Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals in this dispute arising out of environmental-cleanup and remediation work at two Superfund sites in Bronson, Michigan, holding that Restatement (Second) 193 does not govern the choice-of-law analysis for bad faith claims.Scott Fetzer Company filed this action asserting a breach of contract claim against certain insurance companies, including Travelers Casualty and Surety Company, alleging breaches of certain insurance contracts. Fetzer also asserted a tort claim against each company, arguing that they had acted in bad faith when handling his claims. As to Travelers, an administrative judge concluded that Ohio law applied to a discovery dispute concerning Scott Fetzer's bad faith claim. The court of appeals affirmed, determining that Ohio law governed the bad-faith discovery dispute because the cause of action was a tort. In affirming, the court applied the choice-of-law rules set forth in section 145 of the Restatement. Travelers appealed, arguing that section 193 governs the choice-of-law analysis for bad faith claims because they arise out of insurance contracts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly ruled that the choice-of-law analysis applicable to a bad-faith claim as provided by section 145. View "Scott Fetzer Co. v. American Home Assurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition in this original action, holding that the trial court in this case lost jurisdiction to proceed on a request for attorney fees after entering final judgment.After a limited remand in this case stemming from a real estate dispute the trial court entered final judgment, and the judgment was subsequently paid. Thereafter, the prevailing parties filed a motion seeking more than $167,000 in additional attorney fees. Petitioner filed this original action seeking a writ of prohibition alleging that the common pleas court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to conduct further proceedings. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that the court of appeals' mandate did not give the trial court jurisdiction to entertain an attorney fees request that accrued after the final judgment. View "State ex rel. Mather v. Oda" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals rejecting Charles Simpson's peremptory prohibition claim and mandamus claim, holding that the court of appeals did not err in denying the prohibition claim and that Simpson failed to state a valid claim for mandamus relief.Grande Voiture in a separate case filed a motion for an order finding Simpson, the defendant in that case, in contempt of the trial court's order granting declaratory and injunctive relief in favor of Grande Voiture. Common Pleas Court Judge Kimberly Melnick granted Grande Voiture's motion to strike Simpson's answer and counterclaim on the grounds that Grande Voiture's contempt motion was not a pleading. Simpson then filed an original action seeking a peremptory writ of prohibition forbidding the judge from proceeding with the contempt hearing without allowing a jury trial and without considering the answer and counterclaim. Simpson also requested a writ of mandamus compelling the judge to proceed by jury trial on the issues before her. The court of appeals granted the judge's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Simpson failed to state a valid claim for the writs. View "State ex rel. Simpson v. Melnick" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing two complaints Appellant filed seeking writs of mandamus and prohibition, holding that Appellant was not entitled to writs of mandamus or prohibition vacating his convictions and sentence.Appellant filed both a complaint for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel the trial court to vacate his criminal convictions and sentence and a complaint for a writ of prohibition against the trial court raising the same underlying issues. The court of appeals denied the writs, holding (1) Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law through direct appeal to challenge any violation of his right to counsel; and (2) Appellant was not entitled to a writ requiring the trial court to review issues related to the withdrawal of his counsel on direct appeal. View "State ex rel. Boyd v. Tone" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated its decision in State v. Gwynne, __ N.E.3d __ (Ohio 2022) (Gwynne IV) and affirmed the judgment of the Fifth District Court of Appeals in this sentencing dispute, holding that the court of appeals properly applied the plain language of Ohio Rev. Code 2953.08(G)(2) in concluding that the record supported the trial court's consecutive sentence findings.Appellant pleaded guilty to seventeen counts of second-degree burglary, among other offenses. The trial court made the findings required under Ohio Rev. Code 2929.14(C)(4) for imposing consecutive sentences and ordered the felony sentences to be served consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of sixty-five years. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in Gwynne IV, holding on de novo review that the findings required by section 2929.14(C)(4) to impose consecutive prison sentences on an offender must be made in consideration of the aggregate term. The Supreme Court then granted the State's motion for reconsideration, vacated its decision in Gwynne IV and affirmed the court of appeals, holding (1) Ohio Rev. Code 2953.08(G)(2) requires an appellate court to defer to a trial court's consecutive sentence findings, and those findings must be upheld unless they are clearly and convincingly not supported by the record; and (2) the appellate court properly applied that standard. View "State v. Gwynne" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief in this action brought under Ohio's Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, by Kevin Payne against Kelly Rose, an inspector at the Richland Correctional Institution (RCI), holding that Payne did not have a cognizable claim in mandamus.Payne, an inmate at RCI, sent a public-records request to Rose for a copy of, among other things, JPay support ticket number MACI 1220002928. Rose responded that she obtained the requested record and provided a copy of it to Payne. Payne brought this action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering Rose to produce the requested record and statutory damages. The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief, holding (1) because Payne received his requested record before instituting this action he never had a cognizable claim in mandamus; and (2) statutory damages did not accrue. View "State ex rel. Payne v. Rose" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction for violating Ohio Rev. Code 2907.06(A)(2), holding that a jury can reasonably infer that a defendant knew a victim to be substantially impaired so as to convict him of sexual imposition under the statute.Defendant was charged with violating Ohio Rev. Code 2907.06(A)(1) and (2) for his sexual contact with woman who was blind and suffered from unspecified developmental disabilities. The jury found Defendant guilty of both counts of sexual imposition. The court of appeals reversed Defendant's conviction for violating section 2907.06(A)(2), concluding that the victim was not substantially impaired. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) knowledge of a victim's "substantial impairment" can be proved both by the defendant's knowledge of the victim's blindness and evidence of the nature of the interactions between the defendant and the developmentally disabled victim; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to find that Defendant knew that the victim's blindness, together with her developmental disabilities, substantially impaired her ability to appraise the nature of and control of Defendant's conduct. View "State v. Jordan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that Acuity was not required to provide coverage for the car accident in this case, holding that Acuity must provide coverage for the accident.Ashton Smith, who was insured by Acuity and had borrowed a friend's car, was involved in an accident. The car's owner was insured by Progressive Speciality Insurance Company. Under the Progressive policy, Smith was not an "insured person" when he was driving his friend's car, but he was covered by the plain language of the Acuity policy. The trial court found Acuity responsible for providing liability coverage. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the plain language of the two policies at issue, Acuity was responsible for providing coverage. View "Acuity, A Mutual Insurance Co. v. Progressive Specialty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the Ohio Power Siting Board approving two large solar farms that were proposed to be built in Preble County, holding that the Board's order was neither unlawful nor unreasonable.The General Assembly authorized commercial solar farms in Ohio but made their construction conditional on the Board's approval. The Board approved the solar farms after its staff agreed to stipulations imposing a number of conditions on the construction and operation of the facilities. Certain citizens appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was nothing unlawful about the Board's adherence to its own regulations and that the Board did not act unreasonably in making the determinations required by Ohio Rev. Code 4906.10(A). View "In re Application of Alamo Solar I, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for writs of mandamus and prohibition ordering the trial court to vacate his criminal sentence, holding that Appellant was not entitled to a writ of mandamus or prohibition.Appellant was convicted of escape, retaliation, and other offenses and sentenced to 26.5 years in prison. Appellant later brought the current action seeking writs of prohibition and mandamus ordering the trial court to vacate his sentencing entries and to grant any other relief to which he was "entitled." The court of appeals dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law through direct appeal to raise his claim that the Sixth Amendment requires that a defendant be expressly informed of his right to counsel at each critical stage of the proceeding and that the trial court's failure to do so in his case rendered his sentence void. View "State ex rel. Rarden v. Butler County Common Pleas Court" on Justia Law