Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Duke Energy Ohio, Inc. applied to the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) for an increase in natural gas distribution rates and approval of an alternative-rate plan. The Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel (OCC) filed an application for rehearing, which PUCO initially extended through a tolling order. However, following a decision in a related case, In re Application of Moraine Wind, L.L.C., it was determined that PUCO lacked the authority to issue such tolling orders, meaning the OCC’s application for rehearing was denied by operation of law after 30 days.The OCC did not appeal the denial by operation of law but instead filed a second application for rehearing challenging PUCO’s tolling order practice. After the Moraine Wind decision, PUCO journalized an entry on September 4, 2024, acknowledging the denial by operation of law and closing the case. The OCC then filed a third application for rehearing, which PUCO denied on October 2, 2024. The OCC subsequently filed a notice of appeal on October 25, 2024.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and denied Duke Energy’s motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that under R.C. 4903.11, the OCC’s appeal was timely because it was filed within 60 days of PUCO’s journalized entry on September 4, 2024, which constituted an “entry upon the journal of the commission of the order denying an application for rehearing.” Thus, the OCC properly invoked the court’s jurisdiction, and the appeal was allowed to proceed. View "In re Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

Tony Fenstermaker, an inmate at the Southeastern Correctional Institution, requested public records from Union County Prosecuting Attorney David W. Phillips on March 20, 2024. Fenstermaker sought the records-retention schedule of the prosecutor’s office, certified statements prepared under former R.C. 309.161 for the years 2016 through 2022, and the cashbook/journal maintained under R.C. 2335.252 for the same period. Phillips acknowledged receipt of the request on March 22, 2024, but did not provide the requested records until June 28, 2024.Fenstermaker filed a mandamus action on June 10, 2024, seeking to compel Phillips to produce the records and to award statutory damages. The Supreme Court of Ohio granted an alternative writ and referred the case to mediation, which was unsuccessful. The case was returned to the regular docket, and both parties submitted evidence and briefs.The Supreme Court of Ohio found that Phillips had provided the requested records, rendering the mandamus request moot. However, the court determined that Phillips had failed to produce the records within a reasonable period, as the delay exceeded three months without sufficient justification. Consequently, the court awarded Fenstermaker $1,000 in statutory damages under R.C. 149.43(C)(2) for the delay. The court denied Fenstermaker’s request for prejudgment interest, as the case was not based on tortious conduct and there was no precedent for awarding prejudgment interest in public-records cases. View "State ex rel. Fenstermaker v. Phillips" on Justia Law

An inmate, Edward Brown, filed a mandamus action against Laura Sackett, an employee at the Lake Erie Correctional Institution, for allegedly failing to respond to his public-records requests. Brown requested access to a media report and video footage of an alleged assault against him in March 2022 and a copy of the contract between CoreCivic, Inc. and the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) regarding the management of the institution.The lower court initially dismissed Brown's complaint, but upon reconsideration, the Supreme Court of Ohio issued an alternative writ, setting a schedule for evidence and briefs. Sackett responded to Brown's requests by stating that no records of the alleged assault existed and that the contract would require redaction, costing $206.05, including labor costs for redaction. Brown did not pay the fee, and the contract was not provided.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and found that Sackett complied with her duties regarding the February 16 request by asking Brown for more specific information, which he did not provide. Therefore, the court denied the writ of mandamus and statutory damages for this request. However, the court found that Sackett improperly included labor costs in the fee for the contract requested on February 20, as public offices can only charge actual copying costs and postage. The court issued a writ of mandamus ordering Sackett to provide the contract upon Brown's payment of $158.05 for copying and postage. Additionally, the court awarded Brown $1,000 in statutory damages for Sackett's failure to make the contract available at cost and within a reasonable time. Brown's request for court costs was denied due to his indigency affidavit. View "State ex rel. Brown v. Sackett" on Justia Law

In December 2023, Mary McDonald filed a petition to run as a Republican candidate for a seat on the Montgomery County Board of Commissioners. A protest was filed against her candidacy by Mohamed Al-Hamdani and Brenda Blausser, alleging she was not qualified due to her position in the Democratic Party and other statutory non-compliances. During the protest hearing, it was revealed that a confidential legal memorandum from the county prosecutor’s office had been leaked to the protesters. An investigation found that the board’s deputy director, Russell M. Joseph, had forwarded the memo from his board email to his personal email and then to Al-Hamdani.The Montgomery County Board of Elections initially denied a public-records request for emails related to the memo, citing attorney-client privilege and lack of access to the records. After further clarification, the board maintained its position, leading Joseph J. Platt to file an original action seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the board to produce the emails and to organize and maintain public records properly.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and determined that the email from the prosecutor’s office to the board and the email Joseph sent from his board email to his personal email were public records and not protected by attorney-client privilege. However, the email Joseph sent from his personal email to Al-Hamdani was not considered a public record. The court granted the writ in part, ordering the board to produce the two emails, awarded Platt $1,000 in statutory damages, court costs, and attorney fees subject to an itemized application. The court denied the writ regarding the organization and maintenance of records. View "State ex rel. Platt v Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Michael Satink, an employee of the City of Lakewood's Department of Public Works, was terminated for alleged insubordinate and inappropriate behavior. The union representing Satink, Ohio Council 8, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, filed a grievance, leading to a last-chance agreement (LCA) that reinstated Satink with the condition that any further misconduct would result in immediate termination without recourse to the grievance or arbitration provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement (CBA). Satink was terminated again for workplace misconduct, and the union filed another grievance. The city refused to arbitrate, citing the LCA, prompting the union to seek arbitration through the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas.The common pleas court denied the city's motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and granted the union's motion to compel arbitration. The city appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, which reversed the lower court's decision, holding that the State Employment Relations Board (SERB) had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter because the union's claims were dependent on collective-bargaining rights created by R.C. Chapter 4117.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that the union's claims did not allege an unfair labor practice or conduct constituting an unfair labor practice under R.C. 4117.11. Therefore, SERB did not have exclusive jurisdiction. The court emphasized that the right to arbitrate is a contractual right derived from the CBA, independent of R.C. Chapter 4117. The court also noted that R.C. 4117.09(B)(1) allows a party to bring a suit for a violation of a collective-bargaining agreement in a court of common pleas. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Eighth District's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ohio Council 8, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Lakewood" on Justia Law

A husband and wife met at a religious conference, began a relationship, and married after the wife made clear she would not have sex before marriage. After moving to Ohio, the husband began demanding sex more frequently than the wife desired, insisting she submit regardless of her wishes. The wife described a recurring pattern during their marriage in which “date nights” would end with consensual sex, followed by the husband engaging in nonconsensual vaginal intercourse or oral sex while she was asleep or otherwise unwilling. This pattern continued for several years, leading to the wife’s departure, her obtaining a protection order, and the husband’s indictment on three counts of rape, each tied to specific time periods.The case was tried before a jury in the Wood County Court of Common Pleas, which convicted the husband on all three counts. On appeal, the Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed the convictions and vacated them, finding the evidence insufficient to prove “sexual conduct” as defined by Ohio law for the charged periods. The appellate court reasoned that while the wife’s testimony about “date nights” included explicit descriptions of penetration, her testimony regarding the specific periods in the indictment did not explicitly describe penetration, and the use of phrases like “have sex” was deemed too vague to establish the statutory element.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that the wife’s testimony, including her explicit descriptions of vaginal intercourse and her use of the phrase “have sex,” was sufficient to support the element of “sexual conduct” under Ohio’s rape statute when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The court concluded that the appellate court erred by refusing to draw reasonable inferences in favor of the State and reversed the judgment, remanding the case for consideration of the husband’s remaining appellate arguments. View "State v. Coker" on Justia Law

The case involves a workplace accident where the decedent sustained severe head injuries, resulting in a persistent vegetative state and eventual death. The decedent's workers' compensation claim was allowed for several conditions, and he sought scheduled-loss compensation for the loss of use of his bilateral upper and lower extremities. The Industrial Commission of Ohio initially denied this claim, concluding that the loss of use was due to brain injury, not direct injury to the extremities.The decedent filed a mandamus action challenging the denial, but it was dismissed after his death. Subsequently, his surviving spouse, Byk, filed a motion with the commission for scheduled-loss compensation under R.C. 4123.57(B) and 4123.60. The commission denied this motion, stating that the decedent's entitlement to the loss-of-use award had already been determined and denied.Byk then filed a mandamus action in the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which granted a limited writ directing the commission to vacate its order and issue a new order adjudicating the merits of Byk’s claim. The commission and Republic Steel appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and reversed the Tenth District's judgment. The court held that Byk was not entitled to scheduled-loss compensation under R.C. 4123.60 because the decedent was not "lawfully entitled to have applied" a second time for the same scheduled-loss compensation that had already been denied. The court emphasized that the statutory language did not authorize an injured worker to reapply for the same compensation after a final denial. Consequently, Byk's request for a writ of mandamus was denied. View "State ex rel. Byk v. Indus. Comm." on Justia Law

Aarin Clinkscale was indicted in 2014 for his involvement in an armed robbery that resulted in two deaths. He pled guilty to aggravated robbery with a firearm specification and two counts of involuntary manslaughter. In 2016, the trial court sentenced him to a total of 14 years in prison, including a mandatory three-year term for the firearm specification. Clinkscale received 762 days of jail-time credit for time served prior to sentencing.Clinkscale filed his first motion for judicial release in June 2020, which the trial court denied, stating he would be eligible for release in October 2022. He filed a second motion for judicial release in October 2022. The State objected, arguing that Clinkscale was not eligible until November 2024, as he needed to serve the mandatory term and then wait five years. The trial court granted Clinkscale’s motion, and the State appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision, concluding that Clinkscale’s jail-time credit shortened the waiting period for judicial release.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and disagreed with the Tenth District’s conclusion. The court held that jail-time credit does not reduce the required five-year waiting period following the expiration of mandatory prison terms under R.C. 2929.20(C)(1)(d). The court emphasized that the five-year waiting period is fixed and begins only after the mandatory term is completed. Consequently, Clinkscale’s motion for judicial release was premature. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals and remanded the case for consideration of Clinkscale’s equal-protection argument. View "State v. Clinkscale" on Justia Law

Ricardo Dodson is serving prison sentences for convictions in two separate cases. In the first case, Dodson was indicted on multiple counts of rape, attempted rape, and kidnapping. The jury returned guilty verdicts, but the jury-verdict forms mistakenly listed his surname as Jackson instead of Dodson. The trial-court judge read the wrong name into the record and sentenced Dodson to consecutive prison terms for each count. In the second case, Dodson was indicted on another count of rape and kidnapping. He was found guilty and sentenced to serve this sentence consecutively to the sentences from the first case, even though he had not yet started serving those sentences.Dodson petitioned the Seventh District Court of Appeals for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the mistyping of his surname on the jury-verdict forms stripped the trial court of jurisdiction and that the sentences imposed were ambiguous. He claimed that the sentence in the first case should be considered concurrent due to the lack of specificity in the sentencing entry and that the sentence in the second case was ambiguous because it referred to a sentence "already being served" when he had not yet started serving the first sentence.The Seventh District Court of Appeals dismissed Dodson’s petition, determining that his claims were not cognizable in habeas corpus. The court found that the alleged errors did not affect the trial court’s jurisdiction and that Dodson had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law through direct appeal. Dodson appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Seventh District’s judgment, holding that the trial court had jurisdiction over Dodson’s case and that the sentencing entries were not ambiguous. The court concluded that Dodson’s arguments could have been addressed through direct appeal and did not warrant habeas corpus relief. View "State ex rel. Dodson v. Smith" on Justia Law

An inmate at Grafton Correctional Institution filed a mandamus action against the warden’s administrative assistant and public-information officer, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the production of public records and an award of statutory damages. The inmate had sent 13 electronic kites requesting copies of public records, focusing on seven kites sent between May 27 and June 2, 2024. The inmate claimed that the requested records were not provided in a timely manner.The case was initially filed in June 2024. The respondent acknowledged receiving the kites within four to seven days and provided some records on September 3 and others on September 5, 2024. The respondent argued that the delay was due to the volume of requests from the inmate, who had made over 50 public-records requests for more than 300 documents since May 2024. The lower court granted an alternative writ, setting a schedule for evidence and briefs. Both parties submitted their evidence and briefs, and the inmate filed several motions, including a motion to strike the respondent’s evidence and motions to proceed to judgment.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and found that the inmate’s mandamus claim was moot because he had received all the requested records. The court also determined that the three-month response time was reasonable given the volume of requests the respondent had to handle. Consequently, the court denied the inmate’s requests for a writ of mandamus and statutory damages, as well as all his motions. View "State ex rel. Robinson v. Wesson" on Justia Law