Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the board of tax appeals (BTA) of the 2015 tax year value of an apartment complex located in Franklin County, holding that the BTA's decision was reasonable and lawful.At issue was whether the BTA erred in deciding that the sale price paid for the transfer of ownership of a corporate entity, Palmer House Borrower, LLC (Palmer) should be presumed to constitute the value of the real estate owned by that entity. Palmer further asserted that the BTA improperly admitted and relied upon the submitted evidence of the transfer and sale. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the BTA reasonably considered the sale and conveyance documentation; (2) the BTA reasonably determined that the transaction was, in substance, a sale of the real estate; (3) the appraisal offered by Palmer was not the only evidence of value; and (4) Palmer did not show that the BTA's decision violated Ohio Const. art. XII, 2. View "Columbus City Schools Board of Education v. Franklin County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting summary judgment to Judge Joseph D. Russo and denying Sell Jefferson a writ of mandamus, holding that Jefferson's claims were barred by res judicata.In 1975, Jefferson was convicted of aggravated robbery and aggravated robbery and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction was not notified of Jefferson's aggravated murder conviction and life sentence. As a result, the Adult Parole Authority granted Jefferson final release in 1982. In 1985, Jefferson was indicted for several felony counts. Jefferson was convicted and sentenced to a prison term, to be served concurrently with his 1975 sentence. Jefferson raised numerous challenges to his arrest and reincarceration in the 1975 case, without success. Jefferson then brought this proceeding, arguing that his due process rights were violated. The court of appeals concluded that the claims in Jefferson's complaint were barred by res judicata. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was properly granted. View "State ex rel. Jefferson v. Russo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Relator's request for a writ of mandamus to compel Karla Hack, the former Marion County Court Reporter, to inform him of the fee for a copy of the transcript of his 2009 sentencing hearing, holding that Relator established all three requirements necessary to obtain a writ of mandamus.Relator, an inmate in the custody of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, filed a motion to compel the court reporter to produce a copy of the sentencing transcript and inform Relator of the fee for a copy of it. Relator then filed a motion to add the county court reporter's office and the current county court reporter as respondents, stating that Hack had retired and that he was unable to determine who the current court reporter was. The Supreme Court granted the motion and the writ, holding that Relator established that he was entitled to the writ. View "State ex rel. Newsome v. Hack" on Justia Law

In this dispute over which court has jurisdiction over an employer's claim against the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation (BWC) for the reimbursement of alleged excessive premiums paid by the employer the Supreme Court held that the claim was a legal claim, not an equitable one, and therefore, the court of claims had exclusive jurisdiction over the case.The City of Cleveland filed a complaint in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas alleging that the BWC charged the City inflated premiums for workers' compensation insurance in order to make up for discounts the BWC provided other employers. The BWC filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the common pleas court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit and that the court of claims had exclusive jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion and granted partial summary judgment to the City. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City's claim sounded in law and must proceed through the court of claims, which has exclusive jurisdiction over legal claims against the BWC. View "City of Cleveland v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the board of tax appeals (BTA), holding that Cleveland's taxation of Appellant's employment compensation in 2014 and 2015 was required under municipal law and did not violate Appellant's due process rights, despite the fact that Appellant did not work or live in the city of Cleveland during the tax years at issue.Appellant was employed by the Sherwin-Williams Company from 1980 until she retired in 2009 and moved to Florida. Sherwin-Williams compensated Appellant, in part, with stock options during her employment. Appellant exercised some of those options in 2014 and 2015, and Cleveland collected income tax on their value. Appellant sought refunds from the city based on the fact that she resided in Florida during the tax years at issue. Cleveland Board of Income Tax Review denied the refunds, and the BTA affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's arguments challenging the taxation failed. View "Willacy v. Cleveland Board of Income Tax Review" on Justia Law

In this certified-conflict case, the Supreme Court held that when an indigent defendant makes an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based upon counsel's failure to request a waiver of court costs, a reviewing court must apply the test in State v. Bradley, 538 N.E.2d 373 (Ohio 1989) for determining whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel.Defendant was convicted of assaulting a peace officer. The trial court assessed court costs against Defendant, despite his indigent status. On appeal, the court of appeals determined that Defendant was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to request a waiver of costs and that the basis for a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to request such a waiver no longer exists. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when trial counsel fails to request that the trial court waive court costs on behalf of an indigent defendant, a determination of prejudice for purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel analysis deeds on whether there is a reasonable probability that the trial court would have granted the request to waive costs had one been made; and (2) the court of appeals incorrectly analyzed the prejudice prong of the ineffective-assistance of counsel analysis set forth in Bradley. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a limited writ compelling the Stark County Board of Elections to review a petition to transfer certain territory from one school district to another for placement on the March 17, 2020 primary-election ballot, holding that Relators were entitled to a limited writ of mandamus.This was the third case involving a petition to transfer the territory of the village of Hills and Dales from Plain Local School District to Jackson Local School District. In the second case, the Supreme Court ordered Plain Local School District Board of Education to forward the petition to the elections board to check the sufficiency of the signatures on the petition. After the elections board verified that the petition contained a sufficient number of valid signatures, Relators, residents of Hills and Dales, brought this action seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the placement of the transfer proposal on the March 17 ballot. The Supreme Court granted mandamus relief, holding that the elections board had a duty to determine whether the proposal can be placed on an election ballot. View "State ex rel. Dunn v. Plain Local School District Board of Education" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court found Larry Greene in contempt for failing to provide records under the terms of an existing peremptory writ of mandamus and imposed a sanction of $1,000, holding that Greene failed to meet his obligations under both Ohio's Public Records Act and the peremptory writ of mandamus issued by this Court.When Jerone McDougald was an inmate at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF) he sent a public records request to Greene, SOCF's public records custodian. When Greene did not provide copies of the requested document McDougald filed an action for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court granted a peremptory writ. Later, the McDougald filed a motion asking that Greene be held in contempt for court for withholding the requested document. The Supreme Court held that Greene failed to meet his obligations, found him in contempt of court, and imposed a sanction, which the Court stayed to allow Greene the opportunity to purge the contempt in a manner outlined by the Court. View "State ex rel. McDougald v. Greene" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) approving and modifying a previously approved electric-security plan of Ohio Power Company, holding that the Office of the Ohio Consumers' Counsel (OCC) did not satisfy its burden to demonstrate reversible error on the record.The OCC challenged three riders authorized by the PUCO's order, including the power purchase agreement rider, the smart city rider, and the renewable generation rider. The Supreme Court affirmed the PUCO's order, holding (1) this Court lacked jurisdiction to review the OCC's challenge to the power purchase agreement rider because the OCC did not include the challenge in an application for rehearing; (2) the OCC failed to show that the PUCO lacked statutory authority to approve the smart city rider; and (3) the OCC did not establish that approving the renewable general rider on a placeholder basis will harm or prejudice ratepayers. View "In re Application of Ohio Power Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals in this action determining whether an insurer who settles a personal injury claim with an accident victim has a duty to distribute a portion of the settlement proceeds to the victim's former lawyers pursuant to a charging lien, holding that an action based upon a charging lien is an in rem proceeding against a particular fund and that when a matter is resolved through a settlement, the fund comes into being at the time the settlement is paid and the release is received.A discharged law firm sought to enforce a charging lien against a tortfeasor's insurer for the law firm's representation of the victim injured by the tortfeasor. However, no lawsuit was filed on behalf of the victim against the tortfeasor, and the victim settled with the tortfeasor's insurer after he discharged the law firm. The Supreme Court held that, under the facts of this case, the discharged law firm could not enforce its charging lien against the tortfeasor's insurer, and therefore, the discharged law firm did not have a viable charging-lien claim against the tortfeasor's insurer. View "Kisling, Nestico & Redick, LLC v. Progressive Max Insurance Co." on Justia Law