Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Wells Fargo Bank initiated a foreclosure action against Grace Doberdruk, alleging default on a promissory note secured by a mortgage. After both parties filed motions for summary judgment, the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas granted Wells Fargo’s motion, denied Doberdruk’s, and entered a judgment of foreclosure. Despite Doberdruk’s efforts to secure a stay, including posting motions to stay the sheriff’s sale and confirmation of sale, she was unable to post the required supersedeas bond. The property was sold at auction, the sale was confirmed, and proceeds were distributed to the judgment creditors.Doberdruk appealed both the judgment of foreclosure and the confirmation of sale to the Eighth District Court of Appeals. The Eighth District denied her motions to stay further proceedings and distribution of sale proceeds. The court subsequently ordered briefing on whether her appeal was moot due to her failure to obtain a stay. Relying on its own precedent, the Eighth District concluded that, absent a stay and after confirmation and distribution of proceeds, Doberdruk’s appeal was moot and dismissed it. The court also certified a conflict with several other Ohio appellate districts that had interpreted the statutory remedy differently.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case, addressing whether an appeal of a judgment of foreclosure is moot after sale proceeds are distributed when the appellant sought but could not secure a stay. The court held that the statutory remedy of restitution under R.C. 2329.45 remains available even after the distribution of proceeds, preserving a live controversy and enabling appellate relief. Therefore, the appeal is not moot solely because a stay was not obtained or proceeds were distributed. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Eighth District’s dismissal and remanded the case for consideration on the merits. View "Wells Fargo Bank, Natl. Assn. v. Doberdruk" on Justia Law

A roughly 600-space parking garage on the Scioto Peninsula in Columbus was owned by RiverSouth Authority, which is a “new community authority” and a “body corporate and politic.” RiverSouth owned the garage, which sat on city-owned land, and leased it to the City of Columbus under a long-term ground lease. The city then entered into a management agreement with Capitol South, a private nonprofit entity, to manage and operate the garage. Capitol South, in turn, hired LAZ Parking Midwest, a private for-profit operator, to handle day-to-day operations. The agreements required Capitol South to operate the garage in a manner consistent with city obligations, with many operational decisions ultimately subject to city oversight.The Ohio Tax Commissioner denied RiverSouth’s request for a real property tax exemption, concluding that the garage was not entitled to exemption because it was managed by a private, for-profit entity, LAZ. RiverSouth appealed to the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals, which affirmed the denial, but for a different reason: the Board found the garage was under the direction and control of Capitol South, the nonprofit manager, rather than the city. This basis for denial was raised by the Board on its own initiative, without prior notice to the parties.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the Board of Tax Appeals erred by affirming the Tax Commissioner’s decision based on a new issue not raised below and without following statutory remand procedures. The Court further held that the city’s use of a management company to operate the garage did not deprive the city of direction or control over the property for exemption purposes. The decision of the Board of Tax Appeals was vacated, and the case was remanded to the Tax Commissioner to grant the exemption and calculate the appropriate refund. View "RiverSouth Auth. v. Harris" on Justia Law

A local school district board of education filed complaints with a county board of revision, challenging the property tax valuations for two parcels owned by private entities, seeking to increase their assessed values for the 2022 tax year. The county board of revision dismissed the complaints, citing lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the relevant statute governing complaints against property valuation.After these dismissals, the school board appealed to the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, relying on a general statute for administrative appeals. The property owners moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing the school board lacked statutory standing. The Court of Common Pleas agreed and dismissed both appeals. The board then appealed to the Fifth District Court of Appeals, contending that the general statute provided an independent right of appeal. The appellate court, however, affirmed the dismissals, concluding that statutory amendments had eliminated the school board’s ability to appeal property valuation decisions to either the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) or a court of common pleas, unless the board owned or leased the property at issue.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. It held that decisions of a county board of revision regarding property valuation are not appealable to a court of common pleas under the general administrative appeal statute (R.C. 2506.01), because those decisions are appealable to a higher administrative authority, the BTA, under R.C. 5717.01. Further, an appeal to the court of common pleas under R.C. 5717.05 is only available to the property owner. Because the school board did not own the properties, it could not appeal under either provision. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the Fifth District Court of Appeals. View "Olentangy Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

NC Enterprises, L.L.C. maintained and landscaped two parcels of land in Tallmadge, Ohio, adjacent to its own property, for many years. Although Norfolk Southern Railway Company held title to these parcels, NC Enterprises regularly hired contractors to mow, weed, fertilize, trim, and otherwise care for the land from shortly after acquiring its own property in 1997 through 2021. In September 2000, NC Enterprises erected a fence on the parcels, and later, in 2011, installed drainage pipes. NC Enterprises believed it owned the parcels until Norfolk Southern posted for-sale signs in 2021. Norfolk Southern paid property taxes on the parcels throughout the relevant period.After Norfolk Southern refuted NC Enterprises’ claim of adverse possession in 2020, NC Enterprises filed suit in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, seeking a declaratory judgment of adverse possession, quiet title, and damages for unjust enrichment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of NC Enterprises on the adverse possession claim, finding that it had proven, by clear and convincing evidence, exclusive, open, notorious, continuous, and adverse use for at least 21 years. Norfolk Southern appealed, and the Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that NC Enterprises’ landscaping and maintenance, combined with other acts, sufficed to establish adverse possession.The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals. The court held that NC Enterprises failed to prove that its use of the parcels was open and notorious for the required 21-year period. Specifically, the court concluded that ordinary lawn maintenance, such as mowing and trimming, is not sufficiently obvious or apparent to put the title owner on notice of adverse possession. As a result, summary judgment in favor of NC Enterprises was improper, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "NC Ents., L.L.C. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co." on Justia Law

In 1953, C.C. Fay conveyed parcels of land to a third party, reserving “all the coal below the horizon of the No. 8 coal, if any under vein exists thereunder, and other minerals, with the right to mine and remove such coal or other minerals of any vein.” The current owner of the property, a fund, asserted that this reservation did not include rights to oil and gas beneath the parcels. The heirs and successors of Fay argued that the reservation did include those rights. The dispute centered on whether the original deed’s language was broad enough to cover oil and gas.The Harrison County Court of Common Pleas granted summary judgment to the fund, holding that the deed’s language was not broad enough to cover oil and gas rights. The heirs appealed to the Seventh District Court of Appeals, which found the reservation language ambiguous. The appellate court examined extrinsic evidence, including other deeds executed by Fay that specifically referenced oil and gas when intended. It concluded that Fay’s omission of the phrase “oil and gas” in the deed at issue showed he did not intend to reserve those rights, and it affirmed the trial court’s judgment.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and reached the same result but for a different reason. It held that the reservation clause in the deed was unambiguous when read as a whole. The Supreme Court found that the language, including references to “mine,” “mining,” and “vein,” indicated an intent to reserve only solid minerals such as coal, and not oil or gas. The court thus held that oil and gas were not included in the reservation and affirmed the judgment of the Seventh District Court of Appeals. View "Faith Ranch & Farms Fund, Inc. v. PNC Bank, Natl. Assn." on Justia Law

The property in question had operated as a tavern under a nonconforming-use exception in an area zoned for residential use. The tavern ceased operations in April 2019 after its liquor license became inactive in January 2019. In March 2022, one of the property’s owners and a representative inquired with the township zoning inspector about the property’s status, prompted by interest from a potential buyer who wanted to reopen the tavern. The inspector responded by email, stating that the property no longer qualified as a nonconforming use due to over two years of discontinued operation and referenced the applicable zoning resolution provision.Following this, the property owners, through counsel, requested clarification and formal notice regarding the property’s zoning status. The township’s legal counsel confirmed the inspector’s position by forwarding the original email as the official communication. The owners then appealed to the Hinckley Township Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA), which dismissed the appeal as untimely, finding that the email constituted a “decision” under Ohio law and that the 20-day appeal period had lapsed. The Medina County Court of Common Pleas affirmed the BZA’s dismissal, concluding that the email was a “decision” and that notice was sufficient. On further appeal, the Ninth District Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the email was not a formal “decision” under the relevant statutes and therefore did not trigger the appeal deadline.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the Ninth District’s judgment. The Court held that the zoning inspector’s email was not a “decision” as contemplated by Ohio Revised Code sections 519.14 and 519.15, and so did not trigger the statutory appeal deadline. The BZA therefore lacked jurisdiction to entertain the property owners’ appeal. View "729 W. 130th St., L.L.C. v. Hinckley Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals" on Justia Law

A purchaser of a home paid off an existing mortgage at closing, which triggered a statutory obligation for the lender to record a release of the mortgage within 90 days. The lender failed to record the release by the deadline, recording it 22 days late. The statute at issue provides that if a lender does not timely record the release, the borrower and current owner may seek $250 in statutory damages. After the lender’s late recordation, the owner filed suit seeking those damages and, in addition, sought to represent a class of similarly situated individuals whose lenders had not timely recorded mortgage releases.The dispute was initially removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, but that court remanded the case to state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas denied the lender’s motion for summary judgment, finding the owner had standing, and granted the owner’s motion to certify a class. At that time, an amendment to the statute barring class actions for such statutory damages had been enacted but not yet effective, so the trial court applied the prior version. The First District Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the owner had statutory standing and that the amended statute did not apply retroactively to bar the class.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that the statute confers standing consistent with the Ohio Constitution, allowing the owner’s individual claim for statutory damages. However, the court further held that the 2023 amendment, which bars class-wide recovery of statutory damages for violations occurring in 2020, is remedial and applies retroactively to this case. The court found that the lower courts erred by not applying the amended statute and by certifying the class. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding with instructions to decertify the class. View "Voss v. Quicken Loans, L.L.C." on Justia Law

South Branch Solar, L.L.C. sought approval to build a 130-megawatt solar-powered electric generation facility in Hancock County, Ohio, on approximately 700 acres of agricultural land. The project included solar panels, related equipment, and infrastructure. Local government officials and residents had varied reactions, with some supporting the facility for its economic and environmental benefits and others expressing concerns about impacts on land use, aesthetics, property values, wildlife, and local drainage systems. Travis Bohn, who lives near the project site, opposed the project and intervened in the proceedings.The Ohio Power Siting Board reviewed South Branch’s application, which included environmental studies and mitigation plans. After a public hearing and extensive opportunity for public input, the board staff recommended approval subject to 50 conditions. A joint stipulation was agreed to by South Branch, the board staff, the county commissioners, and the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation, but not by Bohn. Following an adjudicatory hearing, the Board issued an order granting the certificate. Bohn unsuccessfully sought rehearing, arguing that the Board misapplied statutory criteria, failed to require adequate wildlife and flood analysis, and improperly weighed local opposition and economic impacts.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the Board’s order using a standard that allows reversal only if the order was unlawful or unreasonable. The court held that the Board’s determinations under R.C. 4906.10(A)(2), (A)(3), and (A)(6)—concerning environmental impact, minimum adverse impact, and public interest—were supported by sufficient probative evidence and complied with statutory and regulatory requirements. The court found no reversible error in the Board’s approval of South Branch’s application and affirmed the order granting the certificate. View "In re Application of S. Branch Solar, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Susan Boggs and Fouad Rachid reside in a home owned by Fouad, Inc., located in Olmsted Township near the Cleveland-Hopkins International Airport. Boggs alleges that increased air traffic and airport operations, particularly following a runway expansion project, have caused significant noise, vibrations, and emissions, rendering the property unsuitable for residential use and amounting to a governmental taking. Boggs declined Cleveland’s offer to purchase an avigation easement and subsequently filed a mandamus action against the City of Cleveland, seeking to compel the city to initiate appropriation proceedings to determine compensation for the alleged taking.The case was initially removed to federal court, where Boggs pursued administrative remedies with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), but her claims were rejected. After further federal litigation, the district court granted summary judgment to Cleveland on federal claims and remanded the state-law claims to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. In state court, both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to Cleveland, finding that Boggs lacked standing because Cleveland, as a municipality, lacked authority to appropriate property outside its boundaries. The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Boggs’s injury was not redressable since Cleveland could not be compelled to initiate appropriation proceedings for property outside its jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and reversed the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals. The court held that under Article I, Section 19 of the Ohio Constitution, a landowner whose property has been taken by a foreign municipality has standing to pursue a mandamus action to force the municipality to institute appropriation proceedings for compensation, regardless of whether the property is located within the municipality’s boundaries. The case was remanded for further proceedings, including consideration of the statute-of-limitations issue. View "State ex rel. Boggs v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

A city filed a criminal complaint against a property owner, alleging that his property was in violation of certain provisions of the International Property Maintenance Code (IPMC), which the city had adopted by ordinance. The complaint stated that the property’s residence lacked water service, had holes in the roof, and that a break wall was collapsing into a river. It also alleged the presence of various items described as “debris,” such as barrels, lawn mowers, boats, trailers, propane tanks, and overgrown vegetation. The city claimed these conditions violated IPMC sections requiring properties to be maintained in a “clean,” “safe,” and “sanitary” condition.The property owner moved to dismiss the charges in the Huron Municipal Court, arguing that the IPMC provisions were unconstitutionally vague because the terms “clean,” “safe,” and “sanitary” were undefined. The trial court agreed, relying on a prior decision from the Seventh District Court of Appeals, State v. ACV Realty, which had found similar IPMC language void for vagueness. As a result, the trial court dismissed the relevant counts. The city appealed, and the Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the terms in question should be given their ordinary meanings and were sufficiently clear to inform property owners of the prohibited conduct.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case to resolve a conflict between appellate districts. The court held that a defendant cannot successfully challenge a law as void for vagueness if his conduct clearly falls within the activities the law prohibits. Because the alleged conditions of the property—such as lack of water, structural decay, and accumulation of debris—clearly violated the IPMC provisions, the property owner’s vagueness challenge failed. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the appellate court’s judgment and remanded the case to the municipal court for further proceedings. View "Huron v. Kisil" on Justia Law