Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court determining that Plaintiff could not recover under a commercial general-liability (CGL) insurance policy issued by United Specialty Insurance Company, holding that when a CGL insurance policy excludes coverage for injuries arising out of an "assault or battery," the subjective intent of the person who committed the assault or battery is irrelevant.Brown County Care Center, an adult care facility, contracted with United for CGL insurance. The policy excluded coverage for bodily injury arising from "any actual, threatened or alleged assault or battery." Plaintiff was living at the Center when he was attacked by another resident, who was later found by the trial court to be not guilty of felonious assault by reason of insanity. Plaintiff sued, and he and the Center entered into a settlement. Plaintiff later brought a declaratory judgment action against United to collect on the judgment. The trial court determined that Plaintiff could not recover under the policy. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the attack on Plaintiff qualified as a civil-law assault; and (2) because the policy excluded coverage for bodily injuries arising for civil assaults the trial court did not err in its judgment. View "Krewina v. United Specialty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus for noncompliance with Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(A) and remanded this case, holding that the record contained the required affidavit.Appellant, an inmate imprisoned for rape and other offenses, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking an order compelling him to vacate the judgment of conviction because it was unsigned. The court of appeals dismissed the action based on Appellant's purported failure to file an affidavit of prior actions, as required by section 2969.25(A). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the affidavit Appellant filed with his petition supported his argument that he complied with section 2969.25(A). View "State ex rel. Woods v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus against Hamilton County Common Pleas Court Judge Tom Heekin for failure to file an affidavit of prior civil actions as required by Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(A), holding that Appellant filed the required affidavit.Appellant, an inmate, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking an order compelling Judge Heekin to vacate a judgment entry dismissing a malpractice case Appellant had filed against his criminal defense attorney. The court of appeals sua sponte dismissed the petition based on Appellant's purported failure to comply with section 2969.25(A). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the affidavit Appellant filed with his petition supported his claim that he complied with section 2969.25(A). View "State ex rel. Woods v. Heekin" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals determining that the Mill Creek Metropolitan Park District Board of Commissioners failed to comply with Ohio Rev. Code 1545.11 when it initiated appropriation proceedings to take private property owed by Landowner, holding that the trial court's orders denying Landowner's motions for summary judgment were not final, appealable orders.The Park District initiated appropriation proceedings against Landowner. Landowner answered by denying the necessity of the appropriation and the Park District's authority to appropriate the property. The trial court denied Landowner's motions for summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed and remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for Landowner. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' judgment, holding that the court erred in determining that the trial court's orders denying Landowner's motions for summary judgment were final, appealable orders. View "Mill Creek Metropolitan Park District Bd. of Commissioners v. Less" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus but denying his requests for statutory damages and court costs, holding that there was no error.Appellant, an inmate, sent a public-records request to Appellee, an employee of a private company that contracts with the state of Ohio to house state prisoners. Dissatisfied with the ultimate response, Appellant filed the current action asking for a writ of mandamus ordering Appellee to produce the records requested. The court of appeals granted the writ to a limited extent and denied Appellant's request for statutory damages and court costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in denying Appellant's request for statutory damages and court costs. View "State ex rel. Atakpu v. Shuler" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for writs of prohibition and mandamus against the Ohio Parole Board and the Franklin County Child Support Enforcement Agency (collectively, the State) and denied Appellant's motions to strike the State's merit brief in whole or in part, holding that there was no error.Appellant was found guilty, after a jury trial, of the rape of two women, one of whom he impregnanted, kidnapping, and attempted rape. Appellant subsequently appeared before the parole board eight times and was denied parole each time. Appellant later filed an original action of writs of prohibition and mandamus arguing that the parole board improperly denied parole. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed and denied Appellant's motions to strike, holding that Appellant failed to establish that he was entitled to relief. View "State ex rel. Dodson v. Ohio Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus against Youngstown Mayo Jamael Tito Brown, Youngstown Fire Chief Barry Finley, and Youngstown Finance Director Kyle Miasek (collectively, the officials), holding that Appellant had a remedy in the ordinary course of the law.Appellant, a captain in Youngstown's fire department, and his union filed a grievance against the city alleging that he city had violated the parties' collective bargaining agreement (CBA) by not timely promoting him to battalion chief. The grievance was denied, and the union did not seek further relief. Appellant brought this complaint. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint on the grounds that Appellant had an adequate remedy at law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly concluded that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. View "State ex rel. Casey v. Brown" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting Appellee's requested writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to reinstate an order of its staff hearing officer denying Appellee's request for temporary total disability (TTD) compensation, holding that Appellee demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief requested and a clear legal duty on the Commission's part to provide that relief.In granting the writ, the court of appeals concluded that the Commission incorrectly applied the law of voluntary abandonment, as set forth in State ex rel. Klein v. Precision Excavating & Grading Co., 1993 N.E.3d 386. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission misinterpreted and misapplied the law of voluntary abandonment as it related to Appellant's request for TTD compensation. View "State ex rel. Quest Diagnostics, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n" on Justia Law

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In proceedings involving divorce and domestic-violence-civil-protection-order (DVCPO) cases that had been pending for more than five years the Supreme Court denied M.D.'s motion to enforce this Court's writ of procedendo but granted his alternative request to declare M.A.D. a vexatious litigator under Sup. Ct. Prac. R. 4.03(B), holding that M.A.D. had persistently engaged in frivolous conduct in the Supreme Court without reasonable cause.Previously, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and granted M.D. a writ of procedendo ordering Judge Reeve Kelsey to rule on pending motions and to proceed promptly to final hearings in the underlying cases. M.D. moved to enforce the writ or, alternatively, to declare M.A.D. a vexatious litigator. The Supreme Court denied the motion to enforce but granted M.D.'s request to declare M.A.D. a vexatious litigator under Rule 4.03(B), holding that M.A.D.'s filings were calculated attempts to prevent Judge Kelsey's compliance with the previously-issued writ of procedendo. View "State ex rel. M.D. v. Kelsey" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus sought by Relators ordering Secretary of State Frank LaRose to remove a proposed constitutional amendment (SJR 2) from the August 8, 2023 special election ballot, holding that Ohio Const. art. XVI, 1 authorizes the General Assembly to prescribe a special election on a specific date by joint resolution.SJR 2 proposed to amend the Ohio Constitution to require a vote of at least sixty percent of Ohio electors to approve any constitutional amendment and to modify the procedures for an initiative petition proposing a constitutional amendment. The Secretary issued a directive to all county boards of elections instructing them to prepare to hold a special election on August 8. Thereafter, Relators brought this action opposing the constitutional amendment proposed in SJR 2. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the August 8, 2023 special election called in SJR 2 was authorized by Ohio Const. Art. XVI, 1. View "State ex rel. One Person One Vote v. LaRose" on Justia Law