Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Public Utilities Commission allowed two electric power operating companies to adjust their economic-development cost-recovery riders and recover additional revenues. Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU) sought a rehearing, which the commission denied. IEU appealed the order, arguing that the commission approved the rate increase without reviewing its reasonableness. The Supreme Court found the order prejudiced IEU because some of IEU's members paid higher rates as a result of the order. The Court then affirmed, holding that IEU failed to meet its burden to identify a legal problem with the order. Because the Court presumes that orders are reasonable, IEU must upset that presumption, and IEU did little more than disagree with the order, giving the Court no reason to reverse.

The Ohio Public Utilities Commission approved a âprogram portfolio planâ proposed by Appellee American Electric Power (SEP). The plan contained a variety of programs designed to increase energy efficiency and reduce peak demands on AEPâs system. Appellant Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU) challenged the PUCâs approval of the plan to the district court, arguing that the plan was too costly, was not energy-efficient, and did not meet the requirements imposed under the applicable state laws. The Supreme Court reviewed the record and found that IEUâs challenges âall lack merit.â The Court affirmed the lower courtâs and PUCâs decisions approving the plan.

The Ohio Public Utilities Commission (PUC) approved âreasonable arrangementsâ between American Electric Power Company (AEP) and two manufacturing firms, Ormet Primary Aluminum (Ormet) and Eramet Marietta, Inc. (Eramet). The arrangements gave substantial price discounts on electric service. The PUC approved the arrangements and allowed AEP to collect from other customers most of the revenue foregone to the discounts. Ormet asked the commission to approve an arrangement linking Ormetâs electric rate to the market price of aluminum; Eramet asked for a fixed discounted rate. The PUC held public hearings to consider the manufacturersâ applications, and numerous parties intervened, including Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU). Disagreements regarding both applications centered on the amount of the discount and who should pay for it. The PUC issued orders permitting discounted rates to the manufacturers, but the PUCâs plan was not exactly what AEP had proposed. AEP appealed the PUCâs decision, arguing that the discounts do not allow the power company to recoup its losses from the plan discounts. The Supreme Court found that state law âaffirmatively gives the commissionânot the utilitiesâfinal say over arrangementsâ like the ones decided for Ormet and Eramet. The Court affirmed the PUCâs decisions regarding the manufacturing companiesâ arrangements.

Appellant Fairfield City Schools (Fairfield) sought reimbursement for a total disability compensation award given to one of its employees. Edward Carpenter, Jr. had hypertension since 1995. In 2002, he injured his back while at work. Mr. Carpenterâs injury resulted in a considerable amount of disability compensation. In 2008, Fairfield requested handicap reimbursement from the Ohio Bureau of Workersâ Compensation for at least part of the disability payments it made to Mr. Carpenter. Fairfieldâs application alleged that Mr. Carpenterâs pre-existing hypertension is a cardiac disease that delayed his recovery from back surgery, contributing to prolonged disability payments. The Bureau rejected Fairfieldâs application as âinsufficient to establish cardiac disease as a pre-existing condition.â Fairfield appealed the Bureauâs decision multiple times. With every appeal, Fairfield added additional doctorâs reports and Bureau datasheets to support its argument that hypertension is a cardiac disease. The court of appeals eventually denied Fairfieldâs appeal and application for a writ of mandamus. The appellate court found that the Bureau had exclusive authority to weigh the evidence Fairfield submitted, and the Bureau could find Fairfieldâs evidence insufficient to prove hypertension was a cardiac disease. Fairfield appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Court agreed with the Bureauâs and appellate courtâs decisions. The Court affirmed the lower courtâs judgment.

The criminal prosecution of the Appellees in this case arose from conduct that allegedly occurred during the election recount of the November, 2004 presidential election. Appellee Jacqueline Maiden was the coordinator for the elections board, and Appellees Kathleen Dreamer and Rosie Grier were the manager and assistant manager, respectively, of the board's Ballot Department. Maiden was in charge of preparing the board's staff for the recount, and Dreamer and Grier were involved in organizing and conducting the recount. In December, 2004, the board met and certified the recount results. During that meeting, information was disclosed that suggested that personnel might not have conducted the recount in accordance with Ohio law. The board did not launch an investigation and did not refer the matter to the prosecutor. In August, 2005, a grand jury was convened, and indicted Dreamer and Grier on election-law violations regarding the recount. The elections board agreed that it would pay the legal fees and expenses of Dreamer, Maiden and Grier in all matters related to their criminal cases if they were not convicted of criminal conduct. In January, 2007, a jury tried Dreamer, Maiden and Grier. Grier was found not guilty on all charges, and the charges against Dreamer and Maiden were eventually dismissed. In 2009, Appellees filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus to compel the prosecutor and commissioners to appoint an independent counsel and to order the commissioners to pay for their legal expenses. The appellate court granted Appellees' the writ, but the Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court found that the writ was available to "county officers" under the applicable state law under which Appellees sought relief. Appellees were "employees" and not "officers." Accordingly, the Court held that the appellate court erred by granting Appellees the writ of mandamus.

During the divorce proceedings of Jeffrey Kissinger and Beth Wilhelm-Kissinger, a dispute arose: Ms. Wilhelm-Kissinger allegedly illegally took privileged e-mail messages between Mr. Kissinger and his attorney from Mr. Kissinger's computer, and gave them to her attorney. Mr. Kissinger moved to disqualify Ms. WIlhelm-Kissinger's attorney. Ms. Wilhelm-Kissinger's attorney denied seeking or reviewing any of the messages in question. The trial court subsequently denied Mr. Kissinger's motion. Mr. Kissinger appealed, arguing that the denial of his motion to disqualify counsel is a final and appealable order. The appellate court found that the denial was not a final order that it could review. The Supreme Court agreed, finding that the denial of the motion to disqualify was not a final order. The Court affirmed the lower courts' judgments.

This case came before the Supreme Court twice. The property owner challenged the Board of Tax Appeals' (BTA) use of a propertyâs sale price as an indicator of its value, arguing that it was an unreliable way to value property. The BTA rejected that challenge and adopted use of the sale price. In the first appeal, the Supreme Court held that the BTA failed to give full consideration to whether the sale was "recent" which was one of the criteria that must be satisfied before a sale price may be used to value a property for tax purposes. The BTA responded by relying solely on the temporal proximity of the sale to the tax-lien dates. Because proximity was not the only factor affecting recency, and because the property owner made a persuasive argument, the Supreme Court vacated the BTA's decision and remanded the case for a proper determination of "recency" based on the entire record. BTA then issued its decision on remand. The BTA again adopted the sale price as the value of a property based on a conclusion that "recency" had not be rebutted. The property owner appealed again to the Supreme Court, arguing that the BTA disregarded the Supreme Court's earlier holding. The Supreme Court reviewed the BTA's findings of fact and found that its decision was "reasonable and lawful," and that it "fulfilled the instruction of the Court." The Court affirmed the decision of the BTA.

Josephine Centorbi died intestate in 2007. At the time of her death, Ms. Centorbi received Medicaid benefits. Ms. Centorbiâs sister, Dianne Fiorille administered the estate, and acting without counsel, applied to relieve the estate from administration. When she filed the application, Ms. Fiorille did not check the box on the form to attest that the decedent was over 55 years old and received Medicaid assistance. In addition, as administrator, Ms. Fiorille failed to file some other forms necessary to notify both the probate court and the Ohio Department of Jobs and Family Services (ODJFS) of the decedentâs death. The probate court granted Ms. Fiorilleâs application to relieve the estate from administration on the same day it was filed. Two years later, ODJFS learned of Ms. Centorbiâs death. It filed an application to vacate the probate courtâs order, but its application was denied. The probate court held that because Ms. Fiorille indicated that no notice was required (in the form of the omitted check box), ODJFSâs application was time barred. The appellate court affirmed the probate courtâs decision. The Supreme Court found that failing to check the box on the initial relief-from-administration form tolled the statute of limitations. Without the check, the Medicaid program had not been officially notified of the decedentâs death. The Court reversed the appellate courtâs decision and remanded the case to the probate court for further proceedings.

Attorney Marie Wheeler and the law firm of Roderick Linton, LLP appealed a grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee New Destiny Treatment Center. The Center sued Attorney Wheeler and her firm over representation of a dissident member of the Centerâs board of trustees who tried to regain control of the Center. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether attorneys who were retained by the dissident member of the Center could actually be sued by the Center for malpractice. The Supreme Court found in this case that the law firm represented only the dissident trustee, not the Center. No attorney-client relationship ever existed between the law firm and the Center. Accordingly, there was no basis for the Center to maintain a cause of action against the firm. The Court reversed the appellate court, and reinstated the trial courtâs judgment in favor of Attorney Wheeler and the law firm.

In 2007, grand jury returned an indictment against Defendant Jeremy Damron that charged one count of felonious assault, two counts of domestic violence and one count of rape. In 2009, Defendant entered a guilty plea to the assault charge and to one count of domestic violence. In exchange, the State requested that the trial court enter a nolle prosequi to the remaining two counts. At the plea hearing, Defendant was advised of the applicable statutory maximum penalties for the charges to which he pled guilty. Before the sentencing hearing, each party submitted a sentencing memorandum. Defendant argued that the two charges against him should be merged as âallied offenses.â Defendant conceded that assault and domestic violence were not the same, but that he could not have committed one offense without the other. A merged offense as Defendant sought, would carry less total jail time. The trial court merged Defendantâs offenses, and sentenced him to eight years for assault, and five years for domestic violenceâwith the sentences to run concurrently. The State appealed, and the appellate court found that âEven if [it] were to conclude that the [trial] courtâs decision to impose concurrent sentences had been based on faulty reasoning, the fact remains that the courtâs order that the sentences be served concurrently resulted in a sentence authorized by the statutes governing sentencing.â The Supreme Court disagreed with both lower courtsâ rulings, holding that the offenses for which Defendant was charged were not âalliedâ but two separate and distinct offenses for which Defendant received separate convictions and separate sentences. The Court vacated the sentences and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing.