Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel a common pleas court judge to enforce the terms of an agreement the county prosecutor had reached with Appellant's wife to secure her testimony against Appellant, holding that the court of appeals did not err.The court of appeals granted the judge's motion for summary judgment, holding that Appellant was not entitled to mandamus relief because he had an adequate remedy at law and because his claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly found that Appellant had a plain and adequate remedy and law and that Appellant's claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. View "State ex rel. Phelps v. McClelland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held in this criminal case that the trial court has the ability to resentence de novo a defendant on a specific count after the sentence related to that count has been vacated on direct appeal and the defendant has been confined for the length of the original prison term that had been attached to that count.Defendant was found guilty of five charges. The court of appeals reversed Defendant's conviction on Count Two and modified two other convictions to reflect lower degrees of the offenses. Upon remand from the Supreme Court, the court of appeals reinstated Count Two but reduced the degree level of the offense. On remand, the trial court resentenced Defendant on Count Two, Count Three, and Count Five. The aggregate sentence after the remand was the same as Defendant's original aggregate sentence. The court of appeal reversed, holding that, by the time Defendant was resentenced, she had already served the original prison term on Count Two and therefore count not be resentenced on Count Two even though she had not completed her sentence for Count Five. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court had the authority to resentence Defendant de novo on Count Two. View "State v. Christian" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus against two court of common pleas judges, holding that the judges did not have a clear legal duty to provide the relief that Appellant sought.The judges in this case sentenced Appellant after he entered guilty pleas to criminal offenses and ordered him to pay court costs. Appellant filed this petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel the judges to vacate their orders imposing court costs and to hold hearings on his ability to pay court costs under Ohio Rev. Code 2947.23. The court of appeals granted the judges' motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant did not have a clear legal right to receive the relief he sought and failed to establish that he lacked an adequate remedy at law by which to challenge the trial courts' determinations. View "State ex rel. Martin v. Russo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's convictions for multiple counts of drug trafficking, holding that the warrant issued by a Sandusky County judge that allowed Drug Enforcement Agency agents sitting in Toledo (Lucas County) to listen to cell-phone calls of an alleged drug trafficker who was based in Sandusky County was valid because the government properly obtained the interception warrant in the Sandusky County Common Pleas Court.On appeal, Defendant argued that the warrant was invalid because the calls were intercepted in Toledo when the agents listened to them, and therefore, the warrant was issued by a judge in the wrong county. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) interception occurs both at the place where agents are listening and at the place where the phone is used and (2) Defendant's calls were intercepted - captured and redirected - by law enforcement in Sandusky County where Defendant used his cell phone to facilitate drug trafficking, and therefore, the interception warrant was properly obtained in Sandusky County. View "State v. Nettles" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that the prosecuting attorney failed properly to respond to a public-records request, holding that Appellant did not comply with Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(A).Appellant, an inmate, filed with his complaint an affidavit listing six civil actions he had filed within the previous five years. The court of appeals concluded that Appellant did not comply with section 2969.25(A)(4) because the affidavit did not provide any information describing the outcome of the actions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly dismissed the complaint because Appellant did not strictly comply with section 2969.25. View "State ex rel. Ware v. Walsh" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals denying Appellant's motion for relief from a judgment dismissing his mandamus action against the Ohio Adult Parole Authority and the Bureau of Sentence Computation (collectively, the APA), holding that the court of appeals properly denied Appellant's motion for relief from judgment.In his complaint for a writ of mandamus Appellant, an inmate, alleged that he should have been eligible for parole in 2019 but that the APA had his first hearing scheduled for 2024. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint after adopting the recommendation of the magistrate. Appellant then filed a motion for relief from judgment. The court of appeals denied the motion, ruling that Appellant was barred from asserting that the court of appeals committed any error in adopting the magistrate's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's propositions of law were either waived or without merit. View "State ex rel. Franks v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying the request of Gary Bisdorf's former employer, Navistar, Inc., for a writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its award of permanent total disability (PTD) compensation to Bisdorf, holding that Navistar was not entitled to an extraordinary remedy in mandamus.In its complaint for a writ of mandamus Navistar asserted that the Commission had abused its discretion in several ways. The magistrate recommended that the court of appeals deny the writ. The court adopted the magistrate's recommendation. Navistar appealed and moved for oral argument. After briefing in the Supreme Court was complete, Bisdorf died. Navistar filed a motion to continue the case. The Supreme Court granted Navistar's motion to continue the case, affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, and denied Navistar's motion for oral argument, holding that Navistar did not make a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the Commission abused its discretion by entering an order not supported by evidence in the record. View "State ex rel. Navistar, Inc. v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals granting a limited writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its decision denying the request of Paul Digiacinto for permanent total disability (PTD) compensation and to hold a new hearing on Digiacinto's PTD application, holding that the Tenth District erred in holding that the Commission's failure to mention an ALJ's earlier decision granting Digiacinto's request for social security disability benefits in its order was an abuse of discretion.In 2001, Digiacinto suffered a workplace injury. In 2003, an ALJ granted Digiacinto's request for social security disability benefits. In 2015, Digiacinto filed a third application for PTD compensation. The Commission denied the application, concluding that Digiacinto had voluntarily abandoned the workforce, rendering him ineligible for compensation. Digiacinto then brought this mandamus action seeking an order for the Commission to vacate its order denying his PTD application. The court of appeals granted a limited writ, holding that the Commission's failure to mention the ALJ's decision in its order was an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commission was not required to discuss the ALJ's decision; and (2) the ALJ's decision was not key to the success or failure of the PTD application. View "State ex rel. Digiacinto v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions for aggravated murder and other felonies and the death sentence imposed by the county court of common pleas, holding that Defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel when defense counsel, during voir dire, failed to question or strike a racially biased juror.On appeal, Defendant presented seventeen propositions of law. In his seventeenth proposition of law, Defendant argued that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to question and strike a juror who made racially biased statements on her juror questionnaire and that counsel's deficient performance denied him a fair and impartial jury. The Supreme Court found this issue dispositive and reversed Defendant's convictions and sentence, holding that defense counsel's performance during voir dire was objectively unreasonable and that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Defendant in violation of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. The Court remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial. View "State v. Bates" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the probate court finding that a single payment of child support made by Father did not amount to the provision of support "as required by law or judicial decree" and therefore concluding that Father's consent was not required for the adoption of his child, holding that the single payment was insufficient to preserve Father's right to object to the adoption of his child.Father was a biological parent of the child who was ordered by a court to pay child support of $85 per week. The only payment Father made in the year before the filing of the adoption petition was a single payment of $200, constituting less than five percent of his annual obligation. On appeal, Father asserted that under Ohio Rev. Code 3107.07(A), provision of any amount of maintenance and support during the statutory one-year period constituted maintenance and support "as required by law or judicial decree." The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that, under the plain language of the statute, Father did not provide for the maintenance and support of the child "as required by law or judicial decree" for the requisite one-year period. View "In re Adoption of A.C.B." on Justia Law