Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Michael Satink, an employee of the City of Lakewood's Department of Public Works, was terminated for alleged insubordinate and inappropriate behavior. The union representing Satink, Ohio Council 8, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, filed a grievance, leading to a last-chance agreement (LCA) that reinstated Satink with the condition that any further misconduct would result in immediate termination without recourse to the grievance or arbitration provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement (CBA). Satink was terminated again for workplace misconduct, and the union filed another grievance. The city refused to arbitrate, citing the LCA, prompting the union to seek arbitration through the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas.The common pleas court denied the city's motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and granted the union's motion to compel arbitration. The city appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, which reversed the lower court's decision, holding that the State Employment Relations Board (SERB) had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter because the union's claims were dependent on collective-bargaining rights created by R.C. Chapter 4117.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that the union's claims did not allege an unfair labor practice or conduct constituting an unfair labor practice under R.C. 4117.11. Therefore, SERB did not have exclusive jurisdiction. The court emphasized that the right to arbitrate is a contractual right derived from the CBA, independent of R.C. Chapter 4117. The court also noted that R.C. 4117.09(B)(1) allows a party to bring a suit for a violation of a collective-bargaining agreement in a court of common pleas. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Eighth District's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ohio Council 8, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Lakewood" on Justia Law

The case involves a workplace accident where the decedent sustained severe head injuries, resulting in a persistent vegetative state and eventual death. The decedent's workers' compensation claim was allowed for several conditions, and he sought scheduled-loss compensation for the loss of use of his bilateral upper and lower extremities. The Industrial Commission of Ohio initially denied this claim, concluding that the loss of use was due to brain injury, not direct injury to the extremities.The decedent filed a mandamus action challenging the denial, but it was dismissed after his death. Subsequently, his surviving spouse, Byk, filed a motion with the commission for scheduled-loss compensation under R.C. 4123.57(B) and 4123.60. The commission denied this motion, stating that the decedent's entitlement to the loss-of-use award had already been determined and denied.Byk then filed a mandamus action in the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which granted a limited writ directing the commission to vacate its order and issue a new order adjudicating the merits of Byk’s claim. The commission and Republic Steel appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and reversed the Tenth District's judgment. The court held that Byk was not entitled to scheduled-loss compensation under R.C. 4123.60 because the decedent was not "lawfully entitled to have applied" a second time for the same scheduled-loss compensation that had already been denied. The court emphasized that the statutory language did not authorize an injured worker to reapply for the same compensation after a final denial. Consequently, Byk's request for a writ of mandamus was denied. View "State ex rel. Byk v. Indus. Comm." on Justia Law

Kenneth Ray Jr. died from asphyxiation due to an industrial accident involving nitrogen gas. His widow, Sharmel Culver, was awarded death benefits and subsequently applied for an additional award, alleging that Ray’s employer, TimkenSteel Corporation, violated specific safety requirements (VSSR). The Industrial Commission of Ohio denied the application, finding that the specific safety requirements did not apply because nitrogen gas is not considered "toxic" or a "poison."Culver sought a writ of mandamus from the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which determined that the commission abused its discretion. The court issued a limited writ, directing the commission to reconsider the VSSR analysis, concluding that nitrogen gas, in the concentration present in the elevator-control room, was toxic and thus fell under the applicable safety regulations.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and reversed the Tenth District’s judgment. The court held that the commission did not abuse its discretion in denying the additional award. The court found that the commission’s decision was supported by some evidence, including expert testimony and industry literature indicating that nitrogen gas is not inherently toxic. The court emphasized that the regulations in effect at the time of Ray’s death defined "air contaminants" as including only "toxic" gases, and the evidence did not support a finding that nitrogen gas met this definition. The court concluded that the commission’s interpretation of the regulations was reasonable and that the Tenth District erred in substituting its own judgment for that of the commission. View "State ex rel. Culver v. Indus. Comm." on Justia Law

The appellants, James Ruble, Linda O’Connor, Cynthia Brill, and Suzanne Holland, were administrators employed by the Switzerland of Ohio Local School District Board of Education. In 2021, the board, following the recommendation of a new superintendent, suspended their contracts to streamline the administration, which was deemed overstaffed. The administrators argued that the local policy under which their contracts were suspended was invalid as it did not meet the requirements of R.C. 3319.171.The Seventh District Court of Appeals denied the administrators' petition for a writ of mandamus, which sought reinstatement to their former positions with back pay and benefits. The court found that the board’s policy was valid and that the reasons for the contract suspensions were legitimate. The administrators then appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, focusing solely on the argument that the board’s policy was invalid under R.C. 3319.171.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the administrators failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to reinstatement under R.C. 3319.171. The court noted that the statute does not provide a right to reinstatement if a local policy is found deficient. The court also denied the administrators' motion for oral argument, finding the briefs sufficient to resolve the issues. The judgment of the Seventh District Court of Appeals was thus affirmed, and the administrators' contracts remained suspended under the board’s policy. View "State ex rel. Ruble v. Switzerland of Ohio Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn." on Justia Law

Emily Johnston began teaching in the North Olmsted City School District in the 2018-2019 school year. Initially, the school board offered her a salary based on ten years of teaching experience, but before she signed the contract, they recalculated it based on six years of experience. Johnston signed the contract with the lower salary. She did not file a grievance under the collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) and later sought a writ of mandamus for the higher salary and backpay.The Eighth District Court of Appeals dismissed Johnston’s complaint, reasoning that she had an adequate remedy through the CBA’s grievance procedure. Johnston argued that the grievance procedure was inadequate because it did not allow for backpay and that she could not use it until her contract was signed. The court found that she had ample opportunity to file a grievance from her first paycheck and that her failure to do so did not make the remedy inadequate.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Eighth District’s decision. The court held that Johnston had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law through the CBA’s grievance procedure, which she failed to utilize. The court also rejected Johnston’s argument that her claim was purely statutory and not subject to the CBA, noting that the CBA implemented the board’s authority under relevant statutes and addressed salary-schedule placement. Therefore, Johnston’s claim was governed by the CBA, and her failure to file a grievance precluded mandamus relief. View "State ex rel. Johnston v. North Olmsted City School District Board of Education" on Justia Law

In 2015, Michael Shields, a mechanic for the Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority (RTA), injured his left shoulder. The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation approved his claim for left shoulder strain. In 2017, Shields sought benefits for a related right shoulder injury, which the bureau denied. Shields then sued in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, and in May 2022, a jury found him entitled to benefits for the right shoulder injury. The RTA appealed, and the Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed the decision on April 27, 2023.Following the appellate court's decision, Shields filed a motion on May 8, 2023, seeking $26,221 in appellate attorney fees or a remand to the trial court to determine the fees. The RTA opposed, arguing the motion was untimely and that Shields had waived the issue by not seeking fees earlier. The appellate court ruled in favor of Shields, allowing him to recover appellate attorney fees and remanded the case to the trial court to determine the amount.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court's decision. The court held that a worker who prevails at trial in a workers’ compensation action may request attorney fees after obtaining an appellate judgment on the merits. The court emphasized that the workers’ compensation statute should be liberally construed in favor of employees and found no statutory requirement for the timing of such a request. The court dismissed the RTA's arguments regarding the timing and jurisdiction of the fee request and did not address the issue of fee caps, as it was not ripe for review. View "Shields v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation" on Justia Law

Paul Prinkey Jr. was injured while working for Emerine’s Towing, Inc. on January 19, 2015. His workers' compensation claim was allowed for myocardial infarction, substantial aggravation of pre-existing coronary artery disease, and major depressive disorder. Prinkey filed his first application for permanent-total-disability (PTD) compensation on February 4, 2019, which was denied by the Industrial Commission of Ohio based on medical evaluations indicating he was capable of sedentary work. Prinkey filed a second application for PTD compensation on June 4, 2021, citing worsening symptoms.The Industrial Commission denied Prinkey’s second application, stating he failed to present evidence of new and changed circumstances as required by the amended R.C. 4123.58(G). The commission's staff hearing officer (SHO) found no jurisdiction to address the application due to the lack of new evidence. Prinkey sought a writ of mandamus from the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which returned the matter to the commission for further proceedings, finding the SHO's order lacked adequate explanation and evidence.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the Tenth District's decision. The court held that the SHO failed to comply with the requirements of State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm., which mandates that the commission must specifically state the evidence relied upon and briefly explain the reasoning for its decision. The court found that the SHO did not provide sufficient reasoning or cite specific evidence to support the conclusion that Prinkey failed to present new and changed circumstances. Consequently, the case was returned to the Industrial Commission for further proceedings. View "State ex rel. Prinkey v. Emerine's Towing, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Patricia A. Heilman, the surviving spouse of Arthur J. Heilman, who died from an industrial accident. Patricia Heilman sought scheduled-loss compensation under Ohio law, claiming her husband had lost the use of both arms, both legs, sight in both eyes, and hearing in both ears before his death. The Industrial Commission of Ohio denied her request based on a nonexamining physician's report, which did not fully accept the findings of the examining physicians.The Tenth District Court of Appeals reviewed the case and granted a limited writ of mandamus. The court ordered the Industrial Commission to vacate its denial of scheduled-loss compensation and to re-evaluate whether Patricia Heilman had established her claims under the relevant statute. The court found that the Commission had improperly relied on the nonexamining physician's report, which did not comply with the requirements set forth in Wallace v. Industrial Commission.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the Tenth District's judgment. The court held that the Industrial Commission abused its discretion by relying solely on the nonexamining physician's report, which failed to accept the objective findings of the examining physicians. The Supreme Court clarified that while the Commission could not base its decision solely on the nonexamining physician's report, it could use the report as guidance in evaluating the remaining medical evidence. The court ordered the Commission to vacate its previous order and issue a new decision based on a proper evaluation of the evidence. View "State ex rel. Heilman v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves the termination of a police chief, Erica Barga, by the Village Council of St. Paris. Barga was placed on administrative leave by the mayor, who filed charges against her for insubordination and neglect of duty. Barga requested a public hearing to address these charges. The village council conducted the hearing in public but deliberated in executive session before voting to terminate Barga's employment.The Champaign County Court of Common Pleas upheld the village council's decision, concluding that Barga did not have a substantive or procedural right to have the entire disciplinary hearing open to the public. The court also found that the village council's decision was presumed valid and that Barga had not overcome this presumption.The Second District Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision regarding the Open Meetings Act, relying on a federal district court decision that exempted quasi-judicial proceedings from the Act. However, it found that the common pleas court had applied the wrong standard of review and remanded the case for a de novo review.The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the court of appeals' decision, holding that the village council violated the Open Meetings Act by deliberating in executive session after Barga requested a public hearing. The court emphasized that the plain terms of the Act required the council to consider the charges in a public hearing. The court remanded the case to the village council for a public hearing in compliance with the Open Meetings Act. View "Barga v. St. Paris Village Council" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Harmon and David Beasley, longtime employees of the City of Cincinnati and members of a city-employees union, were placed on leave under a Temporary Emergency Leave (TEL) program implemented in April 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. They used accrued paid leave during this period and appealed the city's decision to the Cincinnati Civil Service Commission, arguing that the city had not followed proper layoff procedures. The commission determined that the TEL program was not a layoff and denied their request for a hearing, instead holding an "appearance."Harmon and Beasley appealed the commission's decision to the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, which reversed the commission's determination and remanded the matter for a hearing. The city appealed to the First District Court of Appeals, arguing that the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction because the matter was governed by the collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) and the commission's decision was not the result of a quasi-judicial proceeding. The First District held that the common pleas court had jurisdiction under the CBA and R.C. 2506.01, as the commission's decision was an adjudication from a quasi-judicial proceeding.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the First District's judgment. The court held that Harmon and Beasley had a right to appeal the commission’s decision under R.C. 2506.01 and were not precluded by R.C. 4117.10. The court determined that the commission was required to hold a hearing under the Cincinnati Civil Service Rules, and its failure to do so did not divest the common pleas court of jurisdiction. The court concluded that the commission's decision was the result of a quasi-judicial proceeding, thus allowing the appeal to the common pleas court. View "Harmon v. Cincinnati" on Justia Law