Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying a writ of mandamus sought by Appellant to compel Judge Julie M. Lynch to vacate certain nunc pro tunc entries, holding that Appellant was not entitled to the writ.Appellant was sentenced in 2003 on more than sixty felony counts involving crimes he committed in four separate cases. This appeal involved three cases that included offenses Appellant committed after postrelease control became part of Ohio's sentencing scheme in 1996. Prior to Appellant's release from prison in 2020, Judge Lynch issued the nunc pro tunc entries at issue, which corrected some of Appellant's sentencing entries to include references to the imposition of a mandatory five-year term of postrelease control. Appellant brought this action seeking a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Lynch to vacate the entries. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant did not have a clear legal right to relief in mandamus. View "State ex rel. Randlett v. Lynch" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus ordering Trumbull County Board of Elections and its director and Secretary of State Frank LaRose (collectively, Respondents) to place Sarah Thomas Kovoor's name on the November 8, 2022 general election ballot for the office of judge of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, holding that Relators were not entitled to relief.Relators, the Trumbull County Republican Central Committee and Kovoor, sought a writ of mandamus ordering Respondents to certify Kovoor to the November 2022 general election ballot. Secretary LaRose voted against certifying Kovoor as candidate. The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus, holding that Relators did not show a clear legal right to have Kovoor's name placed on the general election ballot as a candidate for the judge of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas. View "State ex rel. Trumbull County Republican Central Committee v. Trumbull County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the order of the trial court ordering forfeiture of Appellant's 2014 Chevrolet Silverado, holding that there was no equal protection violation and that, as applied to Appellant, the vehicle forfeiture did not violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.Appellant entered a plea of no contest to one charge of operating a vehicle while intoxicated (OVI). Because Appellant had two prior OVI convictions within the preceding ten years, his vehicle was seized pending the completion of the proceedings. After a forfeiture hearing held pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4503.234 the trial court ordered Appellant to forfeit his vehicle. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statutory classification contained in Ohio Rev. Code 4511.19(G)(1)(c)(v) does not violate constitutional equal protection guarantees; and (2) the forfeiture of Appellant's vehicle was not grossly disproportional and was thus not unconstitutional as applied to Appellant. View "State v. O'Malley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that in order for a person whose license is suspended for an offense for operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs (OVI) to be guilty of driving under an OVI suspension, the person must cause movement of a motor vehicle on the public roads or highways within this state during the period of the suspension.Because Defendant was in the driver's seat while a parked car was running and her license was suspended due to an OVI offense, the officer cited her for driving under a suspended license. The charge was later amended to reflect a violation of Ohio Rev. Code 4510.14 for driving under an OVI suspension. The trial court found Defendant guilty of driving under an OVI suspension. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that, in order for the state to prove the element of "operated" under section 4510.14(A), it must present sufficient evidence showing some movement of the vehicle. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in order for a person whose license is suspended for an OVI offense to be guilty of driving under an OVI suspension, the person must cause or have caused movement of the motor vehicle on the public roads or highways within this state. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus against Appellee, the warden of Trumbull Correctional Institution, holding that the court of appeals properly dismissed the petition.After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to a prison term of thirty-six years to life. His convictions and sentence were affirmed on appeal. Appellant later filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he was entitled to relief because the jury's verdict was not unanimous. The court of appeals dismissed the petition, concluding that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law law by way of direct appeal to raise his claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant had an adequate remedy at law by which to raise his jury-unanimity claim; and (2) the trial court's judgment was not void for lack of jurisdiction. View "Pope v. Bracy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ sought by Relators, five electors of the city of Canal Winchester, to have a referendum on a zoning ordinance placed on the general election ballot, holding that that the ordinance was properly enacted as emergency legislation and was not subject to referendum.Canal Winchester, NorthPoint Development, LLC, and the owners of the property at issue entered into an agreement whereby the owners agreed to petition for annexation to the city and the city and developer agreed to take steps for the land to be rezoned for the proposed development. However, the owners reserved the right to undo the annexation if the city's zoning approval became subject to referendum. After the city passed a resolution accepting annexation of the land, the city passed a second ordinance as emergency legislation repealing the previous ordinance and rezoning the property to "planned industrial district." Relators then sought to have the ordnance placed on the November ballot for referendum. When their request was refused, Relators filed their complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel the petition to be transmitted to the Board. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding holding that the referendum was not subject to referendum and that the ordinance satisfied Ohio Rev. Code 731.30. View "State ex rel. Halstead v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the court of appeals correctly found the petition to be procedurally defective under Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(C) and 2725.04.Appellant was convicted of five counts of aggravated rape and sentenced to an aggregate prison term of twenty years to life. After he was released, Appellant was arrested by his parole officer for violating the conditions of his parole and found guilty of the charged violations. Appellant filed a petition for habeas corpus, arguing that his parole revocation hearing had been untimely. The court of appeals sua sponte dismissed the petition on the grounds that it failed to comply with the requirements of sections 2969.25(C) and 2725.04. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that dismissal was proper in this case. View "State ex rel. Foster v. Foley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that Ohio Rev. Code 4117.11(B)(7) does not violate the First Amendment, holding that the statute's prohibition on inducing or encouraging targeted picketing in connection with a labor-relations dispute violates the First Amendment.Section 4117.11(B)(7) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employee organization or public employees to "induce or encourage any individual in connection with a labor relations dispute to picket the residence or any place of private employment of any public official or representative of the public employer.” The common pleas court in this case rejected a constitutional challenge to the statute, ruling that section 4117.11(B)(7) was a valid, content-neutral time, place and manner limitation on speech. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the law was a form of expressive-activity suppression that was irreconcilable with First Amendment protections. View "Portage County Educators Ass'n for Developmental Disabilities v. State Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition and denied as moot a writ of mandamus sought by protestors - the village of Moscow and its mayor - to keep a petition to surrender the corporate powers of the village off the November 2022 ballot, holding that the protestors were entitled to a writ of prohibition based on Ohio Code 703.20(A) and (B)(1).The protestors of the petition to surrender the village's corporate powers commenced this original action for writs of prohibition and mandamus after the board of elections voted to deny the protest. The Supreme Court granted the request for a writ of prohibition, holding that the protestors were entitled to a writ of prohibition reversing the board's certification of the surrender petition to the November ballot because the board's decision to approved the surrender petition for placement on the ballot was contrary to law. View "State ex rel. Moscow v. Clermont County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to dismiss two of the charges against him, holding that toxicology results trigger a new speedy-trial period for charges premised on the commission of a per se operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs (OVI) offense.The State charged Defendant with one felony offense related to a car accident in which Defendant killed another driver and was held in jail pending indictment. The grand jury's indictment, however, included additional charges based on toxicology results that had not been available at the time of Defendant's arrest. At issue was whether the charges based on Defendant's drug-test results were subject to the same speedy-trial period as the original charge. The Supreme Court held (1) the test results were new information necessary to establish that Defendant operated a vehicle with a prohibited level of drugs in his system; and (2) therefore, the State was entitled to a new speedy-trial period for the charges premised on the per se OVI offense. View "State v. Sanford" on Justia Law