Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus against two court of common pleas judges, holding that the judges did not have a clear legal duty to provide the relief that Appellant sought.The judges in this case sentenced Appellant after he entered guilty pleas to criminal offenses and ordered him to pay court costs. Appellant filed this petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel the judges to vacate their orders imposing court costs and to hold hearings on his ability to pay court costs under Ohio Rev. Code 2947.23. The court of appeals granted the judges' motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant did not have a clear legal right to receive the relief he sought and failed to establish that he lacked an adequate remedy at law by which to challenge the trial courts' determinations. View "State ex rel. Martin v. Russo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's convictions for multiple counts of drug trafficking, holding that the warrant issued by a Sandusky County judge that allowed Drug Enforcement Agency agents sitting in Toledo (Lucas County) to listen to cell-phone calls of an alleged drug trafficker who was based in Sandusky County was valid because the government properly obtained the interception warrant in the Sandusky County Common Pleas Court.On appeal, Defendant argued that the warrant was invalid because the calls were intercepted in Toledo when the agents listened to them, and therefore, the warrant was issued by a judge in the wrong county. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) interception occurs both at the place where agents are listening and at the place where the phone is used and (2) Defendant's calls were intercepted - captured and redirected - by law enforcement in Sandusky County where Defendant used his cell phone to facilitate drug trafficking, and therefore, the interception warrant was properly obtained in Sandusky County. View "State v. Nettles" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that the prosecuting attorney failed properly to respond to a public-records request, holding that Appellant did not comply with Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(A).Appellant, an inmate, filed with his complaint an affidavit listing six civil actions he had filed within the previous five years. The court of appeals concluded that Appellant did not comply with section 2969.25(A)(4) because the affidavit did not provide any information describing the outcome of the actions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly dismissed the complaint because Appellant did not strictly comply with section 2969.25. View "State ex rel. Ware v. Walsh" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals denying Appellant's motion for relief from a judgment dismissing his mandamus action against the Ohio Adult Parole Authority and the Bureau of Sentence Computation (collectively, the APA), holding that the court of appeals properly denied Appellant's motion for relief from judgment.In his complaint for a writ of mandamus Appellant, an inmate, alleged that he should have been eligible for parole in 2019 but that the APA had his first hearing scheduled for 2024. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint after adopting the recommendation of the magistrate. Appellant then filed a motion for relief from judgment. The court of appeals denied the motion, ruling that Appellant was barred from asserting that the court of appeals committed any error in adopting the magistrate's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's propositions of law were either waived or without merit. View "State ex rel. Franks v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying the request of Gary Bisdorf's former employer, Navistar, Inc., for a writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its award of permanent total disability (PTD) compensation to Bisdorf, holding that Navistar was not entitled to an extraordinary remedy in mandamus.In its complaint for a writ of mandamus Navistar asserted that the Commission had abused its discretion in several ways. The magistrate recommended that the court of appeals deny the writ. The court adopted the magistrate's recommendation. Navistar appealed and moved for oral argument. After briefing in the Supreme Court was complete, Bisdorf died. Navistar filed a motion to continue the case. The Supreme Court granted Navistar's motion to continue the case, affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, and denied Navistar's motion for oral argument, holding that Navistar did not make a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the Commission abused its discretion by entering an order not supported by evidence in the record. View "State ex rel. Navistar, Inc. v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals granting a limited writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its decision denying the request of Paul Digiacinto for permanent total disability (PTD) compensation and to hold a new hearing on Digiacinto's PTD application, holding that the Tenth District erred in holding that the Commission's failure to mention an ALJ's earlier decision granting Digiacinto's request for social security disability benefits in its order was an abuse of discretion.In 2001, Digiacinto suffered a workplace injury. In 2003, an ALJ granted Digiacinto's request for social security disability benefits. In 2015, Digiacinto filed a third application for PTD compensation. The Commission denied the application, concluding that Digiacinto had voluntarily abandoned the workforce, rendering him ineligible for compensation. Digiacinto then brought this mandamus action seeking an order for the Commission to vacate its order denying his PTD application. The court of appeals granted a limited writ, holding that the Commission's failure to mention the ALJ's decision in its order was an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commission was not required to discuss the ALJ's decision; and (2) the ALJ's decision was not key to the success or failure of the PTD application. View "State ex rel. Digiacinto v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions for aggravated murder and other felonies and the death sentence imposed by the county court of common pleas, holding that Defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel when defense counsel, during voir dire, failed to question or strike a racially biased juror.On appeal, Defendant presented seventeen propositions of law. In his seventeenth proposition of law, Defendant argued that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to question and strike a juror who made racially biased statements on her juror questionnaire and that counsel's deficient performance denied him a fair and impartial jury. The Supreme Court found this issue dispositive and reversed Defendant's convictions and sentence, holding that defense counsel's performance during voir dire was objectively unreasonable and that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Defendant in violation of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. The Court remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial. View "State v. Bates" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the probate court finding that a single payment of child support made by Father did not amount to the provision of support "as required by law or judicial decree" and therefore concluding that Father's consent was not required for the adoption of his child, holding that the single payment was insufficient to preserve Father's right to object to the adoption of his child.Father was a biological parent of the child who was ordered by a court to pay child support of $85 per week. The only payment Father made in the year before the filing of the adoption petition was a single payment of $200, constituting less than five percent of his annual obligation. On appeal, Father asserted that under Ohio Rev. Code 3107.07(A), provision of any amount of maintenance and support during the statutory one-year period constituted maintenance and support "as required by law or judicial decree." The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that, under the plain language of the statute, Father did not provide for the maintenance and support of the child "as required by law or judicial decree" for the requisite one-year period. View "In re Adoption of A.C.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing the State's appeal from the order of the trial court granting Defendant's motion for a new trial based on insufficient evidence, holding that the court of appeals was not correct in dismissing the State's appeal.The court of appeals premised its dismissal of the State's appeal on principles of double jeopardy and on its application of Ohio Rev. Code 2945.67. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the double jeopardy protection does not prevent the State from appealing the trial court's order granting the motion for a new trial but, rather, only prevents the State from retrying the defendant in the event the State is unsuccessful on appeal; and (2) section 2945.67, which delineates when the State may appeal in a criminal case, does not require dismissal of the State's appeal. View "State v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that a court may consider evidence beyond the four corners of a search warrant affidavit in determining whether an officer reasonably and in good faith relied on that warrant.Defendant was indicted for sexual imposition and voyeurism. Defendant filed a motion to suppress seeking to invalidate a search warrant authorizing the search of his home on the basis that the warrant affidavit contained materially false statements. The trial court ultimately denied the motion to suppress. At issue on remand was whether a detective's testimony regarding his unrecorded conversation with the judge at the time of the approval of the warrant was admissible at the suppression hearing. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the testimony was inadmissible and that the good-faith exception did not apply. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in deciding whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to a search conducted under a search warrant, a court can consider sworn but unrecorded oral information that the police gave to the judge; and (2) because application of the exclusionary rule would not serve to deter any bad police conduct, suppression was unwarranted. View "State v. Dibble" on Justia Law