Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court declined to issue a writ of prohibition sought by Youngstown Civil Service Commission, the City of Youngstown and Youngstown Mayor Jamael Tito Brown (collectively, Youngstown) to prevent Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas Judge Maureen Sweeney from exercising jurisdiction over an administrative appeal commenced by Michael Cox and to require her to vacate all orders issued in the appeal, holding that Youngstown was not entitled to the writ.Youngstown commenced this action seeking a writ of prohibition prohibiting Judge Sweeney from exercising any judicial authority over the underlying action and vacating all orders and journal entires issued in that case. As grounds for the writ, Youngstown argued that Judge Sweeney patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over it because the pending underlying action was an untimely administrative appeal. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Judge Sweeney did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over the matter at issue. View "State ex rel. Youngstown Civil Service Commission v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's partial denial of Defendant's motion for summary judgment in this dog bite case, holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed, precluding summary judgment.Defendant in this case was a deputy sheriff and K-9 handler who hosted a cookout for friends at his home. Plaintiff, who attended the cookout, was bitten by Defendant's canine partner, Xyrem. Plaintiff brought suit, asserting a common-law negligence claim and a claim under Ohio Rev. Code 955.28, which imposes strict liability for injuries caused by a dog in certain situations. The trial court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment in part, determining that Defendant was immune from liability under section 955.28(B). Defendant appealed the denial of summary judgment on the negligence claim. The court of appeals reversed, holding that, as a matter of law, Defendant was not manifestly acting outside the scope of his employment or official responsibilities during the evening of the dog bite. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that reasonable minds could differ regarding whether Defendant was manifestly acting outside the scope of his employment during the events leading up to Plaintiff's injury. View "Harris v. Hilderbrand" on Justia Law

In this employment action, the Supreme Court held that under the plain language of Ohio Rev. Code 124.48, a "vacancy" occurs for competitive promotional examination purposes when the incumbent in the promoted-rank position in the fire department retires and therefore the position must be filled through the process set forth in section 124.48.Specifically at issue was whether a position is rendered vacant for purposes of section 148.48 when the incumbent in that position retires but is rehired for the same position the next day. The court of appeals concluded that the retirement in question did not create a vacancy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that whether an incumbent intends to permanently leave a position or to leave with the expectation of immediately returning to that position is irrelevant to the determination of whether the incumbent's leaving creates a vacancy under the terms of section 149.48. View "State ex rel. Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local 1536, AFL-CIO v. Sakacs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Tenth District Court of Appeals granting Donna Kidd's request for a writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its order denying Kidd's application for permanent-total-disability (PTD) compensation, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying Kidd's application for PTD compensation.In denying Kidd's application for PTD compensation the commission concluded that Kidd was capable of sustained remunerative employment at a sedentary level. The Tenth District granted Kidd's request for a writ of mandamus, concluding that the Commission exceeded its discretion by relying on a medical report that outlined limitations on Kidd's capabilities that were "seemingly inconsistent" with the definition of "sedentary work" in Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(2)(a). The Supreme Court reversed and denied the writ, holding that the commission did not abuse its discretion by considering "prevalent workplace accommodations to determine whether Kidd could return to 'sustained remunerative employment' with her medical restrictions." View "State ex rel. Kidd v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals upholding the final determination by the tax commissioner assessing a use tax against Appellant, holding that the Board did not err in upholding that tax commissioner's final determination.The challenged assessment in this action related to items used in the construction of a data center that Appellant contracted to have built. The Supreme Court affirmed the Board's decision upholding the use tax assessed against Appellant, holding (1) Appellant failed to cite to any authority to support its argument that it was not liable for the use tax because a contractor had already paid it on the items in question; (2) Appellant forfeited the arguments under its third and fourth positions of law; and (3) Appellant's first and second propositions of law were moot. View "PCM, Inc. v. Harris" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied this action brought by Jennifer Giroux and Thomas Brinkman (collectively, Giroux) challenging an initiative petition to place a proposed constitutional amendment on the November 7, 2023 ballot, holding that Giroux failed to show that Ohio law required invalidating the petition.At issue was a petition proposing a constitutional amendment entitled "Right to Reproductive Freedom with Protections for Health and Safety." Giroux brought this challenge alleging that the petition did not comply with Ohio Rev. Code 3519.01(A). The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that section 3519.01(A) does not require a petition proposing a constitutional amendment to include the text of the existing statute, and Giroux's challenge failed for this reason. View "Giroux v. Committee Representing Petitioners" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a peremptory writ of mandamus ordering Jennifer Harkey, the finance director of the City of Maumee, to transmit a referendum petition to the Lucas County Board of Elections, holding that it was beyond doubt that Petitioner was entitled to a writ of mandamus.Petitioner was a committee member who was attempting to place a referendum of an ordinance passed in March 2023 relating to requirements for non owner-occupied residential property on the ballot for the November 2023 election. Petitioner brought this action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering Harkey to transmit immediately the referendum petition to the Board. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that Harkey had a mandatory, ministerial duty to transmit the referendum petition to the Lucas County Board of Elections. View "State ex rel. LaChapelle v. Harkey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court modified the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus seeking an order directing Appellees to produce unreacted invoices for certain legal services under the Public Records Act, Ohio Pub. Rec. Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, holding that the writ should have been denied.Appellant sought unreacted invoices for legal services provided to the Rootstown Township Board of Trustees by two entities. Appellant was provided with the invoices but redacted portions of them that contained information protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. Appellant then filed his petition for a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals dismissed the petition, concluding that the information sought by Appellant was protected from disclosure under the attorney-client privilege. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for an in camera inspection of the invoices. After an in camera inspection, the court of appeals dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court modified the judgment in part by denying, rather than dismissing, the petition, holding that the redacted invoices contained information protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. View "State ex rel. Ames v. Baker, Dublikar, Beck, Wiley & Mathews" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting a writ of mandamus ordering the Ohio Fair Plan Underwriting (OFP) to provide documents in response to a public records request brought by Fair Housing Opportunities of Northwest Ohio (Fair Housing) and denying Fair Housing statutory damages and attorney fees, holding that there was no error.After OFP provided information it argued was partially responsive to Fair Housing's public records request Fair Housing brought this action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering OFP to provide records responsive to the request. Fair Housing further sought statutory damages and attorney fees awards. The court of appeals found that OFP was a public office subject to the Public Records Act and granted a writ of mandamus. The court, however, denied statutory damages and attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) OFP was subject to the Act; and (2) Fair Housing was not entitled to awards of statutory damages or attorney fees. View "State ex rel. Fair Housing Opportunities of Northwest Ohio v. Ohio Fair Plan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Appellant did not comply with Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(C).Defendant was found guilty on multiple felony counts and sentenced to twenty years in prison. While incarcerated, Defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court of appeals granted the warden's motion to dismiss on the grounds that, among other things, Defendant's claim failed to comply with Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(C). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in finding Defendant's noncompliance with section 2969.25(C) to be a basis for dismissal. View "State ex rel. Sands v. Lake County Common Pleas" on Justia Law