Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

One Power Company challenged two orders issued by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) regarding Ohio Power Company’s fifth electric-security plan. The first issue concerned a protective agreement governing access to confidential discovery materials. One Power argued that the agreement unreasonably prevented its chief executive officer and expert witness, an employee, from accessing all discovery, which allegedly disadvantaged its ability to litigate. The second issue involved the commission’s decision to continue a nonbypassable basic-transmission-cost rider, meaning all customers—including those who purchase generation service from competitive suppliers—must pay the charge.After AEP Ohio filed its application for the fifth electric-security plan, One Power intervened and sought broader access to confidential materials. The PUCO’s attorney examiner denied One Power’s motion for a more permissive protective agreement, finding the proposed limits reasonable. One Power’s interlocutory appeal was also denied. At the evidentiary hearing, One Power renewed its objections, but the commission affirmed the examiner’s rulings and later denied rehearing. Regarding the transmission rider, the commission maintained its nonbypassable status, citing the need for further study before making major changes and noting consistency with prior practice. One Power’s rehearing application on this issue was also denied.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed whether the PUCO’s orders were unlawful or unreasonable. The court held that One Power failed to demonstrate particularized harm from the protective agreement and that the commission acted within its statutory and regulatory authority in continuing the nonbypassable rider. The court found no violation of state electric policy or commission precedent. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the PUCO’s orders. View "In re Application of Ohio Power Co." on Justia Law

Dayton Power and Light Company (DP&L), operating as AES Ohio, sought approval from the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) regarding whether its electric security plan (ESP) resulted in significantly excessive earnings for the years 2018 and 2019. The ESP is a mechanism for setting the standard generation rate for customers who do not choose a competitive supplier. During this period, DP&L also transitioned from its third ESP (ESP III) back to its first ESP (ESP I) after the commission invalidated a similar rider in another utility’s plan, following a decision by the Supreme Court of Ohio. DP&L’s parent company, AES Corporation, made substantial capital contributions to support future investments in grid modernization.PUCO consolidated several related cases and found that DP&L’s ESP resulted in excessive earnings of $3.7 million in 2018 and $57.4 million in 2019. However, PUCO determined that DP&L could offset these excessive earnings with its commitment to future capital investments, and therefore, no refund to consumers was required. PUCO also found that DP&L’s ESP passed the required quadrennial review tests, including a prospective analysis of earnings and a comparison to market-rate offers. The Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel (OCC) appealed, challenging the refusal to order refunds and the continued collection of a rate-stabilization charge. DP&L filed a protective cross-appeal, asserting alternative grounds for affirmance.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that PUCO was not authorized under R.C. 4928.143(F) to allow DP&L to retain significantly excessive earnings based solely on its commitment to future investments. The court reversed PUCO’s orders and remanded the case for a new significantly excessive earnings test analysis. The court rejected OCC’s challenge to the rate-stabilization charge, finding its legality was not at issue in this appeal, and also rejected DP&L’s alternative grounds for affirmance. View "In re Application of Dayton Power & Light Co." on Justia Law

Duke Energy Ohio, Inc. applied to the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) for an increase in natural gas distribution rates and approval of an alternative-rate plan. The Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel (OCC) filed an application for rehearing, which PUCO initially extended through a tolling order. However, following a decision in a related case, In re Application of Moraine Wind, L.L.C., it was determined that PUCO lacked the authority to issue such tolling orders, meaning the OCC’s application for rehearing was denied by operation of law after 30 days.The OCC did not appeal the denial by operation of law but instead filed a second application for rehearing challenging PUCO’s tolling order practice. After the Moraine Wind decision, PUCO journalized an entry on September 4, 2024, acknowledging the denial by operation of law and closing the case. The OCC then filed a third application for rehearing, which PUCO denied on October 2, 2024. The OCC subsequently filed a notice of appeal on October 25, 2024.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and denied Duke Energy’s motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that under R.C. 4903.11, the OCC’s appeal was timely because it was filed within 60 days of PUCO’s journalized entry on September 4, 2024, which constituted an “entry upon the journal of the commission of the order denying an application for rehearing.” Thus, the OCC properly invoked the court’s jurisdiction, and the appeal was allowed to proceed. View "In re Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Ohio Edison Company and the Corder family over the use of herbicides on property subject to easements held by Ohio Edison. The easements, granted in 1948, allow Ohio Edison to maintain electrical transmission lines and to trim, cut, and remove trees, limbs, underbrush, or other obstructions that may interfere with or endanger their infrastructure.Initially, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, believing it fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. The Seventh District Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the trial court had jurisdiction and remanded the case to resolve the ambiguity in the easements. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's jurisdictional ruling but vacated its analysis of the easements, remanding the case to the trial court.On remand, the trial court granted summary judgment to the Corders, holding that the easements did not permit the use of herbicides. The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, finding the easements ambiguous and concluding that they did not authorize the use of herbicides.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and determined that the easements unambiguously grant Ohio Edison the right to remove vegetation and other obstructions. The court held that the term "remove" includes the use of herbicides, as the easements do not restrict the methods of removal. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and remanded the case to the trial court to issue an entry awarding summary judgment to Ohio Edison. View "Corder v. Ohio Edison Co." on Justia Law

Moraine Wind, L.L.C. and other out-of-state wind farms applied to the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) for certification as eligible Ohio renewable-energy-resource-generating facilities. Carbon Solutions Group, L.L.C. (CSG), whose clients include Ohio-based renewable-energy suppliers, opposed the applications. PUCO approved the applications in September 2023. CSG filed an application for rehearing, which PUCO purported to grant for the limited purpose of further consideration, effectively extending the statutory deadline for a decision.CSG appealed PUCO's decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio, arguing that PUCO's failure to grant or deny the rehearing application within 30 days resulted in a denial by operation of law, as per R.C. 4903.10. PUCO moved to dismiss the appeal, claiming the court lacked jurisdiction because the rehearing application was still pending.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that PUCO's order granting rehearing for further consideration did not constitute a substantive grant of rehearing. The court emphasized that R.C. 4903.10 requires PUCO to grant or deny an application for rehearing within 30 days, and failure to do so results in a denial by operation of law. The court found that PUCO's practice of extending the deadline was not supported by statute and undermined the legislative intent for timely judicial review. Consequently, the court denied PUCO's motion to dismiss, affirming that CSG's application for rehearing was denied by operation of law, and the appeal was timely filed. View "In re Application of Moraine Wind, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The case involves the Ohio Power Company’s application for an increase in electric distribution rates. The key issue is whether the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) allowed Ohio Power to recover costs for providing generation services through its distribution rates, which is prohibited by state law. Ohio Power’s distribution rates should only cover noncompetitive services, while generation services are competitive and should be billed separately.In the proceedings before the PUCO, Ohio Power submitted an analysis to identify costs associated with providing Standard Service Offer (SSO) and customer-choice program services, which were potentially being recovered through distribution rates. However, the PUCO found the analysis insufficient and continued to set the rates for the retail-reconciliation rider and the SSO-credit rider at zero, meaning no costs were reallocated. The PUCO’s staff and other parties, including Interstate Gas Supply (IGS), contested Ohio Power’s analysis, arguing it did not provide a detailed cost-of-service study differentiating costs between shopping and nonshopping customers.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the PUCO’s decision. The court held that the PUCO’s findings were supported by evidence and that the commission complied with the statutory requirements. The court found that IGS failed to demonstrate that the PUCO’s decision was unlawful or unreasonable. The court also noted that the PUCO provided sufficient detail in its orders to explain its decision-making process, thus complying with R.C. 4903.09. The court rejected IGS’s arguments that the PUCO ignored uncontroverted evidence and failed to address material issues, concluding that the PUCO’s orders were based on a thorough review of the evidence presented. View "In re Application of Ohio Power Co." on Justia Law

The case involves East Ohio Gas Company, doing business as Dominion Energy Ohio ("Dominion"), and J. William Vigrass, individually and as executor of Virginia Vigrass’s estate. Dominion had requested access to Virginia's residence to inspect the gas meter located inside. However, due to Virginia's immunocompromised state and susceptibility to COVID-19, she denied Dominion access. Despite her account being paid in full, Dominion disconnected its natural-gas service to Virginia’s residence in January 2022. The disconnection resulted in freezing temperatures inside the residence, causing the water pipes to burst and damage the property. Virginia was later found dead in her residence.In the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Vigrass sued Dominion on claims relating to the shutoff of its natural-gas service to Virginia’s residence. Dominion moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio had exclusive jurisdiction over the claims as they related to a service issue. However, Judge Peter J. Corrigan denied Dominion’s motion, reasoning that he had jurisdiction over the complaint because Vigrass had asserted common-law claims.Dominion then filed an original action in prohibition in the Supreme Court of Ohio, asserting that Judge Corrigan patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over Vigrass’s action. Dominion sought an order to prevent Judge Corrigan from exercising jurisdiction and to vacate the orders he has issued in the underlying case.The Supreme Court of Ohio granted the writ of prohibition, ordering Judge Corrigan to cease exercising jurisdiction over the underlying case and directing him to vacate the orders that he had previously issued in the case. The court concluded that both parts of the test set forth in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. were met, indicating that the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio had exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The court also granted in part and denied in part Dominion's motion to strike certain parts of Vigrass's brief. View "State ex rel. E. Ohio Gas Co. v. Corrigan" on Justia Law

This case involves an appeal from the Tenth District Court of Appeals of Ohio. The appellant is the State of Ohio, represented by the Attorney General, and the appellees are FirstEnergy Corporation, Samuel Randazzo, and a consulting company controlled by Randazzo. Randazzo, the former chairman of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO), allegedly received a $4.3 million bribe from FirstEnergy Corporation. The state of Ohio filed a civil action against Randazzo and his consulting company to recover the proceeds of the bribe. The state sought attachment orders to prevent Randazzo from draining his bank and brokerage accounts. The trial court granted the state’s motion ex parte, without notice to Randazzo and his attorneys. After learning about the court's decision, Randazzo requested a hearing and moved to vacate the orders. The court held a hearing with both sides present and declined to discharge the orders of attachment. Randazzo appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which found the orders of attachment had been improperly granted. The Court of Appeals determined that the state had failed to meet its burden at the ex parte hearing to establish the irreparable injury requirement.Upon appeal by the state, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the orders of the trial court. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred by basing its decision on the ex parte requirements. The Supreme Court ruled that the court of appeals should have reviewed the trial court's denial of the motion to vacate the attachment rather than the irreparable injury requirement for an ex parte order. The Supreme Court concluded that the proper remedy for a party dissatisfied with an ex parte attachment order is to request a hearing on the order at which both parties may be heard. It also concluded that Randazzo failed to demonstrate any prejudice from the use of improper garnishment forms. View "State ex rel. Yost v. FirstEnergy Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio approving a stipulation that authorized Dominion Energy Ohio to implement its capital expenditure program rider (CEP Rider), holding that the Commission's orders were not unlawful or unreasonable.Dominion filed an application to recover the costs of its capital expenditure program by establishing the CEP Rider at issue. Dominion and the Commission jointly filed a stipulation asking the Commission to approve the application subject to the staff's recommendations. The Commission modified and approved the stipulation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not violate an important regulatory principle in adopting the 9.91 percent rate of return; (2) the Commission did not inconsistently apply its precedent; (3) the Commission did not violate Ohio Rev. Code 4903.09; and (4) Appellants' manifest-weight-of-the-evidence argument failed. View "In re Application of East Ohio Gas Co." on Justia Law

In this dispute over whether Ohio Power Company, a private agency authorized to appropriate property under Ohio Rev. Code 163.01(B) and (C), was entitled to any of the necessary presumptions set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 163.09(B)(1) in establishing the necessity of easements through eminent domain to upgrade electric transmission lines, the Supreme Court held that the court of appeals properly reversed the trial court's determination that the appropriations at issue were necessary.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the term "appropriation" in Ohio Rev. Code 163.09(B)(1) means the appropriation of the "parcel or contiguous parcels in a single common ownership, or interest or right therein," as identified in the petition filed by an agency under Ohio Rev. Code 163.05; (2) because neither Ohio Power's board of directors nor the Ohio Siting Board reviewed the appropriations Ohio Power was not entitled to a rebuttable presumption under section 163.09(B)(1)(a) or an irrebuttable presumption under section 163.09(B)(1)(c); and (3) Ohio Power was entitled to a rebuttable presumption under section 163.09(B)(1)(b) because it provided evidence of the necessity for the appropriations. The Court remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Ohio Power Co. v. Burns" on Justia Law