Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that when an at-will employee consents, without objection, to the collection of his or her urine sample under the "direct-observation method," the at-will employee has no cause of action for common-law invasion of privacy.Plaintiffs were former and current at-will employees of Defendant. Defendant had a workplace substance-abuse policy requiring employees to submit a urine sample for drug testing under the direct-observation method, under which a same-sex monitor was required to accompany the employee to the restroom to visually observe the employee produce the urine sample. While Plaintiffs did not know at the time they consented that their urine samples would be collected under the direct-observation method they proceeded with the drug test under the direct-observation method without objection. Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that Defendant violated their privacy by requiring them to submit their urine samples under the direct-observation method. The trial court granted judgment for Defendant, concluding that Plaintiffs had not stated a valid claim for invasion of privacy. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs' invasion-of-privacy claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. View "Lunsford v. Sterilite of Ohio, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of prohibition to prevent the three members of a board of county commissioners from going forward with a show-cause hearing to consider the removal of a member of the board of trustees of the county hospital, holding that the commissioners did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to proceed with the show-cause hearing.The Morrow County Board of Commissioners claimed that the authority to appoint and remove members of the Morrow County Hospital Board of Trustees was a five-member body, with each commissioner having one vote. Patrick Drouhard, the chairman of the Board of Trustees, claimed that the appointing authority was a three-member body, with the board of commissioners having a single collective vote and the other votes belonging to the judges of the Morrow County Court of Common Pleas. When the Commissioners sought to schedule a show-cause hearing to remove Drouhard as chairman of the Hospital Board Drouhard filed this complaint for a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) the three commissioners constitute the majority of the appointing authority that is empowered by law to remove a member of the county hospital board; and (2) Drouhard possessed an adequate remedy by way of an appeal following the show-cause hearing. View "State ex rel. Drouhard v. Morrow County Board of Commissioners" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice action, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants, holding that Plaintiff could not rely on the savings statute when he filed this action just before the expiration of the statute of limitations but did not obtain service within one year or dismiss the action during that period.Although Plaintiff had initially filed this lawsuit within the limitations period, he neither obtained service on Dr. Eric Humphreys within one year, nor did he dismiss his lawsuit during that time. As a consequence, the trial court ruled that Dr. Humphreys was dismissed with prejudice from the lawsuit because Plaintiff's claims against him were time barred. Concluding that the remaining defendants could only be vicariously liable, the court found that any liability of those parties was extinguished. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the savings statute applied to Plaintiff's claim against Dr. Humphreys. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because there was neither a dismissal otherwise than on the merits nor the filing of a new action, the savings statute did not apply, and Plaintiff's claim was barred by the statute of limitations. View "Moore v. Mount Carmel Health System" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court sentencing Defendant to death for the aggravated murders of Casonya C. and Esme K., holding that there was no prejudicial error in the proceedings below.Defendant was found guilty of two aggravated murders and sentenced to death for each aggravated murder. The Supreme Court later vacated the death sentences and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. On remand, the trial court again sentenced Defendant to death for the aggravated murders of Casonya and Esme. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant's request for individual sequestered voir dire; (2) the trial court did not commit an obvious error in failing to dismiss a prospective juror sua sponte; (3) Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel during the resentencing hearing; (4) any error with respect to the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments did not prejudicially affect Defendant's substantial rights; and (5) the death sentences in this case were proportionate and appropriate. View "State v. Kirkland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated this Court's denial of Defendant's motion to supplement and remanded the case to the court of appeals to consider the issue of whether Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to trial counsel.Defendant filed a motion to supplement the record with the transcript of a hearing, during which Defendant signed a waiver of his right to trial counsel. The transcript had not been included in the record considered by the court of appeals, which overruled Defendant's argument that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. The Supreme Court denied the motion to supplement, but, on further consideration, vacated the denial and granted the motion to supplement the record with the transcript of the hearing. Because the court of appeals was not privy to the complete record of the hearing, the Supreme Court remanded the cause to the court of appeals to render an opinion, upon its review of the supplemented record, the issue of whether Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Plaintiff's complaint for a writ of mandamus for noncompliance with Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(A), holding that where the court's sole basis for dismissing the complaint may have been the result of a docketing error, the complaint should not have been dismissed.When Appellant, an inmate, did not get the desired response to his public-records requests he filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint based on Appellant's alleged failure to file an affidavit of prior actions, as required by Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(A). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that where the time-stamped affidavit supported Appellant's allegation that he complied with the statute and that the clerk's office failed to place the affidavit in the court file, the court of appeals erred in dismissing the complaint. View "State ex rel. Ware v. Pureval" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus sought by Douglas Bobovnyik to compel the Mahoning County Board of Elections to certify his name to the November 3, 2020 ballot as an independent candidate for the office of Mahoning County Sheriff, holding that the board did not abuse its discretion or disregard applicable law.The board found Bobovnyik ineligible to be a candidate for the officer of Mahoning County Sheriff because (1) Bobovnyik had not demonstrated that he had resided in Mahoning County for the year immediately preceding March 16, 2020, as required under Ohio Rev. Code 311.01(B)(2); and (2) the board had not received the results of Bobovnyik's background check, as required under Ohio Rev. Code 311.01(B)(6). Bobovnyik subsequently filed this mandamus action to compel the board to place his name on the ballot. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the board's residency determination alone was sufficient to prevent Bobovnyik's name from being placed on the ballot. View "State ex rel. Bobovnyik v. Mahoning County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus against the warden of the Toledo Correctional Institution, holding that the court of appeals correctly dismissed Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.In dismissing the petition, the court of appeals held that the petition was barred by res judicata and that Appellant had an adequate remedy at law to assert his claims. The court further determined that Appellant had failed to file an affidavit of prior civil actions, as required by Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(A). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals correctly noted that Appellant's petition was subject to dismissal for his failure to comply with section 2969.25(A); and (2) Appellant was not entitled to file a supplemental brief. View "McDougald v. Bowerman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Jerone McDougald's motion for mediation and his request for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel Sonrisa Sehlmeyer, the administrative assistant to the warden at the Toledo Correctional Institution, to produce documents pursuant to a public-records request, holding that McDougald did not demonstrate that he had a clear legal right to the requested relief and that Sehlmeyer had a clear legal duty to provide that relief.Sehlmeyer responded to McDougald's public-records request with a notation indicating the number of pages of each requested record and the total amount required for the request. McDougald did not follow up with a cash slip or indication that he was still seeking to inspect the documents. Rather, McDougald filed the present complaint seeking a writ of mandamus and requesting an award of statutory damages and court costs. McDougald also filed a motion asking to submit this case to mediation. The Supreme Court denied all requests, holding that where the institution offered to make the records available, McDougald was not entitled to his requested relief. View "State ex rel. McDougald v. Sehlmeyer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals to the extent that the court remanded this case to the trial court to correct an entry imposing post release control, holding that the sentencing entry did not include notice of the consequences of violating postrelease control, but that failure rendered the sentence voidable, not void.After the court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentence Defendant filed a motion to vacate and release from postrelease control, arguing that the trial court had failed properly to impose postrelease control and, therefore, that part of his sentence was void. The court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court to issue a nunc pro tunc entry correcting the deficiency in the judgment entry, as defined in State v. Grimes, 85 N.E.3d 700 (2017). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when the sentencing court has jurisdiction to proceed to judgment, sentencing errors in imposing postrelease control render the sentence voidable, and the doctrine of res judicata will apply to collateral attacks on the sentence; and (2) Defendant's collateral attack on his sentence was barred by res judicata. View "State v. Hudson" on Justia Law