Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Ohio State University entered into an agreement for construction-management services with Turner Construction Company for a construction project. Later, Ohio State selected Turner to serve as construction manager at risk through a qualifications-based selection process rather than going through a traditional competitive bidding process. Ohio State did not require Turner to furnish a surety bond to secure the performance of Turner and its subcontractors. Three trade associations, two that advance the interests of subcontractors (ASA and ASA-Ohio) and one that advances the interests of sureties (SFAA), filed an action for a writ of mandamus to compel Ohio State to require that Turner furnish a bond as construction manager at risk. The Supreme Court dismissed the claims of ASA and ASA-Ohio and denied SFAA's mandamus claim, holding that (1) because ASA and ASA-Ohio did not establish that any of their members had been injured by Ohio State's decision, they lacked standing to raise their mandamus claim; and (2) because the applicable legislation does not require a bonding requirement, SFAA was not entitled to the requested relief in mandamus.

In June 2008, appellant Thomas Everette was convicted of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and grand theft of a motor vehicle. The next year Everette submitted a petition for postconviction relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. The state moved to dismiss Everette's petition as untimely because it had been filed more than 180 days after the filing of the transcript of proceedings, which the state deemed to be the videotapes of the trial and hearings. Everette opposed the motion, arguing that his 180-day time limitation did not begin until the written transcripts were filed and thus his appeal was timely. The trial court dismissed Everette's petition, holding it was untimely under Ohio Rev. Code 2953.21(A)(2). The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the videotaped recordings constituted the transcript of the proceedings. The Supreme reversed and remanded, holding that for purposes of determining when the 180-day time period for filing a postconviction relief petition shall accrue, only the certified, written transcript constitutes a "transcript" under Ohio R. App. P 9(A) and Ohio Rev. Code 2953.21(A)(2) when both a videotape recording and the written form of the proceedings are available.

Appellant Luiz Paneto injured his left foot and ankle at work. After surgery, Paneto still used a cane to walk and had a limp. Paneto moved appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio for scheduled loss compensation, alleging a total loss of use of his left leg. The commission denied the application after finding Paneto's loss of use was not total. After being awarded permanent total disability (PTD) compensation, Paneto reapplied for total-loss-of-use compensation, alleging his PTD award was a new or changed circumstance that warranted reconsideration of the previous denial. The commission disagreed and further appeal was refused. The court of appeals upheld the commission's order. After Paneto filed his notice of appeal the commission terminated Paneto's PTD compensation after learning Paneto concealed his full-time employment. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, finding (1) because the PTD compensation was terminated, it is not a new or changed circumstance sufficient to permit the commission to reopen the issue of scheduled loss benefits; and (2) the evidence supports the commission's determination that Paneto did not have a total loss of use, which negates the need for any further discussion.

Appellee Sutton injured his back while on the job at Tomco. Sutton reported the injury to Tomco's president, after which Sutton was fired. Sutton filed suit against Tomco asserting a statutory claim for unlawful retaliation under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.90 and a tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The trial court granted Tomco's motion for judgment on the pleadings, and Sutton appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment against Sutton on the statutory claim and reversed the judgment against Sutton on the public-policy claim, holding that the discharge violated public policy as expressed in Ohio Rev. Code 4123.90. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute expresses a clear public policy prohibiting retaliatory employment action against injured employees; (2) Ohio recognizes a common-law tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy when employees are retaliated against after they are injured on the job but before they file, institute, or pursue a workers' compensation claim; and (3) the remedies available for wrongful discharge in violation of the public policy against retaliatory employment actions are limited to those listed in the statute.

Sunoco, the owner and operator of several petroleum-refining facilities, purchased electric service from Toledo Edison. The contract between the two companies permitted arrangements that differed from the standard rate schedules. BP Oil Company, which owns a competing refined located next to Sunoco's refinery, also had a contract with Toledo Edison. Both contracts contained 'most favored nation' clauses, which allowed Sunoco and BP to utilize any "arrangement, rates or charges" for their facilities that Toledo Edison had given to the other. At issue was whether Sunoco could invoke the clause to extend the duration of its contract with Toledo Edison to match the duration of BP's contract with Toledo Edison, which would result in a $13 million savings for Sunoco. The commission found the clause did not allow Sunoco to extend the duration of its contract. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the plain language of the clause, the word "arrangement" encompasses all non-price terms of a competitor's contract. Because duration is a non-price term of contract, it is subject to the clause.

Appellee Lynn was indicted on one count of aggravated burglary. The indictment contained a clerical error naming the underlying offense as theft. During the trial the trial court denied the state's request to amend the indictment to remove the word 'theft.' At the conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury on the elements of assault and theft. The jury found Lynn guilty of aggravated burglary, concluding Lynn had committed the underlying offense of assault but had not committed the underlying offense of theft. Lynn argued that once the indictment stated the underlying offense as theft, a jury instruction on assault or any other predicate offense was error. The court of appeals held the trial court erred in instructing the jury on assault and reversed the conviction. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that when an aggravated burglary indictment incorrectly states the underlying criminal offense, the trial court does not violate defendant's due process rights by conforming the jury instructions to the evidence presented at trial and instructing the jury on the correct underlying offense.

Appellant Jamey Baker was struck in the right eye by a piece of metal while working for appellee. After the piece was removed and the laceration of the cornea was repaired, Baker underwent cataract surgery. Immediately following the accident and prior to the cataract surgery several months later, Baker experienced an eight percent visual impairment. At issue was whether the surgical removal of the lens of an eye in the course of treatment for a workplace injury entitles the injured worker to compensation pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 42123.57(B) for a total loss of sight. A staff hearing officer with the Bureau of Workers' Compensation granted an award for a total loss of vision in the right eye, and the Industrial Commission vacated the order. The court of appeals denied Baker's writ of mandamus, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court calculated Baker's loss of sight based on the percentage of vision actually lost as a result of the injury, prior to any corrective surgery. Because Baker's loss of uncorrected vision did reach the statutory threshold of twenty-five percent, Baker's injury was not compensable under the statute.

Appellee Joseph Wilson was tried before a jury and found guilty on three counts of aggravated robbery, felonious assault, and kidnapping. Wilson appealed, arguing the three offenses for which he was convicted were allied offenses of similar import and should have been merged into one offense for sentencing. The court of appeals held that kidnapping and felonious assault were allied offenses and kidnapping and aggravated robbery were allied offenses. The court vacated Wilson's sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing at which the state could elect which of the allied offenses it wanted to pursue for sentencing. The state appealed, arguing the scope of a resentencing judge's authority upon a remand to correct an allied-offenses sentencing error is limited to accepting the state's election among allied offenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when a cause is remanded to a trial court to correct an allied-offenses sentencing error, the trial court must hold a new sentencing hearing for the offenses that remain after the state selects which allied offense or offenses to pursue. The Court also held res judicata does not preclude a defendant from objecting to issues that arise at the new sentencing hearing.

D.B. and another boy were under 13 years of age when they engaged in sexual activity. The juvenile court adjudicated D.B. delinquent for rape based on the violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2907.01(A)(1)(b), which prohibits one from engaging in sexual conduct with a person under the age of 13. On appeal, D.B. argued that application of the statute violated his federal rights to due process and equal protection. At issue was whether a child's constitutional rights are violated when, as a member of the class protected by the statute, the child is adjudicated as a delinquent based upon a violation of the statute. The appeals court affirmed, and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court held that (1) as applied to offenders who are under 13 themselves, the statute is unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process because arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is encouraged; and (2) application of the statute in this case violates equal protection because only one child was charged with being delinquent, while others similarly situated were not.

Warren Lewis, a convicted misdemeanant, unsuccessfully sought a stay from the trial court and thereafter paid the fine and costs while on inactive probation that expired during the pendency of his appeal. At issue was whether Lewis's completion of his sentence was voluntary, thus making his appeal moot. The Supreme Court held that the completion of a sentence is not voluntary and will not moot an appeal if the circumstances surrounding it demonstrate that the appellant neither acquiesced in the judgment nor abandoned the right to appellate review. The Court concluded that the expiration of an inactive period of probation during the pendency of appeal does not render the appeal moot because the misdemeanant failed to file a motion to stay in the appellate court where the misdemeanant unsuccessfully sought a stay of execution from the trial court to prevent an intended appeal from being declared moot and subsequently filed a notice of appeal to challenge the conviction.