Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court accepted a state-law question certified to it by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division and answered that an insured is not permitted to seek full and complete indemnity under a single policy providing coverage for "those sums" that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay because of property damage that takes place during the policy period when the property damage occurred over multiple policy periods.Insured sued Insurer seeking an order requiring Insurer to pay all defense costs incurred in defending the underlying lawsuit and the amounts Insured paid to settle the action. Insurer filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration that Insured was not entitled to allocate all defense costs and indemnity to a single policy period when multiple policies and corresponding policy periods were triggered. At issue was whether contract language providing coverage for "those sums" should be treated like contract language providing coverage for "all sums." The Supreme Court answered the question of state law as set forth above but cautioned against using the answer as a blanket rule applicable to all policies with "those sums" language. View "Lubrizol Advanced Materials, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's original action seeking a writ of procedendo and/or mandamus to compel Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas Judge Melba Marsh to issue a corrected sentencing entry, holding that the court of appeals correctly dismissed the petition as moot.Appellant was convicted of murder with a repeat-violent-offender specification. Appellant later asked the trial court to correct his sentence, arguing that he had improperly been sentenced to postrelease control. On remand, Judge Marsh vacated the postrelease-control sentence. Appellant appealed that order. The court of appeals noted that the trial court had not set forth all the information required under Crim.R. 32(C) in a single document and dismissed the appeal for lack of a final, appealable order. Appellant then filed this original action seeking to compel Judge Marsh to issue a corrected sentencing entry that constitutes a final, appealable order. Judge Marsh issued a nunc pro tunc sentencing entry that constituted a final, appealable order. The court of appeals then dismissed the petition as moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Judge Marsh performed the act Appellant requested, the court of appeals dismissed the petition as moot. View "State ex rel. Roberts v. Marsh" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Judge Nancy Margaret Russo to vacate the consecutive prison sentences imposed on Appellant in 1987, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy at law and was barred from asserting additional claims of sentencing error he could have raised in his previous mandamus action.In 1987, Appellant was convicted of four counts of rape and one count of kidnapping. Appellant was sentenced to prison terms of fifteen to twenty-five years for each of the five counts, to be served consecutively. In 2019, Appellant sought a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Russo to vacate his consecutive sentences. The court of appeals dismissed the writ action, concluding that res judicata barred Appellant's claim and that his prior appeals were an adequate remedy at law to address the alleged defect in his consecutive sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant was not entitled to a writ of mandamus in this case. View "State ex rel. Nelson v. Russo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals upholding Defendant's convictions of four counts related to two specific instances of sexual abuse of D.S., holding that the trial court and court of appeals correctly applied Ohio's rape-shield law and determined that evidence of D.S.'s prior nonconsensual sexual assault was inadmissible.On appeal, Defendant asserted that the trial court erred in prohibiting him from introducing evidence during trial that D.S. had previously been sexually assaulted by another person, arguing that the rape-shield law applies only to an accuser's prior consensual sexual activity. The lower court held that Ohio's rape-shield law addresses all sexual activity, not only consensual sexual activity. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the plain meaning of the term "sexual activity" as used in the rape-shield law includes both consensual and nonconsensual sexual activity; and (2) therefore, all sexual activity is barred from admission into evidence by the rape-shield, absent certain exceptions listed in the law. View "State v. Jeffries" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus against Holmes County Court of Common Pleas Judge Robert D. Rinfret, holding that the court of appeals correctly determined that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.Appellant, who was serving consecutive prison terms for five convictions, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus arguing that Judge Rinfret improperly sentenced him to a prison term of nine years for his attempted rape conviction instead of the maximum term of eleven years. The court of appeals dismissed the petition, determining that Appellant had failed to file a mandatory affidavit of his prior civil actions and had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that relief in mandamus was not available because Petitioner had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. View "State ex rel. Steiner v. Rinfret" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court determining that Defendant's use of its barn on property it owned in Litchfield Township was utilized primarily for the production of wine made from grapes and for the sale of wine produced therein in order for the use of the barn to be exempt from zoning regulation pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 519.212(A), holding that the trial court did not err.Defendant owned a barn on land designated as residential. The Litchfield Township Board of Trustees sought to enjoin Defendant from using its land for weddings and other social gatherings. On remand, the trial court determined that the barn met the "vinting and selling wine" exemption under section 519.21(A). The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly applied the primary-use test under section 519.21(A) in determining that the primary use of the barn was for vinting and selling wine. View "Litchfield Township Board of Trustees v. Forever Blueberry Barn, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant's request for a writ of prohibition and/or mandamus against Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas Judge E. Gerald Parker Jr., holding that the court of appeals correctly determined that Appellant's claim was barred by res judicata.Appellant sought a petition for writ of prohibition and/or mandamus against Judge Erik Blaine, the successor to the judge who sentenced Appellant, alleging that the sentencing court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to sentence him. Judge Parker, who had succeeded Judge Blaine, subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals granted summary judgment for Judge Parker, concluding that Appellant failed to demonstrate that the sentencing court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction or that he lacked an adequate remedy at law and that res judicata barred Appellant's claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's claim was barred by res judicata. View "State ex rel. Kendrick v. Parker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus against the Trumbull Correctional Institution and Julie Loomis, the assistant to the warden (collectively, TCI), holding that the appellate court erred in dismissing Appellant's public-records mandamus complaint.While incarcerated at the Trumbull Correction Institution, Appellant submitted a handwritten public-records request to TCI seeking legal-mailroom logs and the dates and times that the institutional inspector made rounds in the housing units for certain periods. Loomis provided copies of the portions of the requested legal-mailroom logs in which Appellant's name appeared but none of the remaining records. Appellant filed a complaint seeking to compel TCI to provide him with the rest of his requested records. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint, determining that the complaint was moot because Appellant had already received all the requested records to which he was entitled. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where TCI provided no evidence demonstrating that it complied with the second part of Appellant's records request, the court of appeals erred when it concluded that Appellant's claim was moot. View "State ex rel. Parker Bey v. Loomis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus against former Lorain County Court of Common Pleas Judge Thomas W. Janas, holding that Appellant's complaint sufficiently alleged that the judge patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to change Appellant's sentence after the sentence had been affirmed on appeal.In 1994, following Appellant's conviction for aggravated murder, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life in prison with parole eligibility after twenty years. In 2018, the Adult Parole Authority informed Appellant that the trial court had issued a nunc pro tunc entry in 1999 stating that Appellant's sentence for aggravated murder was twenty full years to life. In 2019, Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus arguing that the trial court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to issue the nunc pro tunc entry after the court of appeals had affirmed his sentence. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant's complaint stated a meritorious claim that the trial court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to change his sentence after his sentence had been affirmed on appeal. View "State ex rel. Davis v. Janas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the adult portion of A.W.'s juvenile disposition, holding that because the juvenile court's order invoking the adult sentence under the serious youthful offender (SYO) specification was not journalized until A.W. turned twenty-one years old, the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction when it entered the adult portion of the sentence.At the age of seventeen, A.W. committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the offense of rape. The count was later amended to include an SYO specification. The court placed A.W. in custody until he would turn twenty-one years old and found A.W. to be an SYO. As A.W. neared his twenty-first birthday the State filed a motion to invoke the adult portion of his SYO sentence on the grounds that he had failed to complete "mandatory" sex-offender treatment. After a hearing, the juvenile court terminated the juvenile disposition and invoked the adult sentence. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that although the juvenile court issued its order invoking the adult sentence while A.W. was twenty years old, the clerk of the court did not enter that order upon the journal until after A.W. turned twenty-one years old, depriving the juvenile court of subject matter jurisdiction. View "In re A.W." on Justia Law