Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals granting summary judgment to the chief of the oil-and-gas resources-management division of the Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR), the director of ODNR, the state, and the governor of Ohio (collectively, Appellees) on the grounds that Food and Water Watch (FWW) and FreshWater Accountability Project (FWAP) lacked standing to bring this action for a writ of mandamus to compel the ODNR to promulgate rules relating to the storage, recycling, treatment, processing, and disposal of waste substances associated with oil and gas drilling. The court held (1) because FWAP did not demonstrate that its individual members would have standing in their own right, its claim for associational standing failed; (2) this court declines to extend State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999); and (3) FWAP waived other arguments regarding standing and did not otherwise demonstrate that it had standing to proceed in this mandamus action. View "State ex rel. Food & Water Watch v. State" on Justia Law

To recover on a claim for asbestos-related injuries, the “cumulative-exposure theory,” which postulates that every non-minimal exposure to asbestos is a substantial factor in causing mesothelioma, is in consent with the test for causation set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 2307.96 and therefore not a sufficient basis for finding that a defendant’s conduct was a “substantial factor” in causing an asbestos-related disease. The Supreme Court thus reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, which held otherwise. The court then entered judgment for the defendant-manufacturer, holding that the evidence presented was not sufficient to show that exposure to asbestos from the manufacturer’s product was a substantial factor in causing the injury at issue. View "Schwartz v. Honeywell International, Inc." on Justia Law

In this dispute between Appellant, a nonprofit organization, and Appellees, three landowners, over a abandoned rail corridor, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals. Appellant sought to develop the corridor into a bike trail, but Appellees claimed ownership of the sections of the corridor adjacent to their properties. The Supreme Court held (1) an 1882 deed, by which part of the corridor was conveyed to a railroad company, created an interest in fee simple to the railroad company, and thus there was no reversion of the property to the successors-in-interest of the grantors, as alleged by two landowners; and (2) the trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of Appellant on one landowner’s adverse possession claim but not on the claims of the remaining two landowners. View "Koprivec v. Rails-to-Trails of Wayne County" on Justia Law

Preterm, a state licensed ambulatory surgical facility that provides abortion services, sued asserting that provisions of H.B. 59 (R.C. 3702.30, 3702.302-3702.308, 3727.60; 2317.56, 2919.19-2919.193, 4731.22, 5101.80, 5101.801, 5101.804) are unrelated to the state budget and should be declared void as violating the Single Subject Clause of Article II of the Ohio Constitution. The Written Transfer Agreement Provisions require that an ambulatory surgical facility “shall have a written transfer agreement with a local hospital" and prohibit a “public hospital” from entering into such an agreement with a facility “in which nontherapeutic abortions are performed or induced.” The Heartbeat Provisions provide that unless there is a medical emergency, no person shall perform or induce an abortion before “determining if the unborn human individual has a detectable fetal heartbeat” and notifying the pregnant woman of the results. The Parenting and Pregnancy Provisions permit the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services to offer TANF (federal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) block grant funds to certain entities “not involved in or associated with any abortion activities.” The Supreme Court of Ohio held that Preterm lacked standing to bring the challenge. Preterm has not proven it suffered or is threatened with direct and concrete injury from the passage of the 2013 state budget bill. View "Preterm-Cleveland, Inc. v. Kasich" on Justia Law

Since 1996, Ohio Department of Health regulations have required ambulatory surgical facilities to have a written transfer agreement with a hospital to facilitate treatment in the event of an emergency beyond the capability of the facility. ODH interprets Ohio Adm.Code 3701-83-19(E) to require ambulatory surgical facilities to have a transfer agreement with a hospital within 30 minutes’ transport from the facility. In 2013, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 3702.303(A), expressly requiring written transfer agreements to be negotiated with local hospitals. Capital operated with a negotiated written transfer agreement with the University of Toledo Medical Center but in April 2013, the university advised Capital that it would not renew its contract, which expired in July 2013. Capital continued operating without an agreement until January 20, 2014, when it negotiated a new agreement with the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor,52 miles from Capital’s facility. ODH revoked Capital’s health care facility license. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the law, rejecting an argument that its enactment impedes rights guaranteed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade. The matter is a policy decision made by the legislature, vesting the authority to license ambulatory surgical facilities in the ODH and defining the scope of judicial review of its decisions. Adhering to the doctrine of separation of powers, the court held that the order revoking Capital’s license was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law. View "Capital Care Network of Toledo v. Ohio Department of Health" on Justia Law

Since 1996, Ohio Department of Health regulations have required ambulatory surgical facilities to have a written transfer agreement with a hospital to facilitate treatment in the event of an emergency beyond the capability of the facility. ODH interprets Ohio Adm.Code 3701-83-19(E) to require ambulatory surgical facilities to have a transfer agreement with a hospital within 30 minutes’ transport from the facility. In 2013, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 3702.303(A), expressly requiring written transfer agreements to be negotiated with local hospitals. Capital operated with a negotiated written transfer agreement with the University of Toledo Medical Center but in April 2013, the university advised Capital that it would not renew its contract, which expired in July 2013. Capital continued operating without an agreement until January 20, 2014, when it negotiated a new agreement with the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor,52 miles from Capital’s facility. ODH revoked Capital’s health care facility license. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the law, rejecting an argument that its enactment impedes rights guaranteed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade. The matter is a policy decision made by the legislature, vesting the authority to license ambulatory surgical facilities in the ODH and defining the scope of judicial review of its decisions. Adhering to the doctrine of separation of powers, the court held that the order revoking Capital’s license was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law. View "Capital Care Network of Toledo v. Ohio Department of Health" on Justia Law

The delayed damage rule, which modifies the general rule for when a cause of action accrues, did not apply to this cause of action alleging negligence related to the procuring of a professional-liability insurance policy.The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court’s judgment dismissing the complaint filed by Appellee as untimely, holding (1) the delayed-damage rule does not apply to a cause of action alleging negligent procurement of a professional-liability insurance policy or negligent misrepresentation of the terms of the policy when the policy contains a provision specifically excluding the type of claim that the insured alleges it believed was covered by the policy; (2) the cause of action in such a case accrues on the date the policy is issued; and (3) therefore, the complaint filed by Appellee in this case was untimely. View "LGR Realty, Inc. v. Frank & London Insurance Agency" on Justia Law

The delayed damage rule, which modifies the general rule for when a cause of action accrues, did not apply to this cause of action alleging negligence related to the procuring of a professional-liability insurance policy.The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court’s judgment dismissing the complaint filed by Appellee as untimely, holding (1) the delayed-damage rule does not apply to a cause of action alleging negligent procurement of a professional-liability insurance policy or negligent misrepresentation of the terms of the policy when the policy contains a provision specifically excluding the type of claim that the insured alleges it believed was covered by the policy; (2) the cause of action in such a case accrues on the date the policy is issued; and (3) therefore, the complaint filed by Appellee in this case was untimely. View "LGR Realty, Inc. v. Frank & London Insurance Agency" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant’s convictions and ordering a new trial, holding that the trial court did not commit plain error in joining for trial two indictments charging Defendant first for aggravated robbery and related charges and later for attempting to intimidate a witness in the robbery case. Although Defendant did not object to the joinder in the trial court, he argued on appeal that the joinder prejudiced him and constituted plain error. The appellate court agreed that the joiner prejudiced Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no plain error in joining the two cases. View "State v. Gordon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant’s convictions and ordering a new trial, holding that the trial court did not commit plain error in joining for trial two indictments charging Defendant first for aggravated robbery and related charges and later for attempting to intimidate a witness in the robbery case. Although Defendant did not object to the joinder in the trial court, he argued on appeal that the joinder prejudiced him and constituted plain error. The appellate court agreed that the joiner prejudiced Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no plain error in joining the two cases. View "State v. Gordon" on Justia Law