Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

An incarcerated individual submitted two separate public records requests to a police department in Ohio, one in March 2024 and another in March 2025. The first request, sent from an email account not in his own name and using a contraband cellphone from prison, sought ten categories of documents, including personnel records, budget materials, and complaints against officers. This email was inadvertently diverted to the department’s spam folder and went unnoticed for over a year. The second request, allegedly sent from an account in his own name, sought five items, including records of administrative leave, budget reports, payroll information, and complaints. Shortly after sending the second request, the individual initiated an action seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the department to produce records responsive to both requests.Upon receiving the mandamus complaint, the Put-in-Bay Police Department investigated and discovered the March 2024 email in its spam folder, then promptly responded to both requests, providing available records and written explanations for items that did not exist. The department stated that some requested records, such as use-of-force reports and booking-and-release policies, were not maintained. The department also challenged the applicability of recent statutory amendments barring inmates from receiving statutory damages, but the Supreme Court of Ohio determined those amendments did not apply to this action because it was filed before their effective dates.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that the relator failed to rebut the department’s attestations that all responsive records had been produced. The court found no clear or convincing evidence that additional records existed or that the department unreasonably delayed its responses, particularly given the circumstances surrounding the March 2024 request. Thus, the court denied the writ of mandamus, statutory damages, and court costs. View "State ex rel. Harris v. Put-in-Bay Police Dept." on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with felonious assault and two counts of discharging a firearm into a habitation, following an incident in which he shot at an individual inside his own house and at least one bullet struck a neighboring residence. The defendant claimed self-defense, asserting that the person he shot at was armed and threatening, although security footage revealed the alleged aggressor did not touch his weapon during the encounter. The jury acquitted the defendant of felonious assault but convicted him on both counts of discharging a firearm into a habitation.The Seventh District Court of Appeals reviewed the case after the defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on transferred self-defense, a doctrine he had not requested at trial. The appellate court found that the conviction relating to one residence was unsupported by sufficient evidence and vacated it, but reversed the other conviction, concluding that the trial court’s failure to instruct on transferred self-defense constituted plain error. The court reasoned that clearer instructions might have affected the outcome and remanded the matter for retrial on the remaining count.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio examined whether the omission of a transferred self-defense instruction amounted to plain error under Criminal Rule 52(B). The court held that such an error was not “plain” because current law did not clearly require the instruction. Furthermore, the defendant had not demonstrated that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the instruction been given. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Seventh District Court of Appeals and remanded the case for consideration of the defendant’s sentencing challenge. View "State v. Bradley" on Justia Law

An incarcerated individual submitted 73 public-records requests over ten days to various offices and employees within a state corrections department, a privately managed prison facility, and a food services provider. The requests sought records-retention schedules, records-retention policies, and public-records policies for the years 2023 or 2024, including department-specific documents from areas such as laundry, dental care, religious services, commissary, and education. After not receiving the documents he believed responsive, the requester filed a lawsuit seeking a writ of mandamus to compel production, statutory damages totaling $73,000, and court costs.The Supreme Court of Ohio previously dismissed claims against individual employees of the prison but allowed claims against the corrections department, the private prison manager, the facility, the food services provider, and certain employees. The corrections department and the private prison manager subsequently provided general records-retention and public-records policies, as well as a records-retention schedule. The requester argued these were insufficient, insisting he sought department-specific policies and schedules. Additional motions filed by the requester, including for default judgment and injunctive relief, were also considered.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the requester failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the department-specific records he sought existed. The court found that the general policies provided applied to all departments and that separate department-specific policies did not exist. As such, the requester could not establish a clear legal right to relief or that any respondent failed to comply with obligations under the Public Records Act. The court also held that the private food-services provider was presumed not subject to the Public Records Act, and the requester failed to rebut that presumption. The court denied the writ, statutory damages, court costs, and all other motions. View "State ex rel. Ellis v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr." on Justia Law

A corporation that manufactures generic prescription drugs sells its products to wholesale distributors, who then sell the drugs to retail pharmacies. The manufacturer invoices distributors at a “list price,” but it negotiates separate agreements with retailers for lower prices. When a distributor sells to a retailer, it pays the manufacturer the lower negotiated price rather than the list price, deducting the difference (known as a “chargeback”) at the time of payment. This chargeback practice is common in the pharmaceutical industry, and about 97% of the manufacturer’s sales to distributors use this arrangement.Following an audit, the Ohio Department of Taxation determined that the manufacturer had underreported its gross receipts for the purposes of Ohio’s commercial-activity tax (CAT) by reporting only the amounts it actually received, rather than the higher list prices shown on invoices to distributors. The tax commissioner assessed additional taxes based on the list price. The manufacturer challenged the assessment, arguing that only the amounts actually received should count as gross receipts. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) agreed with the manufacturer, finding that only the amounts actually realized were subject to the CAT, and reversed the tax commissioner’s assessment.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the BTA’s decision. The court held that, under the CAT statute, “gross receipts” means the “amount realized” from a transaction. The court concluded that the amount realized is the sum actually received by the manufacturer from the distributors (i.e., the negotiated price with the retailer), not the list price invoiced. Thus, only the actual payments received—excluding the chargeback amounts—are subject to the CAT. The Supreme Court of Ohio therefore affirmed the BTA’s decision in favor of the manufacturer. View "Perrigo Sales Corp. v. Harris" on Justia Law

Two individuals filed an initiative petition with Wilmington city officials, proposing a new ordinance to regulate data centers and their campuses. The ordinance would set standards for noise, lighting, emissions, generator-testing, water use, and heat generation, among other things. A key feature of the proposed ordinance was the creation of a “private right of action,” allowing residents within certain distances of a data center to sue its owner or operator for alleged violations of these standards, with the possibility of injunctive relief, penalties, and attorney’s fees.After the petition was filed and signatures validated, the Wilmington city auditor certified its sufficiency and validity, but did not opine on whether it was within the city’s initiative power. The Clinton County Board of Elections declined to certify the petition for the ballot, determining that the ordinance was not within the municipality’s power because it sought to create a new private cause of action. The board reaffirmed this decision after a hearing requested by one petitioner.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the mandamus action seeking to compel the board to certify the petition. The court held that the proposed ordinance was outside the municipal initiative power because it would create a new cause of action, which municipalities are not authorized to do. The court relied on its prior decisions, including State ex rel. Bolzenius v. Preisse and State ex rel. Flak v. Betras, and rejected arguments that the ordinance merely restated existing statutory remedies. The court also rejected a First Amendment challenge, finding no unconstitutional prior restraint. The Supreme Court of Ohio denied the writ of mandamus, upholding the board’s decision not to certify the initiative for the ballot. View "State ex rel. Kidd v. Clinton Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

CheckFree Services Corporation, a subsidiary of Fiserv, Inc., provides financial-services products to banks and merchants, primarily offering debit authorization and disbursement authorization services, along with ancillary services supporting these core offerings. For the period July 2011 to June 2015, CheckFree collected sales tax from customers for these services and later sought a refund, claiming its services were not subject to Ohio’s sales-tax law. CheckFree obtained customer approval to seek refunds on their behalf and would remit any refund received to its customers.The Ohio Tax Commissioner denied CheckFree’s refund application, finding insufficient evidence of entitlement. CheckFree appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA), which held a hearing with evidence and testimony from CheckFree employees. The BTA vacated the Tax Commissioner’s final determination and remanded the case for further proceedings. The BTA found CheckFree’s debit-authorization service nontaxable, referencing Marc Glassman, Inc. v. Levin, 2008-Ohio-3819. However, the BTA determined that the taxability of ancillary services must be independently evaluated using the true-object test, as established in Cincinnati Fed. S. & L. Co. v. McClain, 2022-Ohio-725. The BTA’s analysis of the disbursement-authorization service was unclear, leading to differing interpretations by the parties.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the BTA’s decision for reasonableness and lawfulness. The court concluded that the BTA’s lack of clarity regarding the taxability of CheckFree’s disbursement-authorization service prevented meaningful judicial review. The Supreme Court vacated the BTA’s decision in part and remanded the case, instructing the BTA to clarify its analysis of disbursement authorization and to independently evaluate the taxability of each ancillary service under the true-object test. The court did not disturb the BTA’s determination that debit authorization was nontaxable. View "CheckFree Servs. Corp. v. Harris" on Justia Law

Several companies sought to develop a property in Centerville, Ohio, proposing a gas station, convenience store, and drive-through restaurant. The Centerville Planning Commission approved their major site plan, but some community members, including Bethany Village and Epiphany Evangelical Lutheran Church, opposed the project and appealed to the Centerville City Council. The city council reversed the planning commission’s approval, blocking the development.After the city council’s reversal, the companies filed two actions in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. The first was an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506, challenging the council’s decision. The second was a separate lawsuit seeking damages and declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming the city, city council, and other interested parties as defendants. The city and council removed the § 1983 action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The administrative appeal succeeded, with the common pleas court finding the city council’s reversal was improper.Following the administrative appeal’s outcome, the federal court questioned whether the doctrine of res judicata barred the § 1983 action, since it arose from the same transaction as the administrative appeal. The federal court noted conflicting precedents and certified the question to the Supreme Court of Ohio.The Supreme Court of Ohio answered the certified question in the negative, holding that res judicata does not bar a party from bringing claims for damages or declaratory relief in a subsequent action when such claims could not have been brought within an R.C. Chapter 2506 administrative appeal. The court clarified that administrative appeals are limited to judicial review and cannot address damages or declaratory relief, so claim preclusion does not apply to those subsequent claims. View "Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville" on Justia Law

The defendant, a Tier III sex offender, was employed through a job placement organization and assigned to work with a janitorial service. He regularly reported for work by meeting a company van in Cleveland, which then transported him and his crew to various jobsites. On the date in question, he had been working at a children’s camp in Geauga County for several weeks. During this period, he registered the business address of his employer with the appropriate sheriff’s office, but did not register the address of the camp where he physically performed his work.The Geauga County Court of Common Pleas indicted the defendant for failing to register a new “place of employment address” as required by Ohio Revised Code 2950.05(F)(2). The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the statutory phrase “place of employment address” was ambiguous and that he had not changed employers, only worksites. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the statute referred to the physical location where work was performed, not just the employer’s business address. The defendant then entered a no contest plea and was sentenced to community control. On appeal, the Eleventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the statutory language was not unconstitutionally vague and that the place of employment meant the location where the offender performed work.Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the phrase “place of employment address” in R.C. 2950.05(F)(2) means the physical environment where an offender performs work. The court found the statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant, who had worked at the camp for several weeks without registering that address as required. The judgment of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals upholding the conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

A group of qualified electors and residents of Sidney sought to amend the city charter to establish a procedure for recalling elected officials. They filed a petition with the city clerk containing 561 signatures, which they believed met the threshold for submission to the voters. Their proposal was submitted under a provision in the Sidney Charter allowing amendments as provided by the Ohio Constitution. However, the city clerk rejected the petition, citing noncompliance with Ohio Revised Code section 731.32, which she interpreted as requiring a certified copy of the proposed amendment to be filed before circulating the petition.Following this rejection, the electors initiated a mandamus action in the Supreme Court of Ohio. They requested an order compelling the city council to certify the petition to the county board of elections and further sought to have the board verify the signatures and place the amendment on the ballot if sufficient. They also sought attorney fees and court costs. The respondents argued that the petition was invalid for procedural reasons, including the application of R.C. 731.32. The board of elections had not yet reviewed the petition, as it had not been transmitted by the city clerk.The Supreme Court of Ohio found that R.C. 731.32 does not apply to proposed amendments to a city charter unless the municipal charter incorporates that statute into its amendment process; the Sidney Charter does not do so. Thus, the city clerk erred in rejecting the petition on this basis. The court granted a limited writ of mandamus, ordering the city clerk to transmit the petition to the county board of elections for a determination of sufficiency. If the petition is found sufficient, the city council must provide by ordinance for submission of the proposed amendment to the voters within the constitutional timeframe. The requests for attorney fees and court costs, and relief against the law director and board of elections, were denied. View "State ex rel. Turner v. Barhorst" on Justia Law

A group of residents and electors from the city of Trenton proposed an amendment to the city charter that would prohibit the construction of data centers within the city. They submitted a petition with 336 valid signatures to the city council to have this amendment placed on the ballot. The Butler County Board of Elections confirmed the number of valid signatures and reported that 1,277 voters participated in the most recent general municipal election, while 8,197 individuals were registered to vote at that time.The Trenton City Council convened and concluded that the petition did not contain a sufficient number of signatures, reasoning that the requirement was ten percent of all registered voters, not ten percent of votes cast. Accordingly, the council refused to certify the petition to the board of elections for inclusion on the ballot. The residents then filed an action for a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court of Ohio, seeking to compel the council to place the amendment before the voters and to recover court costs and attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the relevant constitutional provisions and its prior decisions. The court held that, consistent with Article XVIII, Sections 8, 9, and 14 of the Ohio Constitution and its decision in State ex rel. Huebner v. W. Jefferson Village Council, the required number of signatures for a charter amendment petition is ten percent of the votes cast in the last preceding general municipal election, not ten percent of all registered voters. The court found that the petitioners had exceeded the required number of signatures and ordered the city council to pass an ordinance certifying the petition to the board of elections for submission to the electors at a special election within the constitutionally specified timeframe. The court denied the request for court costs and attorney fees. View "State ex rel. Blankenship v. Trenton City Council" on Justia Law