Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) that some of Taxpayer's equipment used in fracking was subject to Ohio's sales and use tax, holding most of the equipment at issue was exempt from taxation.While Ohio law generally exempts from taxation equipment used direction in oil and gas production not everything in the production of oil and gas qualifies for the exemption. After Taxpayer purchased equipment for use in its fracking operations the tax commissioner issued use-tax assessments, one for each piece of equipment. The commissioner then canceled about half the assessments. The BTA affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that equipment consisting of blenders, hydration units, chemical-additive units, t-belts, and sand kings are tax exempt. View "Stingray Pressure Washing, L.L.C. v. Harris" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals in this case challenging the constitutionality of the Ohio Liquor Control Commission's emergency rule that was adopted as part of the state's initial response to the COVID-19 pandemic, holding that this appeal and the underlying case were moot.The Commission cited Appellant for violating Rule 80, which was adopted through the emergency procedures prescribed under Ohio Rev. Code 119.03(G). Appellant appealed the order and then initiated a separate civil action for declaratory judgment challenging the constitutionality of the rule. Rule 80 then expired. The trial court dismissed the declaratory judgment action because of the pending administrative appeal. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' judgment, holding that this case was moot. View "Highland Tavern, L.L.C. v. DeWine" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying a writ of prohibition preventing Judge Peter J. Corrigan from proceeding in a declaratory judgment and preliminary injunction action, holding that Judge Corrigan did not lack jurisdiction to proceed in the case.United Twenty-Fifth Building, LLC sued Jessica Maron, a party to a pending divorce case, alleging that Jessica was interfering with an easement involving a multistory building in Cleveland. Specifically, United argued that Jessica was preventing access to the building's elevator, lobby, and stairwell and delaying the construction of a restaurant in the building. Jessica filed a prohibition petition seeking to prevent Judge Corrigan from exercising jurisdiction in United's case because, under the jurisdictional-priority rule, Judge Corrigan patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to proceed because the case involved property that may be subject to equitable division in her divorce case. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Jessica failed to show that the jurisdictional-priority rule applied under the circumstances of this case. View "State ex rel. Maron v. Corrigan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Ohio Power Siting Board authorizing Firelands Wind, LLC to construct, operate, and maintain a wind farm in Huron and Erie Counties, holding that the nineteen nearby residents and the Black Swamp Bird Observatory that brought this appeal (collectively, Appellants) have not established that the Board's order was unlawful or unreasonable.On appeal, Appellants challenged the Board's determination that the wind farm satisfies the statutory requirements for constructing a major utility facility, asserting, among other things, that the project could kill birds and create excessive noise for residents near the wind farm and that the Board improperly failed to follow its administrative rules. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board's order was neither unlawful nor unreasonable. View "In re Application of Firelands Wind, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus against the Hamilton County clerk of courts (Appellee) to compel the production of public records and awarded him $700 in statutory damages, holding that Appellant failed to prevail on his claims.Appellant, an inmate, sent public records requests to the clerk, who informed Appellant that his requests were subject to approval from the judge who sentenced him or their successor according to Ohio Rev. Code 149.43(B)(8). Appellant filed a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the clerk's response. The petition was dismissed, but the Supreme Court reversed. On remand, Appellant filed a motion for default judgment. The court of appeals denied both Appellant's motion for default judgment and his petition for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed and awarded statutory damages, holding that Appellant had prevailed on his claims to the extent the law allowed. View "State ex rel. Ware v. Parikh" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that indefinite sentencing under the "Reagan Tokes Law," which became effective in March 2019 and requires that for certain felony offenses a sentencing court impose on the offender an indefinite sentence consisting of a minimum and a maximum prison term, is not unconstitutional.The two appellants in this case - Christopher Hacker and Danan Simmons - were both subject to sentencing under the Reagan Tokes Law. On appeal, Appellants argued that Ohio Rev. Code 2967.271, which allows the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to maintain an offender's incarceration beyond the minimum prison term imposed by a trial court, violates the separation of powers doctrine, procedural due process, and the right to a jury trial. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding that Appellants failed to rebut the Reagan Tokes Law's presumption of constitutionality in their facial challenge. View "State v. Hacker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Relator's request for a writ of mandamus ordering the Ohio Department Transportation and its director (collectively, ODOT) to begin appropriation proceedings for the taking of real property owned by Relator, holding that appropriation proceedings were necessary.ODOT's roadway construction project resulted in Relator's property being inaccessible from any road. Relator filed this action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering ODOT to commence appropriation proceedings pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 163. ODOT argued in response that Relator could obtain a permit from the city of Cleveland to connect the property to a road and that Relator must apply for and be denied such a permit before he was entitled to mandamus. The Supreme Court granted Relator's request for a writ of mandamus and ordered ODOT to commence appropriation proceedings, holding that Relator was entitled to a writ compelling ODOT to commence appropriation proceedings. View "State ex rel. Balunek v. Marchbanks" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals construing the language of Ohio Rev. Code 2929.25(D)(4) as prohibiting the trial court from ordering a jail term for a violation of a condition of community control exceeding the maximum jail term imposed on the misdemeanant at sentencing, holding that the court's construction of the statute was incorrect.At issue was whether subsection 2929.25(D)(4) authorizes a trial court to impose a jail term for a violation fo a condition of a community-control sanction when the original sentence was directly imposed under subsection 2929.25(A)(1)(a) and no suspended jail time was reserved as contemplated under subsection 2929.25(A)(1)(b), regardless of whether notice has been provided under subsection 2929.25(A)(3)(c). The Supreme Court held that the limit on the total length of time that a misdemeanant may be incarcerated for both a misdemeanor offense and a violation of a condition of a community-control sanction imposed for that offense is the statutory maximum jail term for the offense, as set forth in section 2929.24, and this limit does not change based on the length of the jail term imposed at sentencing. View "Olmsted Township v. Ritchie" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Respondents' motion to dismiss the underlying complaint seeing writs of procedendo and mandamus to compel Respondents to proceed to a hearing on an ex parte motion seeking temporary custody of minor children, holding that dismissal was warranted.Specifically, the Supreme Court (1) sua sponte dismissed the claims against Sherrick; (2) dismissed the mandamus claim as to all Respondents based on Relator's failure to properly caption her complaint; and (3) dismissed the procedendo claims against all Respondents because none of the Respondents were properly named as defendants. View "Page v. Geauga County Probate & Juvenile Court" on Justia Law

In this case regarding the removal of a prospective juror based solely on his or her gender the Supreme Court held that when a party objecting to a peremptory challenge offers a bare allegation of gender discrimination without offering other relevant circumstances to support an inference of gender discrimination, that party fails to establish a prima facie case of purposeful gender discrimination.After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of the crime of sexual imposition. On appeal, Defendant argued that the prosecutor sought to exclude male jurors because they would tend to sympathize with him. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Defendant established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination when the state exercised its peremptory challenge on a prospective juror and did not provide a gender-neutral explanation for its challenge. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred when it failed to recognize that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), applied to Defendant's objections to the state's peremptory challenges, but the error was immaterial because Defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. View "State v. Stalder" on Justia Law