Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant's request for a writ of mandamus against the State Highway Patrol Retirement System (HPRS), holding that Appellant was not entitled to an order compelling HPRS to vacate its finding that his disability was "not in the line of duty" and to grant disability retirement "in the line of duty."Appellant, a state trooper, applied to HPRS for permanent and total disability retirement benefits based on the diagnosis of an L5-S1 disk collapse and right-side disc bulge, as well as disintegration of L5-S1 vertebrae and arthritis. HPRS approved Appellant's disability but concluded that Appellant's condition did not occur in the line of duty. Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, but the court of appeals denied the request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to show that HPRS abused its discretion when it found that Appellant's injury did not occur in the line of duty. View "State ex rel. Seabolt v. State Highway Patrol Retirement System" on Justia Law

In this original action, the Supreme Court granted the City of Cleveland's request for a peremptory writ of prohibition against Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Judge Nancy M. Russo and ordered Judge Russo to vacate the orders that she previously entered in Ass'n of Cleveland Fire Fighters, Local 93 v. Cleveland, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-19-190679, and to cease exercising jurisdiction over that case, holding that the relief the Union was seeking fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Employment Relations Board (SERB).The International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 93 (the Union) filed an unfair-labor-practice charge with SERB, alleging that Cleveland's fire chief's decision to change fire fighters' 24-hour shift start times were unfair labor practices. The Union then filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment, a temporary restraining order, and injunctive relief in the common pleas court against the City of Cleveland and its fire chief, alleging that the chief's shift-time order violated Ohio Rev. Code 4117.08 because it involved a matter subject to collective bargaining. Judge Russo denied Defendants' motion to dismiss for subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted the City's request for a writ of prohibition, holding that the Union failed to assert any claims that fell outside the scope of the collective-bargaining rights created by Chapter 4117. View "State ex rel. Cleveland v. Russo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus and/or procedendo against Hamilton County Common Pleas Court Judge Melba Marsh, holding that Appellant did not have a clear legal right to require Judge Marsh to physically convey him back to court for a de novo resentencing hearing.Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to an indeterminate term of twenty-five years to life imprisonment. Appellant later filed a motion seeking to "Correct Judgment Entry Pursuant to Criminal Rule 36." Judge Marsh overruled the motion. The court of appeals affirmed in part but remanded the matter to the trial court to vacate the portion of the sentencing entry relating to postrelease control. Before Judge Marsh had taken any action on remand, Appellant filed this petition seeking to compel Judge Marsh to convey him to the common pleas court for a new sentencing hearing. Rather than convey Appellant to the trial court Judge Marsh issued an entry vacating his postrelease control sanction. Thereafter, the court of appeals granted Judge Marsh's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant did not have a clear legal right to be conveyed to court for resentencing. View "State ex rel. Roberts v. Marsh" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals granting a writ of mandamus compelling the Ohio Public Employees Retirement Board (the OPERS board) to grant Appellee membership status and service credit in the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System and denied the writ, holding that there was "some evidence" to support the OPERS board's conclusion that Appellee was an independent contractor rather than a contract employee.The OPERS board found that Appellee was an independent contract under Ohio Adm.Code 145-1-42. The court of appeals granted Appellee a writ of mandamus, concluding that the OPERS board abused its discretion in finding that Appellee was an independent contractor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the language of Appellee's contract, the fact that he was required to submit invoices in order to be paid for his work, and his ineligibility for benefits that were available to contract employees satisfied the "some evidence" standard supporting the conclusion that Appellee was an independent contractor. View "State ex rel. Sales v. Ohio Public Employees Retirement Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus against then director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (DRC), other officials at DRC, and the Ross Correctional Institution, holding that Appellant failed to make an allegation of present harm, which was required for mandamus to issue.Appellant, an inmate at the Ross Correctional institution, filed a grievance concerning his designation as a "white supremacist" in DRC records. DRC rejected the grievance. Appellant then filed his complaint for a writ of mandamus requesting an order compelling the removal of the label "white supremacist" from his DRC records. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals properly dismissed Appellant's complaint. View "State ex rel. Evans v. Chambers-Smith" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' denial of a writ of prohibition sought by Appellants against Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Judge Dick Ambrose, holding that the judge had jurisdiction over a breach of contract case against Appellants, a law firm and its then named partners.A company sued Appellants for the deductible due under a malpractice insurance policy. The named partners moved for partial judgment on the pleadings, arguing that they were not individually liable for the debts of the partnership. Judge Ambrose denied the motion and allowed the case to proceed with the partners as named defendants. A jury found against Appellants. Appellants then filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition, arguing that Judge Ambrose exceeded his statutory authority by permitting the trial to go forward against the named partners. The court of appeals granted summary judgment to Judge Ambrose. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants failed to show that Judge Ambrose's exercise of judicial power was unauthorized by law. View "State ex rel. Novak, LLP v. Ambrose" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for a writ of habeas corpus against the warden of the Chillicothe Correctional Institution, holding that the court of appeals correctly dismissed Appellant's petition.Appellant, an inmate, filed a habeas corpus complaint asserting that his maximum sentence of forty-five years in prison had expired. The court of appeals granted the warden's motion to dismiss, holding that because Appellant had an adequate remedy to raise his claims by way of a postconviction relief petition, Appellant failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in dismissing the petition. View "Ridenour v. Shoop" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus, holding that the court of appeals correctly dismissed Appellant's petition for noncompliance with Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(A).Appellant, an inmate at the Marion Correctional Institution, filed a mandamus petition alleging that the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction had miscalculated his maximum-sentence release date. Appellant attached to his compliant an affidavit listing three civil actions he had filed in the previous five years, but the list did not include a mandamus action Appellant had filed two weeks earlier. The court of appeals dismissed the case for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of section 2969.25(A). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the affidavit listed some, but not all, of Appellant's prior actions, the petition was correctly dismissed. View "State ex rel. Swanson v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation & Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals granting Sharon Vonderheide's petition for a writ of mandamus and ordering the Industrial Commission to vacate its decision denying Vonderheide's request for temporary total disability (TTD) compensation, holding that "some evidence" supported the Commission's decision.The Commission denied Vonderheide's request for TTD compensation after she had surgery on her right knee, finding that Vonderheide failed to establish that she was in the workforce and had wages to replace as of the date of her surgery. The court of appeals granted Vonderheide's mandamus petition, holding that the Commission's decision was an abuse of discretion because it was not based on "some evidence." The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred by disregarding the directive that an order that is supported by "some evidence" will be upheld; and (2) Vonderheide did not show a need for oral argument. View "State ex rel. Vonderheide v. Multi-Color Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's appeal of his conviction for failure to maintain reasonable control of a vehicle, a minor misdemeanor, on the ground that the judgment of conviction was not a final, appealable order because it did not include a sentence, holding that the judgment of conviction was not a final, appealable order.The trial court had discretion to impose a financial sanction on Appellant, but the judgment of conviction contained no sentence. The court of appeals dismissed Appellant's appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, ruling that there was no sentence imposed on Defendant and, therefore, no final, appealable order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly dismissed Appellant's appeal for lack of a final, appealable order. View "State v. White" on Justia Law