority to enter into a plea agreement on behalf of the state for crimes committed wholly outside the county in which the prosecuting attorney has been elected; and (2) because the Portage County prosecuting attorney had not granted the Summit County prosecuting attorney authority to bind him as to the prosecuting of Defendant for crimes committed in Portage County, the plea agreement between the Summit County prosecuting attorney and Defendant did not preclude the Portage County prosecuting attorney from prosecuting Defendant for crimes that he committed wholly in Portage County or from asking for consecutive sentences. View "State v. Billingsley" on Justia Law

This was a public-records mandamus action in which Relator, an attorney representing defendants in criminal cases, sought certain records from Respondents, the county prosecutor's office and the county prosecuting attorney. The Supreme Court granted the writ for a few of the requested records but denied the writ for the remaining requested records, holding (1) Relator, for the most part, did not establish his entitlement to the requested relief in mandamus for most of his requests; but (2) Relator established his entitlement to a writ of mandamus to compel Respondents to provide copies of those portions of the requested calendars of the prosecuting attorney and two assistant prosecuting attorneys that were work-related entries for the period of November 2008 to July 2010, as these portions of the requested calendars were records for purposes of Ohio Rev. Code 149.011(G) and 149.43 and Relator had not previously been provided with the requested records. View "State ex rel. McCaffrey v. Mahoning County ProsecutorÂs Office" on Justia Law