Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted Relator's request for a writ of mandamus ordering the Ohio Department Transportation and its director (collectively, ODOT) to begin appropriation proceedings for the taking of real property owned by Relator, holding that appropriation proceedings were necessary.ODOT's roadway construction project resulted in Relator's property being inaccessible from any road. Relator filed this action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering ODOT to commence appropriation proceedings pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 163. ODOT argued in response that Relator could obtain a permit from the city of Cleveland to connect the property to a road and that Relator must apply for and be denied such a permit before he was entitled to mandamus. The Supreme Court granted Relator's request for a writ of mandamus and ordered ODOT to commence appropriation proceedings, holding that Relator was entitled to a writ compelling ODOT to commence appropriation proceedings. View "State ex rel. Balunek v. Marchbanks" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals construing the language of Ohio Rev. Code 2929.25(D)(4) as prohibiting the trial court from ordering a jail term for a violation of a condition of community control exceeding the maximum jail term imposed on the misdemeanant at sentencing, holding that the court's construction of the statute was incorrect.At issue was whether subsection 2929.25(D)(4) authorizes a trial court to impose a jail term for a violation fo a condition of a community-control sanction when the original sentence was directly imposed under subsection 2929.25(A)(1)(a) and no suspended jail time was reserved as contemplated under subsection 2929.25(A)(1)(b), regardless of whether notice has been provided under subsection 2929.25(A)(3)(c). The Supreme Court held that the limit on the total length of time that a misdemeanant may be incarcerated for both a misdemeanor offense and a violation of a condition of a community-control sanction imposed for that offense is the statutory maximum jail term for the offense, as set forth in section 2929.24, and this limit does not change based on the length of the jail term imposed at sentencing. View "Olmsted Township v. Ritchie" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Respondents' motion to dismiss the underlying complaint seeing writs of procedendo and mandamus to compel Respondents to proceed to a hearing on an ex parte motion seeking temporary custody of minor children, holding that dismissal was warranted.Specifically, the Supreme Court (1) sua sponte dismissed the claims against Sherrick; (2) dismissed the mandamus claim as to all Respondents based on Relator's failure to properly caption her complaint; and (3) dismissed the procedendo claims against all Respondents because none of the Respondents were properly named as defendants. View "Page v. Geauga County Probate & Juvenile Court" on Justia Law

In this case regarding the removal of a prospective juror based solely on his or her gender the Supreme Court held that when a party objecting to a peremptory challenge offers a bare allegation of gender discrimination without offering other relevant circumstances to support an inference of gender discrimination, that party fails to establish a prima facie case of purposeful gender discrimination.After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of the crime of sexual imposition. On appeal, Defendant argued that the prosecutor sought to exclude male jurors because they would tend to sympathize with him. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Defendant established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination when the state exercised its peremptory challenge on a prospective juror and did not provide a gender-neutral explanation for its challenge. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred when it failed to recognize that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), applied to Defendant's objections to the state's peremptory challenges, but the error was immaterial because Defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. View "State v. Stalder" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus against Warden Jay Forshey, holding that the court of appeals did not err granting Forshey's motion to dismiss.Appellant, an inmate, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking his immediate release from prison, arguing that his maximum sentence had expired. The court of appeals granted Forshey's motion to dismiss on the grounds that Appellant did not comply with Ohio Rev. Code 2725.04(D). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals was correct in finding that Appellant did not comply with the requirements of section 2725.04(D) and that this defect alone was a valid basis to dismiss Appellant's petition. View "State ex rel. Missimer v. Forshey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals dismissing this action in mandamus brought by Appellant, an inmate at the London Correctional Institution, against Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost asking Yost to provide him with names of Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) employees who worked on a case Appellant had previously filed against the ODRC, holding that there was no error.In 2016, Appellant filed a pro se lawsuit alleging excessive force during an altercation with ODRC staff. After the parties settled, Appellant unsuccessfully requested from the attorney general's (AG) office the name of the ODRC employee who communicated with the attorney general's office during settlement negotiations. Appellant then filed the current action requesting an order requiring the AG to provide the ODRC employees' who made decisions regarding his settlement. The attorney general dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to show that he had a clear legal right to the requested information or that the AG had a clear legal duty to provide that information. View "State ex rel. Russell v. Yost" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed judgment of the court of appeals denying Mother's complaint for a writ of prohibition, holding that Mother was not entitled to relief on her argument that the juvenile division lacked jurisdiction to award custody of Child to Grandfather.A Nevada court issued a shared parenting order establishing Mother's and Father's rights regarding custody of and visitation of Child. The Nevada court subsequently adopted a modified shared-parenting order. Grandfather later filed a complaint seeking legal custody of Child. The juvenile court and gave Grandfather legal custody of Child. Mother filed a complaint for prohibition, alleging that the juvenile court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to modify the Nevada court's custody order. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court holding that Mother failed in her burden of showing that she was entitled to a writ of prohibition by clear and convincing evidence. View "State ex rel. Harris v. Bruns" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court determining that Plaintiff could not recover under a commercial general-liability (CGL) insurance policy issued by United Specialty Insurance Company, holding that when a CGL insurance policy excludes coverage for injuries arising out of an "assault or battery," the subjective intent of the person who committed the assault or battery is irrelevant.Brown County Care Center, an adult care facility, contracted with United for CGL insurance. The policy excluded coverage for bodily injury arising from "any actual, threatened or alleged assault or battery." Plaintiff was living at the Center when he was attacked by another resident, who was later found by the trial court to be not guilty of felonious assault by reason of insanity. Plaintiff sued, and he and the Center entered into a settlement. Plaintiff later brought a declaratory judgment action against United to collect on the judgment. The trial court determined that Plaintiff could not recover under the policy. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the attack on Plaintiff qualified as a civil-law assault; and (2) because the policy excluded coverage for bodily injuries arising for civil assaults the trial court did not err in its judgment. View "Krewina v. United Specialty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus for noncompliance with Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(A) and remanded this case, holding that the record contained the required affidavit.Appellant, an inmate imprisoned for rape and other offenses, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking an order compelling him to vacate the judgment of conviction because it was unsigned. The court of appeals dismissed the action based on Appellant's purported failure to file an affidavit of prior actions, as required by section 2969.25(A). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the affidavit Appellant filed with his petition supported his argument that he complied with section 2969.25(A). View "State ex rel. Woods v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus against Hamilton County Common Pleas Court Judge Tom Heekin for failure to file an affidavit of prior civil actions as required by Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(A), holding that Appellant filed the required affidavit.Appellant, an inmate, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking an order compelling Judge Heekin to vacate a judgment entry dismissing a malpractice case Appellant had filed against his criminal defense attorney. The court of appeals sua sponte dismissed the petition based on Appellant's purported failure to comply with section 2969.25(A). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the affidavit Appellant filed with his petition supported his claim that he complied with section 2969.25(A). View "State ex rel. Woods v. Heekin" on Justia Law