Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus ordering the Mahoning County Board of Elections to place Eric Ungaro's name on the November 2022 general election ballot as an independent candidate for the office of state representative, holding that Ungaro successfully established that he was entitled to the writ.Ungaro filed a statement of candidacy and nominating petition to run as an independent candidate for the office of state representative of the 59th Ohio House District in the November 2022 general election. The Board rejected the petition by a vote of three to one. Ungaro then filed this action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the Board to place his name on the ballot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board abused its discretion by invalidating Ungaro's petition in an arbitrary fashion. View "State ex rel. Ungaro v. Mahoning County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's mandamus complaint for failure to satisfy the affidavit requirement of Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(A), holding that Appellant failed to demonstrate any error in the court of appeals' judgment of dismissal.In 1993, Appellant was convicted of murder. In 2021, Appellant commenced this action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the Ohio Adult Parole Authority to remove all incorrect information from his file and order a new parole hearing. The court of appeals dismissed the action after finding that Appellant's affidavit of prior actions was fatally deficient. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly dismissed this action for failure to comply with section 2969.25(A). View "State ex rel. Pointer v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority" on Justia Law

In this expedited election case the Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus compelling Ohio Secretary of State Frank La Rose to certify Terpsehore P. Maras's name to the November 8, 2022 ballot as an independent candidate for Ohio Secretary of State, holding that Maras was entitled to the writ.On July 18, 2022, Secretary LaRose informed Maras that she had submitted a significant number of signatures and that her candidacy was certified to the November ballot. Justin Bis subsequently filed a protest against the certification of Maras's candidacy, challenging the validity of sixty-five of the petition signatures. A hearing officer sustained the protest as to eighteen signatures and recommended that Maras be decertified from the ballot. Secretary LaRose adopted most of the hearing officer's conclusions and decertified Maras from the ballot. Maras then filed this original action for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court granted relief, holding (1) the Secretary acted in clear disregard of applicable law when he refused to count certain verified signatures; and (2) because with the additional signatures the total number of petition signatures exceeded the threshold required for ballot access, the Secretary is ordered to certify Maras's name to the November 8 ballot as an independent candidate for Ohio Secretary of State. View "State ex rel. Maras v. LaRose" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying a writ of mandamus sought by Appellant to compel Judge Julie M. Lynch to vacate certain nunc pro tunc entries, holding that Appellant was not entitled to the writ.Appellant was sentenced in 2003 on more than sixty felony counts involving crimes he committed in four separate cases. This appeal involved three cases that included offenses Appellant committed after postrelease control became part of Ohio's sentencing scheme in 1996. Prior to Appellant's release from prison in 2020, Judge Lynch issued the nunc pro tunc entries at issue, which corrected some of Appellant's sentencing entries to include references to the imposition of a mandatory five-year term of postrelease control. Appellant brought this action seeking a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Lynch to vacate the entries. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant did not have a clear legal right to relief in mandamus. View "State ex rel. Randlett v. Lynch" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus ordering Trumbull County Board of Elections and its director and Secretary of State Frank LaRose (collectively, Respondents) to place Sarah Thomas Kovoor's name on the November 8, 2022 general election ballot for the office of judge of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, holding that Relators were not entitled to relief.Relators, the Trumbull County Republican Central Committee and Kovoor, sought a writ of mandamus ordering Respondents to certify Kovoor to the November 2022 general election ballot. Secretary LaRose voted against certifying Kovoor as candidate. The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus, holding that Relators did not show a clear legal right to have Kovoor's name placed on the general election ballot as a candidate for the judge of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas. View "State ex rel. Trumbull County Republican Central Committee v. Trumbull County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the order of the trial court ordering forfeiture of Appellant's 2014 Chevrolet Silverado, holding that there was no equal protection violation and that, as applied to Appellant, the vehicle forfeiture did not violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.Appellant entered a plea of no contest to one charge of operating a vehicle while intoxicated (OVI). Because Appellant had two prior OVI convictions within the preceding ten years, his vehicle was seized pending the completion of the proceedings. After a forfeiture hearing held pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4503.234 the trial court ordered Appellant to forfeit his vehicle. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statutory classification contained in Ohio Rev. Code 4511.19(G)(1)(c)(v) does not violate constitutional equal protection guarantees; and (2) the forfeiture of Appellant's vehicle was not grossly disproportional and was thus not unconstitutional as applied to Appellant. View "State v. O'Malley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that in order for a person whose license is suspended for an offense for operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs (OVI) to be guilty of driving under an OVI suspension, the person must cause movement of a motor vehicle on the public roads or highways within this state during the period of the suspension.Because Defendant was in the driver's seat while a parked car was running and her license was suspended due to an OVI offense, the officer cited her for driving under a suspended license. The charge was later amended to reflect a violation of Ohio Rev. Code 4510.14 for driving under an OVI suspension. The trial court found Defendant guilty of driving under an OVI suspension. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that, in order for the state to prove the element of "operated" under section 4510.14(A), it must present sufficient evidence showing some movement of the vehicle. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in order for a person whose license is suspended for an OVI offense to be guilty of driving under an OVI suspension, the person must cause or have caused movement of the motor vehicle on the public roads or highways within this state. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus against Appellee, the warden of Trumbull Correctional Institution, holding that the court of appeals properly dismissed the petition.After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to a prison term of thirty-six years to life. His convictions and sentence were affirmed on appeal. Appellant later filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he was entitled to relief because the jury's verdict was not unanimous. The court of appeals dismissed the petition, concluding that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law law by way of direct appeal to raise his claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant had an adequate remedy at law by which to raise his jury-unanimity claim; and (2) the trial court's judgment was not void for lack of jurisdiction. View "Pope v. Bracy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ sought by Relators, five electors of the city of Canal Winchester, to have a referendum on a zoning ordinance placed on the general election ballot, holding that that the ordinance was properly enacted as emergency legislation and was not subject to referendum.Canal Winchester, NorthPoint Development, LLC, and the owners of the property at issue entered into an agreement whereby the owners agreed to petition for annexation to the city and the city and developer agreed to take steps for the land to be rezoned for the proposed development. However, the owners reserved the right to undo the annexation if the city's zoning approval became subject to referendum. After the city passed a resolution accepting annexation of the land, the city passed a second ordinance as emergency legislation repealing the previous ordinance and rezoning the property to "planned industrial district." Relators then sought to have the ordnance placed on the November ballot for referendum. When their request was refused, Relators filed their complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel the petition to be transmitted to the Board. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding holding that the referendum was not subject to referendum and that the ordinance satisfied Ohio Rev. Code 731.30. View "State ex rel. Halstead v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the court of appeals correctly found the petition to be procedurally defective under Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(C) and 2725.04.Appellant was convicted of five counts of aggravated rape and sentenced to an aggregate prison term of twenty years to life. After he was released, Appellant was arrested by his parole officer for violating the conditions of his parole and found guilty of the charged violations. Appellant filed a petition for habeas corpus, arguing that his parole revocation hearing had been untimely. The court of appeals sua sponte dismissed the petition on the grounds that it failed to comply with the requirements of sections 2969.25(C) and 2725.04. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that dismissal was proper in this case. View "State ex rel. Foster v. Foley" on Justia Law