Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Juvenile Law
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In this case, the Supreme Court of Ohio considered whether a juvenile, T.D.S., knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before providing statements to the police. The statements related to a homicide investigation involving another juvenile.The case originated from an incident in 2019, where the Police responded to a report of shots fired in an apartment building and discovered a male juvenile, S.G., with gunshot wounds. The police investigation led them to T.D.S., who was then 15 years old. During questioning at T.D.S.'s mother’s house, T.D.S. initially denied involvement in the shooting but later admitted to accidentally shooting S.G. while playing with a gun. After these statements, T.D.S. was read his Miranda rights and questioned further. He was subsequently charged with several offenses including murder and felonious assault.T.D.S. argued that the juvenile court should have granted a motion to suppress all the statements he made to the police officers, contending that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. After considering the totality of the circumstances, including T.D.S.'s age, prior criminal experience, and the nature of the police interrogation, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the lower courts' decisions that T.D.S. had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. The court found that the police did not engage in coercion and that T.D.S.'s waiver was not involuntary.T.D.S. also argued that his post-Miranda statements should be presumed inadmissible under the court's previous reasoning in a case called State v. Farris. However, the court found that T.D.S. had not properly raised this argument in the lower courts, so it was forfeited. Even if he had preserved the argument, the court found that the record did not support his claims under the Farris case.Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the lower courts, finding that T.D.S.'s post-Miranda statements were properly admitted at trial. View "In re T.D.S." on Justia Law

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In the case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, the issue was the quantum of evidence required to satisfy the probable-cause standard for determining whether a juvenile-court offender may be bound over to adult court. The case arose from an incident where a juvenile, E.S., was in a stolen car during a police chase, with his friend E.M., who was driving. After the car crashed, E.M. was found dead from a gunshot wound. A gun was found under the car’s passenger seat where E.S. had been seated, and E.S.'s DNA was found on the trigger and the grip of the gun. A bullet that had been fired from the gun was found in the driver's side front door. E.S. was charged in juvenile court with multiple offenses relating to the stolen car, the gun, and E.M.’s death.The juvenile court found probable cause for some charges but not for involuntary manslaughter or reckless homicide. The state appealed the juvenile court's decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s judgment. The state then appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The court held that the state had presented sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to believe that E.S. had committed the offense of involuntary manslaughter. The court found that the state’s evidence, both circumstantial and direct, was sufficient to establish probable cause. The court held that the juvenile court and the Court of Appeals had erroneously held the state to a higher burden than required for establishing probable cause in a bindover proceeding. The case was remanded back to the juvenile court for further proceedings. View "In re E.S." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that Defendant's sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Ohio Const. art. I, 9 when he was convicted as a juvenile and the trial court failed to consider his youth as a mitigating factor in sentencing.Defendant was charged with allegedly committing acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the offense of complicity to aggravated murder and other crimes. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of several charges, and the trial court sentenced him to an indefinite life sentence in prison with parole eligible after thirty-eight to forty-three years. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court's sentence was unconstitutional because the court failed to consider Defendant's youth as a factor in sentencing. View "State v. Morris" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals determining that Ohio Rev. Code 2152.84(A)(2)(b) was fundamentally unfair as applied to D.R., the juvenile in this case, and thus violated his right to procedural due process, holding that the court of appeals did not err.D.R. was adjudicated delinquent for sexually assaulting his friend when he was sixteen years old. The juvenile court suspended D.R.'s commitment and placed him on probation with conditions. The court classified D.R. as a Tier I offender and notified him that he had a duty to register as a sex offender. At the end of D.R.'s disposition, the magistrate terminated D.R.'s probation but continued his Tier I classification on the grounds that it lacked the statutory authority the terminate the classification. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute was fundamentally unfair as applied to D.R. and violated due process. View "In re D.R." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the juvenile court to transfer Appellant to adult court, holding that that court's decision to transfer Appellant to adult court was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence and that the juvenile court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction.After the juvenile court transferred jurisdiction over Appellant to the general division a jury found Appellant guilty of aggravated murder and murder for a killing that occurred when he was fourteen years old. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, concluding that the juvenile court did not violate Appellant's constitutional right to due process by transferring his case to the adult court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the standard of proof applicable to discretionary-bindover proceedings is a preponderance of the evidence, and the state need not produce affirmative evidence of nonamenability; (2) a juvenile court need not consider all potential juvenile dispositions when balancing the factors weighing in favor of and against transfer; and (3) the juvenile court improperly relinquished jurisdiction in this case. View "State v. Nicholas" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's convictions, entered upon his guilty plea, for involuntary manslaughter, having weapons while under a disability, and aggravated riot, holding that the juvenile court's probable cause determination was not subject to a manifest-weight challenge on appeal.The State filed a complaint in the juvenile court alleging that Defendant committed involuntary manslaughter and related offenses. The juvenile court determined that the State had established probable cause to believe that Defendant committed the offense and transferred Defendant's case to the general division. Defendant ultimately pled guilty. On appeal, Defendant argued that the juvenile court erred in transferring his case to the general division. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a juvenile court's probable cause determination at a mandatory binder hearing is not subject to a manifest-weight review on appeal. View "State v. Martin" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals holding that a person adjudicated a juvenile delinquent may not reopen his or her direct appeal from the adjudication based on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel under App.R. 26(B).The juvenile division of the court of common pleas adjudicated T.A. a delinquent child. The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed. T.A. subsequently filed an application to reopen his direct appeal under App.R. 26(B). The Ninth District denied the application, concluding that a child adjudicated delinquent may not apply for reopening of his or her appeal from the adjudication under the rule. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that App.R. 26(B) does not apply to juvenile adjudications. View "In re T.A." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that the general division of a common pleas court does not have jurisdiction over an offender who was arrested at the age of twenty for felonious acts he allegedly committed as a juvenile.Appellant was arrested at the age of twenty for acts he allegedly committed when he was seventeen years old, acts that would have been felonious had they been committed by an adult. Appellant was first indicted in the general division of the court of common pleas. The State recognized that the general division did not have jurisdiction over Appellant under Ohio Rev. Code 2152.02(C)(3) and 2151.23(I) and moved to dismiss the indictment. The indictment was dismissed, but because Appellant was twenty-two years old at that point, the State reindicted him in the general division the next day. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the jurisdiction of the general division of the court of common pleas is not invoked when a person is arrested at the age of twenty for felonious acts that he allegedly committed as a juvenile. View "State v. Hudson" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Appellant's conviction and vacated the conviction, holding that no adult court had jurisdiction over acts that were charged in but not bound over by the juvenile court.Appellant was sixteen years old when he was charged with committing the category-two offense of aggravated robbery while possessing a deadly weapon. Binding Appellant over to adult court would have been mandatory for counts one and two upon a finding of probable cause. The juvenile court found probable cause as to counts one through three and count five, a misdemeanor. After the case was transferred to the adult court, Appellant pled guilty to several charges. On appeal, Appellant argued that the adult court lacked jurisdiction to consider the charges for which the juvenile court found no probable cause. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that in the absence of a juvenile court's finding probable cause or making a finding that the juvenile is unalienable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system, no adult court has jurisdiction over acts that were charged in but not bound over by the juvenile court. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court granted Guernsey County Juvenile Court Judge David Bennett's motion to dismiss this habeas corpus action against him and sua sponte dismissed this action as to Muskingum County Juvenile Court Magistrate Erin Welch, holding that the petition was procedurally defective and failed to state a claim for relief.Petitioner filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of his minor son, E.G., naming Judge Bennett and Magistrate Welch as respondents and alleging that E.G.'s current detention was illegal. The Supreme Court dismissed the action because (1) the amended petition was defective for failure to satisfy Ohio Rev. Code 2725.04(D); (2) Petitioner failed to name a proper respondent; and (3) Petitioner's amended petition failed to stat a valid claim for habeas relief. View "Gomez v. Bennett" on Justia Law

Posted in: Juvenile Law