Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's sentences in connection with his conviction for robbery, kidnapping, abduction and rape, holding that the plain error doctrine was not properly applied by the court of appeals.Defendant was convicted following a jury trial. For purposes of sentencing, the trial court merged the abduction and kidnapping counts but concluded that the kidnapping and rape counts did not merge. Defendant did not object at sentencing to the trial court's failure to merge the kidnapping and rape counts. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court committed plain error by failing to merge the kidnapping and rape counts, which were allied offenses of similar import. View "State v. Bailey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that the trial court committed harmless error by not holding a competency hearing after one was requested by Defendant's counsel prior to trial, holding that the trial court's error was not harmless.In affirming Defendant's conviction, the appellate court rejected Defendant's argument that a new trial was warranted because of the trial court's failure to conduct a hearing on Defendant's motion for a competency evaluation. Specifically, the appellate court held that the error was harmless because "the record lacks sufficient indicia of incompetency." The Supreme Court reversed and vacated Defendant's convictions, holding that the trial court erred to Defendant's prejudice by not conducting a hearing on his motion for competency evaluation. View "State v. Hough" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction and sentence for felonious assault, holding that the court of appeals erred in determining that the State lacked standing to appeal the trial court's restitution under Ohio Const. art. I, 10a, also known as Marsy's Law.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of felonious assault in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2903.11(A)(1) and one count of felonious assault in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2903.11(A)(2). The trial court sentenced Defendant to an indefinite term of imprisonment of two to three years and denied the victim's request for restitution to compensate him for the medical bills he incurred as a result of the assault. Defendant appealed and the State cross-appealed, challenging the trial court's decision to deny restitution. The court of appeals affirmed, ruling that the State lacked standing to appeal the restitution order under Marsy's Law. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the matter for the court of appeals to consider the merits of the State's cross-appeal, holding that the scope of Marsy's Law was inadequate to answer whether the State was entitled to appeal the denial of restitution to the victim. View "State v. Fisk" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered in the negative a certified question regarding whether a provision in a commercial insurance policy, governed by Ohio law, providing coverage for a "direct 'loss'" to certain property covers a claim based on business shutdowns caused by COVID-19 (Covid), holding that the term "direct loss" did not include Plaintiff's Covid-related loss of the use of its offices for business purposes.Plaintiff, which owned and operated an audiology practice in northeast Ohio, held an all-risk commercial-property insurance policy issued by Defendant. Plaintiff filed suit alleging that Defendant had breached the contract by refusing to provide coverage for its Covid-related claim on the ground that there was no "direct physical loss or damage" to covered property. The federal court granted Defendant's motion for certification. The Supreme Court answered (1) the term "direct 'loss'" requires that there be some loss or damage to covered property that is physical in nature, and any potential exception to this rule did not apply in this case; and (2) therefore, the term "direct 'loss'" did not include Plaintiff's Covid-related loss of the ability to use covered property for business purposes. View "Neuro-Communication Services v. Cincinnati Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that an offender must receive separate prison terms for multiple firearm specifications when the criminal offenses to which those firearm specifications were attached had been merged as allied offenses.Appellant pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter, felonious assault, and having weapons while under a disability. The trial court merged the involuntary-manslaughter and felonious-assault counts but imposed a three-year prison term for each of the firearm specifications linked to those counts. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plain language of Ohio Rev. Code 2929.14(B)(1)(g) requires that offenders like Appellant receive separate prison terms for convictions on multiple firearm specifications. View "State v. Bollar" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court in favor of Appellee on his claims for conversion and unjust enrichment, holding that the trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on the conversion and unjust enrichment claims.Appellee filed suit against Appellant and others, asserting claims for breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment. During trial, Appellant moved for a directed verdict on Appellee's conversion and unjust-enrichment claims. The trial court denied the motion. Thereafter, the jury returned verdicts against Appellant on the conversion and unjust enrichment claims. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) there was insufficient evidence as a matter of law to support Appellee's claims of conversion and unjust enrichment against Appellant; and (2) therefore, the trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on these claims. View "Bunta v. Superior VacuPress, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a column heading in a schedule contained in a township zoning resolution was substantive and must be read as part of a resolution especially when the heading contains a term that is defined in the resolution and when ignoring the heading would change the resolution's meaning completely.The Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) affirmed the zoning inspector's decision denying Willow Grove's application for a zoning certificate. The court of common pleas reversed in part and affirmed in part and ordered the BZA to issue a zoning certificate. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a zoning certificate could not be issued because the proposed development was deficient in its plan for off-street parking. At issue on appeal was whether the minimum parking-space requirements set forth in Schedule 310.04 of the Olmsted Township Zoning Resolution (OTZR) applied to the swimming pool and community center in Willow Grove's proposed development plan. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the column headings in Schedule 310.04 are substantive and cannot be ignored or used as a mere guidepost when applying the off-street parking requirements of the OTZR; and (2) therefore, Willow Grove was entitled to approval of its application for a zoning certificate. View "Willow Grove, Ltd. v. Olmstead Township Bd. of Zoning Appeals" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that Ohio Rev. Code 2953.08(D)(3) was not unconstitutional for precluding appellate review of a sentence for aggravated murder and reversed the portion of the judgment declining to review Appellant's challenges to his aggravated-murder sentence based on Ohio Rev. Code 2953.08(D)(3), holding that remand was required.At issue was section 2953.08(D)(3), which states that a "sentence imposed for aggravated murder or murder pursuant to sections 2929.02 to 2929.06 of the Revised Code is not subject to review under this section." In State v. Patrick, 172 N.E.3d 952 (Ohio 2020), the Supreme Court held that section 2953.08(D)(3) does not preclude an appellate court from reviewing an offender's sentence for aggravated murder when the offender raises a constitutional claim regarding that sentence on appeal. Patrick was decided after the court of appeals affirmed Defendant's sentence. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the court of appeals properly upheld the constitutionality of section 2953.08(D)(3); and (2) in light of State v. Patrick, 172 N.E.3d 952 (Ohio 2020), the case must be remanded for the court of appeals to consider the merits of Appellant's constitutional challenges to his aggravated-murder sentence. View "State v. Grevious" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court to deny Appellant's petition for postconviction relief, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the court abused its discretion in denying Appellant's petition for postconviction relief.In 2016, Appellant was found guilty of aggravated murder, gross abuse of a corpse, and tampering with evidence. The trial court sentenced Appellant to life in prison without the possibility of parole for the aggravated murder. Appellant later filed a petition for postconviction relief arguing that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to present evidence about neonaticide, as it is currently understood, as a mitigating factor. The trial court denied the petition, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court's decision denying Appellant's postconviction petition was unreasonable and arbitrary and not based on competent and credible evidence. View "State v. Weaver" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals remanding to the probate court this matter involving a biological father (K.W.), who wanted to parent his child but did not preserve his right to do so under Ohio's adoption laws, holding that K.W. was not entitled to relief.Appellants, a married couple, filed a petition for legal adoption of H.P., K.W.'s biological child. The probate court determined that the adoption could proceed without K.W.'s consent because K.W. had failed to register with the putative father registry within fifteen days after H.P.'s birth. The court of appeals remanded the matter, holding that the probate correctly determined that K.W.'s consent to the adoption was not necessary but that K.W. had a "second status" as the biological father of H.P. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that K.W. could not be a legal father to H.P. under the plain language of the applicable statutes. View "In re Adoption of H.P." on Justia Law