Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a defendant who was charged with multiple counts of rape and gross sexual imposition involving a minor. He pleaded guilty to several counts, after which his defense counsel withdrew and new counsel was appointed. Despite being represented, the defendant filed several motions on his own, including a motion to withdraw his pleas and a motion to represent himself. The trial court allowed him to represent himself but denied his motion to withdraw his pleas. Before sentencing, he requested and was granted new counsel, and was ultimately sentenced to concurrent prison terms.The defendant appealed to the Ninth District Court of Appeals, arguing, among other things, that the trial court failed to obtain a proper waiver of counsel. The appellate court agreed, finding that the trial court erred in accepting the waiver and failed to comply with procedural requirements, so it reversed and remanded. On remand, the trial court determined that the guilty pleas remained valid and resentenced the defendant. The defendant appealed again, but the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision. He then filed an application to reopen his appeal under Ohio Appellate Rule 26(B), claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The Ninth District granted the application but later confirmed its prior judgment, finding that the defendant had not adequately addressed how his prior appellate counsel was deficient or how he was prejudiced by that deficiency.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed whether an appellate court may presume ineffective assistance of counsel in a reopened appeal when the appellant fails to specifically argue counsel’s deficiency and resulting prejudice, as required by App.R. 26(B)(7). The court held that the requirements of App.R. 26(B)(7) are mandatory: an appellant must address both the deficiency of prior appellate counsel and the resulting prejudice in their brief. Because the defendant failed to do so, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals. View "State v. Clark" on Justia Law

One Power Company challenged two orders issued by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) regarding Ohio Power Company’s fifth electric-security plan. The first issue concerned a protective agreement governing access to confidential discovery materials. One Power argued that the agreement unreasonably prevented its chief executive officer and expert witness, an employee, from accessing all discovery, which allegedly disadvantaged its ability to litigate. The second issue involved the commission’s decision to continue a nonbypassable basic-transmission-cost rider, meaning all customers—including those who purchase generation service from competitive suppliers—must pay the charge.After AEP Ohio filed its application for the fifth electric-security plan, One Power intervened and sought broader access to confidential materials. The PUCO’s attorney examiner denied One Power’s motion for a more permissive protective agreement, finding the proposed limits reasonable. One Power’s interlocutory appeal was also denied. At the evidentiary hearing, One Power renewed its objections, but the commission affirmed the examiner’s rulings and later denied rehearing. Regarding the transmission rider, the commission maintained its nonbypassable status, citing the need for further study before making major changes and noting consistency with prior practice. One Power’s rehearing application on this issue was also denied.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed whether the PUCO’s orders were unlawful or unreasonable. The court held that One Power failed to demonstrate particularized harm from the protective agreement and that the commission acted within its statutory and regulatory authority in continuing the nonbypassable rider. The court found no violation of state electric policy or commission precedent. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the PUCO’s orders. View "In re Application of Ohio Power Co." on Justia Law

Dayton Power and Light Company (DP&L), operating as AES Ohio, sought approval from the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) regarding whether its electric security plan (ESP) resulted in significantly excessive earnings for the years 2018 and 2019. The ESP is a mechanism for setting the standard generation rate for customers who do not choose a competitive supplier. During this period, DP&L also transitioned from its third ESP (ESP III) back to its first ESP (ESP I) after the commission invalidated a similar rider in another utility’s plan, following a decision by the Supreme Court of Ohio. DP&L’s parent company, AES Corporation, made substantial capital contributions to support future investments in grid modernization.PUCO consolidated several related cases and found that DP&L’s ESP resulted in excessive earnings of $3.7 million in 2018 and $57.4 million in 2019. However, PUCO determined that DP&L could offset these excessive earnings with its commitment to future capital investments, and therefore, no refund to consumers was required. PUCO also found that DP&L’s ESP passed the required quadrennial review tests, including a prospective analysis of earnings and a comparison to market-rate offers. The Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel (OCC) appealed, challenging the refusal to order refunds and the continued collection of a rate-stabilization charge. DP&L filed a protective cross-appeal, asserting alternative grounds for affirmance.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that PUCO was not authorized under R.C. 4928.143(F) to allow DP&L to retain significantly excessive earnings based solely on its commitment to future investments. The court reversed PUCO’s orders and remanded the case for a new significantly excessive earnings test analysis. The court rejected OCC’s challenge to the rate-stabilization charge, finding its legality was not at issue in this appeal, and also rejected DP&L’s alternative grounds for affirmance. View "In re Application of Dayton Power & Light Co." on Justia Law

A divorce and child-custody case between two parents was initially filed in 2019 in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, where a guardian ad litem was appointed for their minor children. The parents made partial payments toward the guardian ad litem’s fees, but a motion for payment of the remaining fees was pending when the mother requested, and the court granted, a dismissal of the case without prejudice. Shortly after, the parents refiled for divorce, and the guardian ad litem sought payment for services rendered in both the dismissed and refiled cases. The trial court ordered both parents to pay their respective shares of the outstanding fees.The father appealed the trial court’s order to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, arguing that the court erred by ordering payment of fees incurred in the dismissed case. The appellate court initially dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, stating that such an order was interlocutory and not final or appealable. Upon reconsideration, however, the appellate court reversed its position, finding that under the specific circumstances, the order was final and appealable under R.C. 2505.02(B)(2) because it affected a substantial right in a special proceeding. The appellate court then vacated the trial court’s fee order.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that an interlocutory order requiring payment of guardian ad litem fees in an ongoing divorce and child-custody proceeding is not a final order under R.C. 2505.02(B). The court reasoned that such orders do not, as a category, affect a substantial right requiring immediate appeal, and parties must wait for a final judgment before appealing. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Ohio vacated the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals, finding it lacked jurisdiction to review the fee order. View "E.A.K.M. v. M.A.M." on Justia Law

The case concerns a personal injury lawsuit in which the plaintiffs attempted to serve the defendant with a summons and complaint at an address where he no longer resided. The plaintiffs had previously been informed, during an earlier related lawsuit, that the defendant had moved to a new address. Despite this knowledge, they directed service to the defendant’s former residence, which was then occupied by unrelated tenants. The certified mail was accepted by one of the tenants, who eventually forwarded the documents to the defendant’s father, and the father then delivered them to the defendant. The defendant received the summons only days before his answer was due.After the complaint was refiled, the defendant raised the defense of insufficient service of process in his answer. Nearly two years later, he moved for summary judgment, arguing that service had not been perfected within the required one-year period under Ohio Civil Rule 3(A), since the summons was sent to an outdated address. The Summit County Court of Common Pleas granted summary judgment to the defendant, finding that although the plaintiffs’ service attempt complied with the procedural requirements of Civil Rule 4.1(A)(1)(a), it did not meet the due process standard of being reasonably calculated to provide notice. The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that for service of process to be sufficient, it must not only comply with the procedural rules but also be reasonably calculated to apprise the defendant of the lawsuit, as required by due process. Service to the defendant’s former residence, when the plaintiffs were aware of his current address, was not reasonably calculated to provide notice and was therefore insufficient. The court affirmed the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals. View "Hunt v. Alderman" on Justia Law

A city filed a criminal complaint against a property owner, alleging that his property was in violation of certain provisions of the International Property Maintenance Code (IPMC), which the city had adopted by ordinance. The complaint stated that the property’s residence lacked water service, had holes in the roof, and that a break wall was collapsing into a river. It also alleged the presence of various items described as “debris,” such as barrels, lawn mowers, boats, trailers, propane tanks, and overgrown vegetation. The city claimed these conditions violated IPMC sections requiring properties to be maintained in a “clean,” “safe,” and “sanitary” condition.The property owner moved to dismiss the charges in the Huron Municipal Court, arguing that the IPMC provisions were unconstitutionally vague because the terms “clean,” “safe,” and “sanitary” were undefined. The trial court agreed, relying on a prior decision from the Seventh District Court of Appeals, State v. ACV Realty, which had found similar IPMC language void for vagueness. As a result, the trial court dismissed the relevant counts. The city appealed, and the Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the terms in question should be given their ordinary meanings and were sufficiently clear to inform property owners of the prohibited conduct.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case to resolve a conflict between appellate districts. The court held that a defendant cannot successfully challenge a law as void for vagueness if his conduct clearly falls within the activities the law prohibits. Because the alleged conditions of the property—such as lack of water, structural decay, and accumulation of debris—clearly violated the IPMC provisions, the property owner’s vagueness challenge failed. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the appellate court’s judgment and remanded the case to the municipal court for further proceedings. View "Huron v. Kisil" on Justia Law

A business owner, who held a 50% stake in a group of skilled-nursing and real estate companies, personally guaranteed a $77 million loan arranged by a bank for those companies and others managed by his business partner. The loan was part of a refinancing effort after the companies’ prior lender declared a default. The owner signed both an initial guaranty agreement and a subsequent reaffirmation of that guaranty. Within a year, the companies defaulted on the new loan, and it was later revealed that the business partner had engaged in fraudulent check-kiting. The bank demanded repayment from the guarantors, including the owner, who then argued that he had been fraudulently induced into signing the guaranty because the bank failed to disclose material financial risks related to his partner and the companies.The Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas granted summary judgment to the bank, finding that the owner had waived defenses under the guaranty agreement, that the bank owed no duty to disclose information about the companies’ financial condition, and that the owner could not establish fraudulent inducement. On appeal, the First District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that as a surety, the owner could assert a defense based on the bank’s alleged failure to disclose facts that materially increased his risk, adopting the “doctrine of increased risk” from Section 124(1) of the Restatement (First) of Security.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and reversed the appellate court’s decision. The court held that, under Ohio law, parties to an arm’s-length transaction do not owe each other a duty to disclose unknown facts that materially increase risk, unless a special relationship of trust or confidence exists. This rule applies regardless of whether one party is a guarantor or surety. The court reinstated the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the bank. View "Huntington Natl. Bank v. Schneider" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who pleaded guilty in 2004 to two counts of forgery, both fifth-degree felonies, after depositing counterfeit checks and withdrawing funds from a credit union. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent nine-month prison terms and ordered him to pay $2,663 in restitution to the victim, Mid-State Credit Union, and $408 in court costs. The sentencing entry specified that these amounts were entered as civil judgments. After serving his sentence and completing postrelease control, the individual applied in 2022 to have the record of his convictions sealed, though he had not paid the restitution.The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granted the application to seal the records, despite the State’s objection that restitution remained unpaid. The State appealed, but the Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court reasoned that because the restitution was entered “as a civil judgment,” it was not a criminal sanction that needed to be satisfied before the record could be sealed. The court further concluded that the civil judgment for restitution had become permanently dormant under debtor-protection laws, as it had not been revived within the statutory period.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that, regardless of how a restitution order is labeled in a sentencing entry, it remains a criminal sanction that is part of the sentence. Therefore, restitution must be paid before an offender is eligible to apply to have the record of conviction sealed. The court reversed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals and remanded the case for consideration of the individual’s constitutional arguments. View "State v. T.W.C." on Justia Law

In 1996, the defendant pleaded guilty to several first-degree felonies, including rape, attempted aggravated murder, kidnapping, and aggravated burglary, for acts committed in 1995. The trial court imposed an aggregate indefinite prison sentence of 15 to 50 years under the sentencing laws in effect before July 1, 1996. Over the years, the defendant challenged aspects of his sentence and conviction, including the indefinite nature of his sentence and the lack of eligibility for judicial release, but these challenges were unsuccessful.After serving more than 26 years, the defendant filed a motion for judicial release under R.C. 2929.20 in December 2021, arguing that he was serving a “stated prison term” and had completed the mandatory portion of his sentence. The State of Ohio opposed the motion, asserting that the defendant was serving an indefinite sentence under pre-S.B. 2 law and was therefore ineligible for judicial release. The trial court granted the motion for judicial release, placing the defendant on community control, and the State appealed. The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that amendments to R.C. 2929.20 had expanded eligibility for judicial release to include offenders serving nonmandatory sentences on or after April 7, 2009.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that the definition of “eligible offender” for purposes of judicial release under R.C. 2929.20 includes only those serving a “stated prison term,” as defined in R.C. 2929.01. The court concluded that an offender serving an indefinite sentence imposed under pre-S.B. 2 law does not meet this definition and is therefore not eligible for judicial release. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Seventh District Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court to deny judicial release. View "State v. Staffrey" on Justia Law

A company leased 24 properties from a landlord under separate agreements that included options to renew the leases for additional terms, provided the tenant gave written notice 120 days before expiration. The tenant successfully renewed twice, but in 2021, failed to send the required renewal notice to the landlord by the deadline. The landlord notified the tenant that the leases would terminate, and after unsuccessful negotiations for new leases, the tenant sought a court declaration that its late renewal was still effective, citing the significant value of improvements made to the properties.The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas ruled in favor of the tenant, finding that equity could forgive the tenant’s “honest mistake” in missing the deadline and prevent forfeiture of the improvements. The court also found that the landlord’s acceptance of rent after the expiration of a tolling agreement estopped the landlord from terminating the leases. The Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on prior Ohio appellate decisions that allowed equitable relief for honest mistakes or even negligence if forfeiture would result and the landlord was not prejudiced.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and reversed the Tenth District’s judgment. The court held that while equity may excuse a failure to comply with a lease renewal option in cases of fraud, accident, or mistake, it does not extend to negligence. The court clarified that “mistake” refers to a misapprehension of a basic assumption at contract formation, not a negligent failure to act. Because the tenant’s failure to timely exercise the renewal option was due to negligence, equitable relief was not warranted. The case was remanded to the Tenth District Court of Appeals to consider the landlord’s remaining arguments regarding equitable estoppel. View "Ashland Global Holdings, Inc. v. SuperAsh Remainderman, Ltd. Partnership" on Justia Law