Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court answered questions certified by the court of appeals in the negative and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Akron General Medical Center (AGMC) on the issue of whether AGMC was liable for a cause of action for negligent hiring, retention, or supervision, holding that the grant of summary judgment was inappropriate.Malieka Evans filed a complaint alleging that she had been sexually abused and assaulted by Dr. Amir Shahideh, one of AGMC's employees, while seeking treatment at AGMC. The trial court granted summary judgment for AGMC based on Evans's failure to have filed a cause of action against Dr. Shahideh and her inability to establish the doctor's civil liability or criminal guilt. The court of appeals reversed and certified to the Supreme Court two questions of law. The Supreme Court held (1) a plaintiff need not show that an employee has been adjudicated civilly liable or has been found guilty of a crime in order for the plaintiff to maintain a negligent hiring, retention, or supervision claim against an employer; (2) the statute of limitations for such a claim is not affected by the statute of limitations governing the underlying legally wrongful conduct of the employee; and (3) summary judgment was improper. View "Evans v. Akron General Medical Center" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of mandamus filed by the South Euclid Municipal Court asking the Supreme Court to compel the City of South Euclid to comply with a funding order issued by the municipal court judge, holding that the judge was not entitled to mandamus relief.The judge in this case requested that the City allocate thirty percent more money than allocated for the previous year for the municipal court's 2019 budget. The court then issued a funding order directing the city council to allocate the full requested amount. The city council did not give the court the full amount. The municipal court subsequently filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel the city to comply with the judge's funding order. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the municipal court failed to establish its entitlement to a writ. View "State ex rel. Williams-Byers v. City of South Euclid" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant's request for a writ of mandamus ordering the City of Cincinnati to repair and maintain two streets located within the City's boundaries, holding that the court of appeals' analysis eschewed a comprehensive mandamus discussion.Appellant sought a writ of mandamus to compel the City to repair and maintain the streets at issue, alleging that the City's neglect of the streets had resulted in unsafe conditions caused by inadequate water drainage. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluding that the streets had never become public through either a statutory or a common-law dedication. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Platting Commission Act furnishes a means of achieving a statutory dedication; (2) the two streets at issue were the subject of a statutory dedication as of 1876; and (3) because the parties did not adequately brief the clear-legal-right and clear-legal-duty requirements of the mandamus standard, the cause is remanded for full application of the mandamus standard. View "State ex rel. Delta Lookout, LLC v. City of Cincinnati" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that a child-abuse investigator employed by a county children-services agency need not give the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), before questioning a child suspected of committing child abuse, holding that the questioning in this case violated neither Miranda nor the suspect's federal due process rights.The trial court in this case granted the suspect's motion to suppress, finding that the suspect's statement to the agency had been obtained in violation of his due process rights. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that where the evidence demonstrated that the child-abuse investigator who interviewed the suspect was neither a law enforcement officer nor acting under the direction or control of the police and where the suspect's confession was not causally related to any conduct of the police, the court of appeals correctly concluded that the confession resulting from the questioning was admissible at trial. View "In re M.H." on Justia Law

In this case involving the proper scope of the litigation privilege in Ohio the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court granting judgment on the pleadings concluding that certain actions of the Certified Steel Stud Association's directors were protected by the litigation privilege, holding that judgment on the pleadings was inappropriate.ClarkDietrich previously sued the Association alleging that the Association made defamatory statements about ClarkDietrich's products. William Gardner and Edward Slish (together, Appellees) were members of the Association's board of directors at that time. The jury returned a verdict in favor of ClarkDietrich. John Reister, who was subsequently appointed as a receiver on behalf of the Association, filed this action claiming that Appellees breached their fiduciary duties by mishandling the ClarkDietrich litigation. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Appellees' actions were protected under the litigation privilege rule. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the litigation privilege protects statements, not actions; and (2) the decision to grant judgment on the pleadings was improper in this case. View "Reister v. Gardner" on Justia Law

In this original action involving a dispute between two judges who sit on the Sandusky County Court the Supreme Court granted a peremptory writ of prohibition that vacated Judge John Kolesar's judgment entry vacating Judge Mary Elizabeth Fiser's judgment entries granting pay raises to certain personnel, holding that Judge Kolesar's vacating entry arose from an exercise of judicial power that he patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to exercise.Shortly after Judge Fiser issued entries granting pay raises to court personnel Judge Kolesar, who serves as the court's administrative judge, issued a judgment entry vacating Judge Fiser's entries and forbidding pay raises and the expenditure of court resources that did not have his approval. Judge Fiser sought a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Kolesar from enforcing his entry, and Judge Kolesar sought a writ of prohibition to prohibit Judge Fiser from making future entries that infringe on his powers as administrative judge. The Supreme Court granted a peremptory writ of prohibition that vacated Judge Kolesar's vacating entry, holding that Judge Kolesar patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to issue his vacating entry. View "State ex rel. Fiser v. Kolesar" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals granting summary judgment for the State and denying Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the State to initiate property-appropriation proceedings in this regulatory-takings case, holding that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether Appellant had suffered a total or partial taking.Appellant alleged that it had suffered a taking of its property when the Ohio Department of Natural Resources' Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management suspended Appellant's operation of one of its two saltwater-injection wells. The Division suspended the well's operation due to concerns that the well had induced two earthquakes in its vicinity. The court of appeals granted summary judgment for the State, determining that Appellant had suffered neither a total nor a partial governmental taking. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. View "State ex rel. AWMS Water Solutions, LLC v. Mertz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Appellant failed to state a claim cognizable in habeas corpus.Appellant, an inmate at the Trumbull Correctional Institution, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his transfer from juvenile court to adult court was void and that, therefore, his resulting convictions were also void. The court of appeals held that Appellant's conviction was barred by res judicata. Further, the court rejected Appellant's claim on the merits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on this Court's decision in Smith v. May, 148 N.E.3d 542, Appellant failed to state a claim cognizable in habeas corpus. View "Steele v. Harris" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate R.B. delinquent, holding that the timing requirements of Ohio Rev. Code 2152.84 are not jurisdictional.The juvenile court adjudicated R.B. delinquent, classified him as a sex offender, and imposed a disposition that included probation. After a second sex-offender-classification hearing the juvenile court kept R.B.'s classification the same. R.B. appealed, arguing that the juvenile court was required to hold the review hearing and and issue its decision on the precise day his disposition ended and because the juvenile court did not do so, it lost jurisdiction to continue his classification. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the language "upon completion of the disposition" found in section 2152.84(A)(1) requires only that the court's review take place within a "reasonable time" of the juvenile's completion of his disposition; and (2) section 2151.23(A)(15) vests the juvenile court with jurisdiction to carry out its requirements under the classification statutes, independent of whether the delinquent child has reached the age of twenty-one. View "In re R.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that there is no irreconcilable conflict between the general provisions of the Ohio Marketable Title Act, Ohio Rev. Code 5301.47 et seq., as applied to severed mineral interests, and the Ohio Dormant Mineral Act, Ohio Rev. Code 5301.56.Appellants claimed they were the owners of a portion of a severed royalty interest in oil and gas underlying about sixty-six acres of land in Monroe County. Appellees filed this action for a declaratory judgment that the Marketable Title Act had extinguished the severed royalty interest and had vested that previously severed interest in Appellees. Appellants argued that the Dormant Mineral Act supersedes and controls over the original Marketable Title Act due to a conflict between the two acts. The trial court declared Appellants the owners of a 1/16 royalty interest, holding that the Dormant Mineral Act irreconcilably conflicts with the general provisions of the Marketable Title Act and that the more specific Dormant Mineral Act controls. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there is no irreconcilable conflict between the two acts, and therefore, they are applied as independent, alternative statutory mechanisms that may be used to reunite severed mineral interests with the surface property subject to those interests. View "West v. Bode" on Justia Law