Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, the defendant was charged with two counts of rape after an incident in 2010. The victim testified that after taking a sip of her drink at a bar, she lost memory of events until she awoke in a parking lot, injured and with physical signs suggesting sexual assault. DNA evidence linked the defendant to the victim, and the victim asserted she had not consented to sexual activity. The investigation initially stalled for years until DNA analysis in 2020 identified the defendant as a suspect. The defendant denied any encounter with the victim or presence at the bar, but witness testimony placed him in the vicinity and contradicted his statements.On appeal, the Eighth District Court of Appeals vacated the defendant’s conviction for rape under R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c), finding that the State had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the victim was substantially impaired. The court also determined that defense counsel had been ineffective for not objecting to certain hearsay testimony presented at trial. Based on these conclusions, the appellate court vacated the conviction and remanded the case to the trial court.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and found that the Eighth District had applied the wrong legal standard in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence. The Supreme Court held that the State only needed to present adequate evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, that the defendant knew or had reasonable cause to believe the victim was substantially impaired. The Court also found no ineffective assistance of counsel, as the contested testimony did not undermine the trial’s outcome. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the appellate court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings on the remaining claims. View "State v. McClain" on Justia Law

A child, A.S., was adjudicated dependent in 2017 after her mother, C.S., tested positive for drugs at the birth of another child. Temporary custody was granted to the child's paternal grandparents, while the mother entered treatment. After successfully completing her case plan, in 2019, the mother was granted shared legal custody of A.S. with the father, and the case was closed. In 2021, due to the father's illness, the mother was made the residential parent for school purposes. In 2023, following the father's death, the grandparents sought legal custody, citing concerns about the mother's drug history, her marriage to a sex offender, and truancy issues. The mother had limited interaction with A.S. at this time, and evidence was presented regarding her husband’s criminal history and A.S.'s discomfort around him.The Summit County Juvenile Court granted legal custody of A.S. to the grandparents without first finding the mother unsuitable. The mother objected, arguing her parental rights required a finding of unsuitability before custody could be transferred to nonparents. The juvenile court overruled her objections, reasoning that the prior dependency adjudication established unsuitability, and that R.C. 2151.42(B) controlled, requiring only a determination of changed circumstances and best interest. The mother appealed.The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the juvenile court did not need to find the mother unsuitable before awarding custody to nonparents, since the child had previously been adjudicated dependent. This decision conflicted with precedent from the Eighth District Court of Appeals (In re B.K., 2013-Ohio-1190).The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that when a natural parent has regained legal custody after a dependency finding and the dependency case is closed, a juvenile court may not terminate that custody order under R.C. 2151.42(B) without first finding that the parent has become unsuitable. The judgment of the Ninth District was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re A.S." on Justia Law

A juvenile dropped a sandbag from an overpass bridge undergoing reconstruction in Toledo, Ohio, resulting in the death of Marquise Shawndell Byrd, a vehicle passenger traveling on Interstate 75. At the time of the incident, the bridge's north side was closed for reconstruction, including removal of the existing vandal-protective fencing, while the south side remained open to pedestrian traffic with its fencing intact. The Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT) managed the reconstruction, and the project contractor used sandbags to secure traffic barricades and signage. Prior to the incident, there had been no reported vandalism or safety concerns at the site.The estate of Byrd, represented by Patricia Wilkes, brought a wrongful death action against ODOT in the Ohio Court of Claims, alleging negligence in failing to mitigate dangerous conditions by allowing sandbags to remain accessible and not erecting temporary protective fencing. The Court of Claims denied ODOT’s motion for summary judgment on immunity grounds but ultimately found that the estate had not proven ODOT’s liability after trial. On appeal, the Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that ODOT was not immune and liable for Byrd’s death, remanding for a determination of damages.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that ODOT’s decision not to install temporary vandal-protective fencing on the bridge’s north side during reconstruction was a basic policy decision involving a high degree of discretion, granting ODOT discretionary immunity from the negligence suit under R.C. 2743.02. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the appellate court’s judgment and remanded the case to the Court of Claims with instructions to dismiss the action. View "Wilkes v. Ohio Dept. of Transp." on Justia Law

An incarcerated individual submitted two separate public records requests to a police department in Ohio, one in March 2024 and another in March 2025. The first request, sent from an email account not in his own name and using a contraband cellphone from prison, sought ten categories of documents, including personnel records, budget materials, and complaints against officers. This email was inadvertently diverted to the department’s spam folder and went unnoticed for over a year. The second request, allegedly sent from an account in his own name, sought five items, including records of administrative leave, budget reports, payroll information, and complaints. Shortly after sending the second request, the individual initiated an action seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the department to produce records responsive to both requests.Upon receiving the mandamus complaint, the Put-in-Bay Police Department investigated and discovered the March 2024 email in its spam folder, then promptly responded to both requests, providing available records and written explanations for items that did not exist. The department stated that some requested records, such as use-of-force reports and booking-and-release policies, were not maintained. The department also challenged the applicability of recent statutory amendments barring inmates from receiving statutory damages, but the Supreme Court of Ohio determined those amendments did not apply to this action because it was filed before their effective dates.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that the relator failed to rebut the department’s attestations that all responsive records had been produced. The court found no clear or convincing evidence that additional records existed or that the department unreasonably delayed its responses, particularly given the circumstances surrounding the March 2024 request. Thus, the court denied the writ of mandamus, statutory damages, and court costs. View "State ex rel. Harris v. Put-in-Bay Police Dept." on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with felonious assault and two counts of discharging a firearm into a habitation, following an incident in which he shot at an individual inside his own house and at least one bullet struck a neighboring residence. The defendant claimed self-defense, asserting that the person he shot at was armed and threatening, although security footage revealed the alleged aggressor did not touch his weapon during the encounter. The jury acquitted the defendant of felonious assault but convicted him on both counts of discharging a firearm into a habitation.The Seventh District Court of Appeals reviewed the case after the defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on transferred self-defense, a doctrine he had not requested at trial. The appellate court found that the conviction relating to one residence was unsupported by sufficient evidence and vacated it, but reversed the other conviction, concluding that the trial court’s failure to instruct on transferred self-defense constituted plain error. The court reasoned that clearer instructions might have affected the outcome and remanded the matter for retrial on the remaining count.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio examined whether the omission of a transferred self-defense instruction amounted to plain error under Criminal Rule 52(B). The court held that such an error was not “plain” because current law did not clearly require the instruction. Furthermore, the defendant had not demonstrated that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the instruction been given. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Seventh District Court of Appeals and remanded the case for consideration of the defendant’s sentencing challenge. View "State v. Bradley" on Justia Law

An incarcerated individual submitted 73 public-records requests over ten days to various offices and employees within a state corrections department, a privately managed prison facility, and a food services provider. The requests sought records-retention schedules, records-retention policies, and public-records policies for the years 2023 or 2024, including department-specific documents from areas such as laundry, dental care, religious services, commissary, and education. After not receiving the documents he believed responsive, the requester filed a lawsuit seeking a writ of mandamus to compel production, statutory damages totaling $73,000, and court costs.The Supreme Court of Ohio previously dismissed claims against individual employees of the prison but allowed claims against the corrections department, the private prison manager, the facility, the food services provider, and certain employees. The corrections department and the private prison manager subsequently provided general records-retention and public-records policies, as well as a records-retention schedule. The requester argued these were insufficient, insisting he sought department-specific policies and schedules. Additional motions filed by the requester, including for default judgment and injunctive relief, were also considered.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the requester failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the department-specific records he sought existed. The court found that the general policies provided applied to all departments and that separate department-specific policies did not exist. As such, the requester could not establish a clear legal right to relief or that any respondent failed to comply with obligations under the Public Records Act. The court also held that the private food-services provider was presumed not subject to the Public Records Act, and the requester failed to rebut that presumption. The court denied the writ, statutory damages, court costs, and all other motions. View "State ex rel. Ellis v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr." on Justia Law

A corporation that manufactures generic prescription drugs sells its products to wholesale distributors, who then sell the drugs to retail pharmacies. The manufacturer invoices distributors at a “list price,” but it negotiates separate agreements with retailers for lower prices. When a distributor sells to a retailer, it pays the manufacturer the lower negotiated price rather than the list price, deducting the difference (known as a “chargeback”) at the time of payment. This chargeback practice is common in the pharmaceutical industry, and about 97% of the manufacturer’s sales to distributors use this arrangement.Following an audit, the Ohio Department of Taxation determined that the manufacturer had underreported its gross receipts for the purposes of Ohio’s commercial-activity tax (CAT) by reporting only the amounts it actually received, rather than the higher list prices shown on invoices to distributors. The tax commissioner assessed additional taxes based on the list price. The manufacturer challenged the assessment, arguing that only the amounts actually received should count as gross receipts. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) agreed with the manufacturer, finding that only the amounts actually realized were subject to the CAT, and reversed the tax commissioner’s assessment.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the BTA’s decision. The court held that, under the CAT statute, “gross receipts” means the “amount realized” from a transaction. The court concluded that the amount realized is the sum actually received by the manufacturer from the distributors (i.e., the negotiated price with the retailer), not the list price invoiced. Thus, only the actual payments received—excluding the chargeback amounts—are subject to the CAT. The Supreme Court of Ohio therefore affirmed the BTA’s decision in favor of the manufacturer. View "Perrigo Sales Corp. v. Harris" on Justia Law

Two individuals filed an initiative petition with Wilmington city officials, proposing a new ordinance to regulate data centers and their campuses. The ordinance would set standards for noise, lighting, emissions, generator-testing, water use, and heat generation, among other things. A key feature of the proposed ordinance was the creation of a “private right of action,” allowing residents within certain distances of a data center to sue its owner or operator for alleged violations of these standards, with the possibility of injunctive relief, penalties, and attorney’s fees.After the petition was filed and signatures validated, the Wilmington city auditor certified its sufficiency and validity, but did not opine on whether it was within the city’s initiative power. The Clinton County Board of Elections declined to certify the petition for the ballot, determining that the ordinance was not within the municipality’s power because it sought to create a new private cause of action. The board reaffirmed this decision after a hearing requested by one petitioner.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the mandamus action seeking to compel the board to certify the petition. The court held that the proposed ordinance was outside the municipal initiative power because it would create a new cause of action, which municipalities are not authorized to do. The court relied on its prior decisions, including State ex rel. Bolzenius v. Preisse and State ex rel. Flak v. Betras, and rejected arguments that the ordinance merely restated existing statutory remedies. The court also rejected a First Amendment challenge, finding no unconstitutional prior restraint. The Supreme Court of Ohio denied the writ of mandamus, upholding the board’s decision not to certify the initiative for the ballot. View "State ex rel. Kidd v. Clinton Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

CheckFree Services Corporation, a subsidiary of Fiserv, Inc., provides financial-services products to banks and merchants, primarily offering debit authorization and disbursement authorization services, along with ancillary services supporting these core offerings. For the period July 2011 to June 2015, CheckFree collected sales tax from customers for these services and later sought a refund, claiming its services were not subject to Ohio’s sales-tax law. CheckFree obtained customer approval to seek refunds on their behalf and would remit any refund received to its customers.The Ohio Tax Commissioner denied CheckFree’s refund application, finding insufficient evidence of entitlement. CheckFree appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA), which held a hearing with evidence and testimony from CheckFree employees. The BTA vacated the Tax Commissioner’s final determination and remanded the case for further proceedings. The BTA found CheckFree’s debit-authorization service nontaxable, referencing Marc Glassman, Inc. v. Levin, 2008-Ohio-3819. However, the BTA determined that the taxability of ancillary services must be independently evaluated using the true-object test, as established in Cincinnati Fed. S. & L. Co. v. McClain, 2022-Ohio-725. The BTA’s analysis of the disbursement-authorization service was unclear, leading to differing interpretations by the parties.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the BTA’s decision for reasonableness and lawfulness. The court concluded that the BTA’s lack of clarity regarding the taxability of CheckFree’s disbursement-authorization service prevented meaningful judicial review. The Supreme Court vacated the BTA’s decision in part and remanded the case, instructing the BTA to clarify its analysis of disbursement authorization and to independently evaluate the taxability of each ancillary service under the true-object test. The court did not disturb the BTA’s determination that debit authorization was nontaxable. View "CheckFree Servs. Corp. v. Harris" on Justia Law

Several companies sought to develop a property in Centerville, Ohio, proposing a gas station, convenience store, and drive-through restaurant. The Centerville Planning Commission approved their major site plan, but some community members, including Bethany Village and Epiphany Evangelical Lutheran Church, opposed the project and appealed to the Centerville City Council. The city council reversed the planning commission’s approval, blocking the development.After the city council’s reversal, the companies filed two actions in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. The first was an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506, challenging the council’s decision. The second was a separate lawsuit seeking damages and declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming the city, city council, and other interested parties as defendants. The city and council removed the § 1983 action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The administrative appeal succeeded, with the common pleas court finding the city council’s reversal was improper.Following the administrative appeal’s outcome, the federal court questioned whether the doctrine of res judicata barred the § 1983 action, since it arose from the same transaction as the administrative appeal. The federal court noted conflicting precedents and certified the question to the Supreme Court of Ohio.The Supreme Court of Ohio answered the certified question in the negative, holding that res judicata does not bar a party from bringing claims for damages or declaratory relief in a subsequent action when such claims could not have been brought within an R.C. Chapter 2506 administrative appeal. The court clarified that administrative appeals are limited to judicial review and cannot address damages or declaratory relief, so claim preclusion does not apply to those subsequent claims. View "Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville" on Justia Law