Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's judgment ordering Michael Knab to make restitution to the City of Centerville, holding that a municipality is not a victim and has no right to restitution under Ohio Const. Art I, 10a, a provision known as Marsy's law.Knab was found guilty of making a false report to law enforcement and improper use of the 9-1-1 emergency system. The trial court ordered Knab to pay restitution to Centerville for the costs it had incurred responding to Knab's 9-1-1 call. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions but vacated the restitution order, holding that Centerville was not a victim for purposes of restitution when it was carrying out its official duties. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a municipal corporation does not qualify as a victim under Marsy's Law and is not entitled to restitution under that provision. View "Centerville v. Knab" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison for rape based on the trial court's finding that Defendant had compelled the victim to submit by force, holding that the Sixth Amendment requires that such a finding be made by a jury.Defendant was convicted of rape of a child under the age of thirteen. At a second resentencing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-five years to life under Ohio Rev. Code 2971.03(B)(1)(c). The court of appeals reversed, holding that Defendant's sentence was not authorized because none of the prerequisites for such a sentence under Ohio Rev. Code 2971.03(B)(1)(c) was present and that permitting a trial court to make a finding of force for the purpose of imposing a sentence under the statute would violate the Sixth Amendment based on Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Alleyne requires that a finding that the victim was compelled to submit by force or that one of the other factors under subsection (B)(1)(c) is present be made by a jury. View "State v. Bowers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of a teacher and school officials on Plaintiffs' complaint alleging that Defendants were reckless in addressing the alleged bullying of a kindergartener by another student, holding that Defendants did not act in perverse disregard of a known risk.In granting summary judgment for Defendants, the trial court found that they were immune from liability because the family had failed to establish that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Defendants disregarded a known risk or obvious risk of harm to the kindergartener. The court of appeals reversed, finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to whether Defendants had been reckless. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendants did not act in perverse disregard of a known risk, and therefore, Defendants' conduct was not reckless. View "A.J.R. v. Lute" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant's request for a writ of mandamus against Governor Mike DeWine, holding that Appellant failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence a clear legal right to the requested relief and a clear legal duty on the part of the Governor to provide it.Appellant, an inmate, sent a public-records request to the Governor requesting certain documents. Appellant later filed this action seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the production of the documents. The court of appeals denied the writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that where the evidence showed that the Govenor's office satisfied its duty to make the records available by sending them to the correctional institution at which Appellant was an inmate, Appellant was not entitled to his requested relief. View "State ex rel. Ware v. DeWine" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals finding that Ohio Rev. Code 3319.321(B), a provision of the Ohio Student Privacy Act (OSPA), prohibits disclosure of records pertaining to a deceased former public-school student in response to a public-records request, holding that the OSPA unambiguously forbids disclosure of the requested records.Appellants each submitted a public-records request to the school district of Bellbrook-Sugarcreek Local Schools (the school district) requesting school records related to Connor Betts, who killed nine people in a mass shooting in Dayton. Betts was a graduate of a high school that was part of the school district. When the school district denied the requests Appellants filed this action for a writ of mandamus, arguing that they had a clear legal right to inspect Betts's records under Ohio Rev. Code 149.43(B). The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 3319.321(B) prohibits the disclosure of the records sought by Appellants. View "State ex rel. Cable News Network, Inc. v. Bellbrook-Sugarcreek Local Schools" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus sought by Relator, an inmate at the Toledo Correction Institution, ordering the production of shift rosters that show the duty assignments of correctional officers within the prison, holding that the shift rosters are security records exempt from disclosure under the Public Records Act.Respondent, the public-records custodian at TCI, withheld the requested records from Relator on the basis that they were "security records" exempt from public-records disclosure under Ohio Rev. Code 149.433(A) and (B). Relator then filed this action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering Respondent to produce the requested records. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the shift rosters are security records exempt from public records disclosure under section 149.433(A) and (B). View "State ex rel. Burfitt v. Sehlmeyer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the portion of the court of appeals' judgment upholding the General Assembly's enactment of laws that centralize the collection and administration of net-profits taxes but reversed the portion of the judgment upholding the portion of the legislation allowing the state to retain .5 percent of the collected taxes, holding that the retention provision exceeds the General Assembly's authority.Appellants, several cities and villages, all impose a net-profits tax, which is a tax on income earned within their boundaries. After the General Assembly passed laws imposing centralized administration of those taxes Appellants brought this lawsuit arguing that the legislation violates their home-rule authority and exceeds the General Assembly's constitutional power to limit the power of municipalities to levy taxes. The Supreme Court held (1) the laws imposing centralized administration constitute an act of limitation within the General Assembly's explicit constitutional authority; and (2) the law providing for the state's retention of .5 percent of municipal net-profits taxes a fee or a tax for the state's centralized administration is unconstitutional. View "Athens v. McClain" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's class certification order and vacated the class certification order, holding that Ohio Rev. Code 124.34 does not authorize civil service employees to file a civil action in common pleas court to address an alleged reduction in pay in violation of section 124.34.Appellees and other named class representatives filed two consolidated class action lawsuits against Cuyahoga County seeking damages and a declaratory judgment that the county reduced their compensation, in violation of section 124.34. The trial court certified a class. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 124.34 does not authorize civil service employees to file a civil action in common pleas court for an alleged reduction in pay in violation of the statute; and (2) because Appellees' complaints did not state a cause of action for which relief may be granted, the trial court erred in certifying a class based on those claims. View "Binder v. Cuyahoga County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the court of common pleas, juvenile division, which granted permanent custody of A.M. to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services (Department), holding that the juvenile court complied with Ohio Rev. Code 2151.414(D)(1).At issue was the statutory requirement that juvenile courts consider the factors set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 2151.414(D)(1) for determining a child's best interest before granting a motion filed by a private child-placing agency or a public children-services agency for permanent custody of that child. The magistrate in this case granted the Department permanent custody of A.M., finding that A.M. should not be placed with either parent and that an award of permanent custody to the Department was in A.M.'s best interest. The juvenile court adopted the magistrate's decision. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 2151.414(D)(1) requires a juvenile court to consider all relevant factors in determining the best interest of a child in a permanent custody case; and (2) the record demonstrated that the magistrate and the juvenile court considered the statutory factors. View "In re A.M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part Jerone McDougald's writ of mandamus to compel Larry Greene to provide documents in response to McDougald's public-records request, holding that McDougald was entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling Greene to allow him personally to inspect two of the three records he sought.McDougald, an inmate at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF), sent a public-records request to Greene, the records custodian at SOCF, requesting to inspect three records. When Greene did not allow the inspection, McDougald filed the present complaint for a writ of mandamus. Also pending was McDougald's motion to consider the exhibits attached to his complaint as substantive evidence and his two motions for leave to amend. The Supreme Court granted the motion to consider evidence, granted in part and denied in part the writ of mandamus, and denied McDougald's request for an award of statutory damages, holding (1) McDougald was entitled to a writ of mandamus with respect to his request for two of the three records he requested; and (2) McDougald was not entitled to statutory damages. View "State ex rel. McDougald v. Greene" on Justia Law