Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint alleging that his former employer wrongfully terminated him during his probationary period, holding that the civil-service statutes invoked by Plaintiff do not express a clear public policy providing the basis for a wrongful-discharge claim by a probationary employee.Plaintiff brought this complaint alleging that the Ohio Department of Veterans Services, at the direction of the governor's office, wrongfully terminated him during his probationary period. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Ohio Rev. Code 124. 27(B) and 124.56 do not express a clear public policy that provides the basis for a wrongful-discharge claim for civil service employees terminated during their probationary period, and therefore, the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint. View "Miracle v. Ohio Department of Veterans Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part Relator's request for a peremptory writ in mandamus seeking to compel responses to a request for public records, holding that Larry Greene, the public-records custodian for the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, was required to provide Relator copies of requested pages of a legal-mail log, if they existed.Relator, an inmate, submitted a public-records request to Greene seeking a legal-mail log for February 27, 2019 and a copy of an envelope containing legal mail from the federal district court from that same date. Greene did not produce any documents. Relator then commenced this action for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, holding (1) because Greene did not dispute that if the institution maintained a log of incoming mail that log would qualify as a public record, Greene is ordered to provide the requested records; and (2) because the institution does not maintain the original envelopes enclosing incoming mail, Greene has no responsive documents to this request. View "State ex rel. McDougald v. Greene" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and held that, unless otherwise authorized by statute, a trial court may not impose community-control sanctions on one felony count to be served consecutively to a prison term imposed on another felony count.Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor. On two of the counts the court ordered Defendant to serve a five-year prison term, with each term to run consecutively to the other. On the third count, the court ordered Defendant to serve a five-year term of community control to be served consecutively to the prison terms imposed on the other two counts. The court of appeals affirmed the sentence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no statutory basis for ordering that a defendant be assessed for placement in a community-based correctional facility after that defendant's completion of a prison term imposed for another offense in that case. View "State v. Hitchcock" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court declaring that the Village of Bratenahl did not violate Ohio's Open Meetings Act, Ohio Rev. Code 121.22, by conducting public business by secret ballot, holding that the use of secret ballots in a public meeting violates the Open Meetings Act.The Bratenahl Village Council voted by secret ballot to elect a president pro tempore. Plaintiffs brought this suit seeking a declaratory judgment that Bratenahl violated the Open Meetings Act. The trial court awarded summary judgment to Bratenahl. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Open Meetings Act does not permit a governmental body to take official action by secret ballot and that maintaining secret ballot slips as public records does not cure a section 121.22 violation. View "State ex rel. Bratenahl v. Bratenahl" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's judgment granting Plaintiff's motion to certify a class action, holding that when a class-certification case originates with a single named plaintiff and that plaintiff is not subject to an arbitration agreement that was entered into by unnamed putative class members, the defendant need not raise a specific argument referring or relating to arbitration in the defendant's answer.Plaintiff filed a class-action complaint against Defendant, his former employer. When Plaintiff moved to certify the case as a class action Defendant opposed the motion, asserting the defense of arbitration. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that Defendant waived any right of arbitration. The appellate court affirmed, determining that Defendant's failure to assert the arbitration defense in his answer or to seek to enforce the right to arbitration prior to its opposition to the certification was inconsistent with its right to assert the defense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because arbitration was not available as a defense at the time Defendant submitted its answer, Defendant could not waive a right to assert arbitration at that time; and (2) Defendant had no duty to raise an argument that Plaintiff failed to satisfy Civ.R. 23(A)'s typicality and adequacy requirements. View "Gembarski v. PartsSource, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that the Industrial Commission did not abuse its discretion when it found that Alfredo Pacheco was medically able to perform light-duty work offered by his employer, Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa) but reversed the conclusion that Alcoa did not make the light-duty job offer in good faith, holding that the court of appeals should not have determined whether the job was offered in good faith.Pacheco sustained an injury while working for Alcoa and received temporary total disability (TTD) compensation for approximately one year. Thereafter, Alcoa offered Pacheco light-duty employment. Pacheco accepted the offer and worked in the light-duty position for three weeks. Pacheco then submitted a renewed request for TTD compensation, which Alcoa denied. The Commission denied the request for TTD compensation based on a finding that the light-duty job was within Pacheco's medical restrictions. The court of appeals concluded that the evidence supported the Commission's finding but also concluded that the job offered by Alcoa was not offered in good faith. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that where the Commission did not address the question of whether the light-duty job offer was made in good faith, the court of appeals should not have made that determination. View "State ex rel. Pacheco v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its order denying the request of Joshua Pilarczyk for permanent total disability (PTD) compensation, holding that the court of appeals erred in relying on the report of Dr. Kenneth Gruenfeld in making its decision.Dr. Gruenfeld undertook an independent psychological evaluation of Pilarczyk at the request of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation and then issued a report stating that Pilarczyk was likely able to perform sustained remunerative employment despite his psychological disability. The Commission denied Pilarczyk's request for PTD compensation based in part on Dr. Gruenfeld's report. The court of appeals concluded that the Commission abused its discretion by denying PTD compensation based on Dr. Gruenfeld's report and issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Commission to vacate its order denying PTD compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Dr. Gruenfeld's report was equivocal and ambiguous, and therefore, it did not constitute "some evidence" in support of the Commission's determination that Pilarczyk could engage in sustained remunerative employment. View "State ex rel. Pilarczyk v. Geauga County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus against the warden of the Marion Correctional Institution, holding that Appellant's noncompliance with Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(C) was a sufficient reason to dismiss the petition.The court of appeals dismissed the petition because Appellant, an inmate, had failed to submit an inmate-account statement, as required by section 2969.25(C), and because it was clear that Appellant was not entitled to immediate release. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly dismissed Appellant's petition for noncompliance with section 2969.25(C). View "State ex rel. Ellis v. Wainwright" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the court of appeals in this construction dispute, holding that Ohio's construction statute of repose, Ohio Rev. Code 2305.131, applies to any cause of action, whether sounding in contract or tort, so long as the cause of action meets the requirements of the statute.Plaintiff filed this action against several defendants, companies involved in the design and construction of a public school building, alleging claims for breach of contract. Defendants argued that the statute of repose on section 2305.131 barred Plaintiff's claims because substantial completion of the project occurred more than ten years before the claims were filed. The trial court agreed and dismissed the claims as time barred. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that section 2305.131 does not apply to breach of contract claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 2305.131 applies to both contract and tort claims. View "New Riegel Local School District Board of Education v. Buehrer Group Architecture & Engineering, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's action seeking a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Christine Croce to vacate his sentences, merge certain offenses, and resentence him, holding that Appellant could have raised his claims by appealing his sentence.Appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated burglary, felonious assault, rape and kidnapping. Finding that Appellant's offenses were separate and should not be merged at sentencing the trial court imposed a prison term for each offense and ordered the terms to be served consecutively. Appellant later filed his mandamus action. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint, determining that Appellant had an adequate remedy at law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly determined that Appellant did not lack an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law because he could have raised his claims by appealing his sentence. View "State ex rel. Cowell v. Croce" on Justia Law