Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Medical Malpractice
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The Supreme Court of Ohio dealt with a case involving the plaintiff, who was acting both individually and as the executor of an estate, and the defendants, which included a medical center and various medical professionals. However, the opinion provides very little information about the specific facts of the case or the legal issues at stake. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals, relying on the authority of a prior case, Everhart v. Coshocton Cty. Mem. Hosp. The case was then remanded back to the Court of Appeals to consider arguments that it had previously declined to address. The specific nature of these arguments, and the reasons for the Court of Appeals' initial refusal to consider them, are not provided in the opinion. As such, the precise holding of the Supreme Court of Ohio in this case cannot be determined from the available information. View "Davis v. Mercy St. Vincent Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

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In this case, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals. The case involved a dispute between Ewing, in her capacity as executor of an estate and personal representative of the deceased's next of kin and beneficiaries, and UC Health along with other defendants. The court did not provide detailed facts or legal conclusions in its decision. Instead, it simply stated that it was reversing the judgment of the lower court based on the authority of a separate case, Everhart v. Coshocton Cty. Mem. Hosp. Since the court does not elaborate on the details of the case nor the reasons for its decision, the exact holding in this case isn't clear from the opinion provided. View "Ewing v. UC Health" on Justia Law

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In this case from the Supreme Court of Ohio, the court considered whether a derivative claim for loss of parental consortium could proceed even when the primary medical negligence claim, on which it was based, was barred by the statute of repose. The appellants, Mr. and Mrs. McCarthy, had filed a medical negligence claim against Dr. Lee and associated medical practices, alleging negligent care in the treatment of Mrs. McCarthy's condition. The claim was dismissed due to the statute of repose. Subsequently, the McCarthys filed a separate claim on behalf of their three minor children for loss of consortium due to the treatment of Mrs. McCarthy's condition. The medical providers moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that it could not stand alone as it was a derivative claim of the previously dismissed medical claim. The trial court granted the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the children's derivative claim for loss of parental consortium could not exist when the principal claim on which it was based was extinguished by the statute of repose. The court explained that the statute of repose operates as a substantive bar to a claim, extinguishing both the remedy and the right. Therefore, when a principal claim is extinguished, no other claim derived from it can exist. The court affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss the children's derivative claim for loss of parental consortium. View "McCarthy v. Lee" on Justia Law

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In the case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, the main issue was whether the four-year medical-claims statute of repose, set forth in R.C. 2305.113(C), applies to wrongful-death claims based on medical care. The facts of the case involved Todd Everhart, who had been involved in a car accident in 2003 and was subsequently transferred to Coshocton County Memorial Hospital. Despite finding an abnormality in his chest x-rays, the doctors did not inform him about it. Nearly three years later, Everhart was diagnosed with advanced-stage lung cancer and died two months later. His wife, Machelle Everhart, filed a lawsuit against the hospital and the doctors involved, alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death due to their failure to inform Mr. Everhart of his lung condition.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the broad definition of "medical claim" clearly and unambiguously includes wrongful-death claims based on medical care. Therefore, the four-year medical-claims statute of repose applies to such claims. The court ruled that the Tenth District Court of Appeals erroneously held otherwise and thus reversed its decision. The court remanded the case to the Tenth District Court of Appeals to address Mrs. Everhart's remaining assignment of error. View "Everhart v. Coshocton Cty. Mem. Hosp." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the court of claims seeking to recover a portion of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation (BWC)'s subrogated award in this case, holding that the BWC's attempted expansion of subrogation was unlawful.The BWC allowed Lamar Thomas's workers' compensation claim for some conditions he received in an industrial accident caused by a third party but disallowed an additional claim for other conditions linked to the workplace accident based on a second opinion rendered during a medical review. When Thomas settled his personal injury case against a third-party tortfeasor, the BWC recouped through subrogation the cost of the medical review it had used to deny Thomas's additional claim. Thomas brought suit against the BWC. The court of claims denied the complaint via judgment on the pleadings. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the medical review the BWC obtained was not an expense recoverable in subrogation. View "Thomas v. Logue" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that, by its plain language, the four-year statute of repose, Ohio Rev. Code 2305.15(A), tolls the medical-claim statute of repose, Ohio Rev. Code 23.05.113(C), and therefore, the statute of repose does not bar the filing of a claim during the defendant's absence.In 2015, Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice complaint Dr. Abubaker Durrani, his clinic, and Good Samaritan Hospital in the court of common pleas alleging that Durrani negligently performed a spinal surgery on him in 2010. Defendants filed motions to dismiss, citing the four-year statute of repose as an absolute bar to Defendant's action. The trial court granted the motions to dismiss. On appeal, the court of appeals held that section 2305.15(A) tolled the repose period as to Durrani because he fled the country before the statute of repose had expired but did not toll the repose period as to the other defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 2305.15 makes clear that an absconding defendant is not entitled to a four-year statute of limitations that is not tolled. View "Elliot v. Durrani" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that a negligent credentialing is a separate and independent claim from medical negligence but that a negligent credentialing claim cannot proceed without either a simultaneous or prior adjudication of or stipulation to medical negligence.At issue was whether a hospital's grant of staff privileges to a physician, otherwise known as credentialing a physician, confers a duty upon the hospital that is separate and independent of the duty the physical owes to the hospital's patients. If so, the question remained whether a patient's negligent credentialing claim can proceed in the absence of a prior adjudication or stipulation that the physician was negligent in his care of the patient. The trial court in this case granted the hospital's motion for summary judgment on the negligent credentialing claim. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a negligent credentialing claim cannot proceed without either a simultaneous or prior adjudication of or stipulation that a doctor committed medical malpractice; and (2) because such an adjudication or stipulation was not present in this case, the negligent credentialing claim was properly dismissed. View "Walling v. Brenya" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that a physician employed in an executive position who does not directly oversee physicians who treat patients does not satisfy the active-clinical-practice requirement of Ohio R. Evid. 601.Plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice suit alleging that Defendant was negligent of his treatment of one of the plaintiffs. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Defendant. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the plain language of Rule 601 should have precluded the testimony of Dr. Ron Walls as an expert regarding the standard of care when Walls was not involved in the active clinical practice of medicine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a physician who is employed in an executive position and does not directly oversee physicians who treat patients does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 601; and (2) Walls did not satisfy the active-clinical-practice requirement of Rule 601. View "Johnson v. Abdullah" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may not take advantage of Ohio's saving statute to refile a medical claim after the applicable one-year statute of limitations has expired if the four-year statute of repose for medical claims has also expired.Plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice complaint against Defendants in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiffs previously filed their claims against Defendants in prior actions that were dismissed without prejudice before refiling their claims in Hamilton County. Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings in both refiled cases, arguing that Ohio's medical statute of repose, Ohio Rev. Code 2305.113(C) barred the refiled claims. The trial court agreed and granted Defendants' motions. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Plaintiffs timely refiled their claims pursuant to the saving statute and that the statute of repose did not bar the refiled claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Plaintiffs commenced their actions in Hamilton County more than four years after the alleged conduct that formed the basis of their claims, the statute of repose barred Plaintiffs' refiled actions. View "Wilson v. Durrani" on Justia Law

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In this medical malpractice action, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants, holding that Plaintiff could not rely on the savings statute when he filed this action just before the expiration of the statute of limitations but did not obtain service within one year or dismiss the action during that period.Although Plaintiff had initially filed this lawsuit within the limitations period, he neither obtained service on Dr. Eric Humphreys within one year, nor did he dismiss his lawsuit during that time. As a consequence, the trial court ruled that Dr. Humphreys was dismissed with prejudice from the lawsuit because Plaintiff's claims against him were time barred. Concluding that the remaining defendants could only be vicariously liable, the court found that any liability of those parties was extinguished. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the savings statute applied to Plaintiff's claim against Dr. Humphreys. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because there was neither a dismissal otherwise than on the merits nor the filing of a new action, the savings statute did not apply, and Plaintiff's claim was barred by the statute of limitations. View "Moore v. Mount Carmel Health System" on Justia Law