Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A pipeline running through 13 Ohio counties was valued by the Ohio Tax Commissioner at $1,620,358,699 for tax year 2019. The pipeline's owner, Nexus Gas Transmission, L.L.C., appealed this valuation to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA), arguing for a lower value of $615,695,340. The dispute was settled through an agreement between Nexus and the Tax Commissioner, setting the pipeline's value at $950,000,000 for 2019 and resolving valuation issues for 2020 and 2021. The Tax Commissioner issued a final determination reflecting these agreed values.The Lorain County Auditor, dissatisfied with the settlement, appealed the Tax Commissioner’s final determination to the BTA, arguing that the Commissioner had not followed statutory criteria in valuing the property. The BTA dismissed the appeal, stating that the valuation dispute had been resolved through the settlement agreement and that the auditor had not participated in the initial appeal process.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case, focusing on reconciling the Tax Commissioner’s authority to settle tax disputes under R.C. 5703.05(C) with the county auditor’s right to appeal under R.C. 5717.02(A). The court held that while a county auditor can appeal a final determination, this right does not extend to challenging the substance of a settlement agreement reached by the Tax Commissioner. The court emphasized that allowing such appeals would undermine the Commissioner’s statutory authority to settle disputes. The court affirmed the BTA’s decision, concluding that the county auditor’s appeal, which contested the valuation methodology rather than the validity of the settlement itself, could not proceed. View "Snodgrass v. Harris" on Justia Law

Christopher Hildebrant, a real-estate developer, facilitated a property sale in 2011 and expected consulting fees from both the seller and the buyer. During the transaction, Hildebrant alleged that Thomas Weidman, a trustee on the Sycamore Township Board, demanded a kickback. To avoid paying, Hildebrant created a fictitious email account and sent himself an email portraying Weidman as demanding payments. This email was forwarded to another party but remained private until 2020, when Hildebrant showed it to other township officials during a separate transaction. Weidman learned of the email in November 2020 during an investigation and received a copy in January 2021.The Warren County Court of Common Pleas granted Hildebrant’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that Weidman’s defamation claim was time-barred by the statute of limitations, which began when the email was first sent in 2011. The court also ruled that Weidman’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and false-light invasion of privacy were similarly time-barred as they were derivative of the defamation claim.The Twelfth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the discovery rule applied to defamation claims when the publication was secretive or inherently unknowable. The court ruled that Weidman’s claims were not time-barred because he could not have known about the defamatory email until it was disclosed to him in 2020.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the appellate court’s decision, holding that the discovery rule applies to libel claims when the publication is secretive or inherently unknowable. The court also held that the discovery rule applies to derivative claims like IIED and false-light invasion of privacy when they are based on the same allegations as the libel claim. The case was remanded to the Warren County Court of Common Pleas for further proceedings. View "Weidman v. Hildebrandt" on Justia Law

A public children-services agency determined that an allegation of child abuse against Kelly D. Kyser was substantiated. Kyser challenged this finding through the agency’s administrative-review process, but her appeal was unsuccessful. She then appealed the agency’s decision to the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. The court dismissed her appeal as untimely, and the Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. The court noted that under R.C. 2506.01, a person may appeal a final order or decision of an agency that determines their rights, duties, privileges, benefits, or legal relationships. However, the court found that an agency’s disposition finding that an allegation of child abuse is substantiated does not determine any of these things. The court explained that while certain consequences may result from such a finding, the agency’s disposition itself does not determine those consequences.The Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that the common pleas court did not have jurisdiction to hear Kyser’s appeal because the agency’s disposition was not a final order under R.C. 2506.01. As a result, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth District Court of Appeals’ judgment and dismissed the appeal. View "Kyser v. Summit Cty. Children Servs." on Justia Law

Jeffrey Harmon and David Beasley, longtime employees of the City of Cincinnati and members of a city-employees union, were placed on leave under a Temporary Emergency Leave (TEL) program implemented in April 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. They used accrued paid leave during this period and appealed the city's decision to the Cincinnati Civil Service Commission, arguing that the city had not followed proper layoff procedures. The commission determined that the TEL program was not a layoff and denied their request for a hearing, instead holding an "appearance."Harmon and Beasley appealed the commission's decision to the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, which reversed the commission's determination and remanded the matter for a hearing. The city appealed to the First District Court of Appeals, arguing that the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction because the matter was governed by the collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) and the commission's decision was not the result of a quasi-judicial proceeding. The First District held that the common pleas court had jurisdiction under the CBA and R.C. 2506.01, as the commission's decision was an adjudication from a quasi-judicial proceeding.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the First District's judgment. The court held that Harmon and Beasley had a right to appeal the commission’s decision under R.C. 2506.01 and were not precluded by R.C. 4117.10. The court determined that the commission was required to hold a hearing under the Cincinnati Civil Service Rules, and its failure to do so did not divest the common pleas court of jurisdiction. The court concluded that the commission's decision was the result of a quasi-judicial proceeding, thus allowing the appeal to the common pleas court. View "Harmon v. Cincinnati" on Justia Law

The case involves the Ohio Power Company’s application for an increase in electric distribution rates. The key issue is whether the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) allowed Ohio Power to recover costs for providing generation services through its distribution rates, which is prohibited by state law. Ohio Power’s distribution rates should only cover noncompetitive services, while generation services are competitive and should be billed separately.In the proceedings before the PUCO, Ohio Power submitted an analysis to identify costs associated with providing Standard Service Offer (SSO) and customer-choice program services, which were potentially being recovered through distribution rates. However, the PUCO found the analysis insufficient and continued to set the rates for the retail-reconciliation rider and the SSO-credit rider at zero, meaning no costs were reallocated. The PUCO’s staff and other parties, including Interstate Gas Supply (IGS), contested Ohio Power’s analysis, arguing it did not provide a detailed cost-of-service study differentiating costs between shopping and nonshopping customers.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the PUCO’s decision. The court held that the PUCO’s findings were supported by evidence and that the commission complied with the statutory requirements. The court found that IGS failed to demonstrate that the PUCO’s decision was unlawful or unreasonable. The court also noted that the PUCO provided sufficient detail in its orders to explain its decision-making process, thus complying with R.C. 4903.09. The court rejected IGS’s arguments that the PUCO ignored uncontroverted evidence and failed to address material issues, concluding that the PUCO’s orders were based on a thorough review of the evidence presented. View "In re Application of Ohio Power Co." on Justia Law

Shawn Jones, a teacher employed under a limited contract by the Kent City School District Board of Education, faced nonrenewal of his contract. The board was required by Ohio law (R.C. 3319.111(E)) to conduct three formal observations of Jones teaching before deciding on nonrenewal. The first observation occurred in January 2020, and the second in May 2020, both involving Jones actively teaching. However, the third observation, conducted in May 2020, only involved the evaluator attending a remote session with Jones’s students, which Jones could not attend due to a medical condition.The Portage County Court of Common Pleas initially affirmed the board’s decision not to renew Jones’s contract. Jones appealed, arguing that the board did not comply with the statutory requirement of observing him teaching three times. The Eleventh District Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, finding that the board failed to meet the statutory requirements because the third observation did not involve observing Jones teaching.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the Eleventh District Court of Appeals’ judgment. The court held that the board did not comply with R.C. 3319.111(E) because the third observation did not involve observing Jones teaching. The court ordered the board to reinstate Jones and remanded the case to the Portage County Court of Common Pleas for the calculation of Jones’s back pay. The court emphasized that the statutory requirement of observing the teacher teaching is mandatory and cannot be substituted by observing students without the teacher’s presence. View "Jones v. Kent City School Dist. Bd. of Edn." on Justia Law

Michael Jones was convicted by a jury of ten drug-trafficking and drug-possession charges. Before the trial, Jones filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from a safe in a house, arguing that the consent to search was invalid and the search warrant for the safe was insufficient. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced Jones to an aggregate prison term of 22 to 24.5 years.Jones appealed to the First District Court of Appeals, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for not challenging the evidence as coerced and the protective sweep as unconstitutional. The appellate court agreed, finding that Jones's trial counsel had a reasonable basis to challenge the consent and the protective sweep. The court concluded that the failure to raise these arguments constituted deficient performance and prejudiced Jones. The appellate court ordered a limited remand for Jones to file a new motion to suppress and for the trial court to hold a suppression hearing, staying the consideration of Jones’s remaining assignments of error.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and determined that it had jurisdiction under Article IV, Section 2(B)(2) of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 2505.03(A). The court found that the First District did not comply with App.R. 12(A)(1)(a) and (c) because it did not affirm, modify, or reverse the trial court’s judgment and did not decide all assignments of error. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the First District, vacated its entry ordering limited remand, and remanded the case to the First District to enter a judgment that complies with App.R. 12. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

Michael Berkheimer experienced severe medical issues after a chicken bone became lodged in his throat while eating a "boneless wing" at a restaurant. He sued the restaurant, its food supplier, and a chicken farm, alleging negligence, breach of warranty, and other claims. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants, stating they were not negligent as a matter of law. Berkheimer appealed, arguing that the court focused on the wrong question by determining whether the bone was natural to the boneless wing.The Twelfth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court concluded that the presence of a bone in the boneless wing was something a reasonable consumer could have anticipated and guarded against. The court applied a blended analysis, considering both whether the bone was foreign to or natural to the food and whether a consumer could reasonably expect its presence.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and upheld the lower court's decision. The court reaffirmed the analysis from Allen v. Grafton, which blends the "foreign-natural" test and the "reasonable-expectation" test. The court concluded that there was no breach of duty because a reasonable consumer could have expected and guarded against the presence of a bone in the boneless wing. The court emphasized that the label "boneless wing" was a description of the cooking style, not a guarantee of the absence of bones. Therefore, the judgment of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Berkheimer v. REKM, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The case involves a public-records request submitted by David Armiak and the Center for Media and Democracy to the Ohio Attorney General. The request sought documents related to the Republican Attorneys General Association (RAGA) and the Rule of Law Defense Fund (RLDF). The Attorney General refused to produce the documents, arguing they were not public records as defined by Ohio law. Armiak then filed a mandamus action to compel the production of the documents.The Tenth District Court of Appeals handled the initial proceedings. During discovery, the court allowed Armiak to conduct broad discovery to test the Attorney General's claim that the documents were not public records. This included deposing the Attorney General and obtaining extensive documents and interrogatories. The Attorney General sought a protective order to limit this discovery, arguing it was overly burdensome and interfered with his constitutional duties. The Tenth District denied the protective order and allowed the broad discovery to proceed.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case to determine whether the discovery order was appealable. The court found that the order met the criteria for a provisional remedy under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4), as it determined the action regarding the discovery dispute and prevented a judgment in favor of the Attorney General. The court also found that the Attorney General would not be able to obtain effective relief through an appeal following final judgment, as the discovery process itself would cause irreparable harm. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Ohio denied Armiak's motion to dismiss the appeal and set the matter for oral argument. View "State ex rel. Ctr. for Media & Democracy v. Yost" on Justia Law

The case involves a car accident in April 2017 between Ryan McCullough and Joseph Bennett, where McCullough alleged Bennett was at fault. McCullough initially filed a lawsuit on January 15, 2018, but it was dismissed without prejudice on February 28, 2018, due to unclaimed service. He refiled on June 27, 2018, and obtained service by publication, but the court dismissed this second complaint without prejudice on November 27, 2018, for failure to prosecute. McCullough filed a third complaint on September 12, 2019, after the statute of limitations expired but within one year of the second dismissal.The trial court dismissed the third complaint, agreeing with Bennett that it was time-barred since the statute of limitations had expired. The Second District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the saving statute applied by its plain terms, allowing McCullough to refile within one year of the second dismissal.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the Second District's decision. The court held that under the plain language of Ohio’s saving statute, R.C. 2305.19(A), McCullough’s third complaint was timely. The statute allows a plaintiff to commence a new action within one year after a previous action fails otherwise than on the merits. The court rejected Bennett’s argument for a “one-use” limitation on the saving statute, noting that the statute’s text does not support such a restriction. The court also dismissed Bennett’s argument that the saving statute could not apply because the second complaint was dismissed before the statute of limitations expired, clarifying that the current version of the statute does not include this requirement. Finally, the court found that the saving statute applied despite the service issues with the second complaint, as the third complaint was filed within the statutory period allowed. View "McCullough v. Bennett" on Justia Law