Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Cheryl Waiters was employed by the city of Cleveland. When the city discharged Waiters from employment, the union of which Waiters was a member filed a grievance and later demanded arbitration. The arbitrator found the city had discharged Waiters without just cause and ordered that she be reinstated to employment. Waiters then filed a complaint in the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus to compel her reinstatement to her former position with back pay and an award of attorney fees. The city subsequently reinstated Waiters to her former job. The court of appeals denied Waiters's writ, concluding that her claim for reinstatement was moot and that she failed to establish her entitlement to back pay or attorney fees. Waiters appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that (1) Waiters's reinstatement claim was rendered moot when she was reinstated; (2) as a bargaining-unit employee who was represented by the union in the grievance and arbitration process, Waiters was relegated to the arbitration proceeding in which the dispute concerning the amount of back pay she would be entitled to was being decided; and (3) Waiters was not entitled to attorney fees. View "State ex rel. Waiters v. Szabo" on Justia Law

Appellant Juan Lackey, who drove trucks for Penske Truck Leasing Company, injured his knee at work. After surgery was performed, Lackey returned to work and filed retirement papers with Penske. Nothing in his retirement documents indicted that Lackey's retirement was connected to the industrial injury. Following his retirement, Lackey requested temporary total disability compensation (TTC). A district hearing officer for Lackey, the state industrial commission, denied the request, finding Lackey had voluntarily retired for reasons unrelated to his injury and Lackey's retirement constituted a voluntary abandonment of the entire labor market. On appeal, a staff hearing officer affirmed. Lackey appealed to the commission, and the commission denied the appeal. The court of appeals denied Lackey's mandamus action after finding the commission's findings were supported by evidence. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding the commission did not abuse its discretion in finding that Lackey's retirement was unrelated to his injury, and, accordingly, Lackey could receive postretirement TTC only if he were gainfully employed elsewhere and prevented from doing that job by his industrial injury. View "State ex rel. Lackey v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

During Greg Zeigler's tenure as Stark County treasurer, his chief deputy pleaded guilty to stealing almost $2.5 million from the treasurer's office, after which the county prosecutor instituted an recoupment action under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 321.37. The board of commissioners then voted to remove Zeigler from office pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 321.38, which permits the removal of the county treasurer by the board of commissioners upon institution of a suit under Section 321.37. Zeigler then filed an action for a writ of quo warranto to oust the current treasurer and to be reinstated as treasurer, arguing that Section 321.38 is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted the writ of quo warranto, holding (1) that because Section 321.38 does not require a complaint and hearing before authorizing a board of county commissioners to remove a county treasurer, it is unconstitutional; (2) the removal of Zeigler violated Ohio Const. art. 2, 38; and (3) Zeigler was entitled to serve the remainder of his elected term. View "State ex rel. Zeigler v. Zumbar" on Justia Law

The German Village Society (GVS) filed an application for exemption of real property. Pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 5715.27(C), the school board became a party to the proceedings before the tax commission and to any appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA). After the tax commissioner denied GVS's application, GVS appealed to the BTA but did not serve the school board with its notice of appeal. BTA reversed the decision of the tax commissioner and granted the exemption but did not transmit its decision to the school board. The tax commissioner then issued a determination giving effect to the BTA's decision. The school board filed a notice of appeal from the tax commissioner's order, asserting that the BTA's decision was void ab initio because the school board was not named or notified as to the existence of the appeal. The BTA held that because the period for appeal from its decision had expired, it did not have jurisdiction to address the validity of its earlier decision. The Supreme Court reversed the BTA's holding that it had no jurisdiction to grant relief to the school board, vacated the BTA's decision along with the tax commissioner's related order, and remanded. View "Columbus City Schools Bd. of Educ. v. Testa" on Justia Law

After appellee Mary Williams was hired as a full-time residential social worker at appellant Bridgeway, Inc., a community mental health center, Bridgeway offered Williams a promotion. The promotion was conditioned on the requirement that Williams obtain certification as a Licensed Independent Social Worker (LISW) within 15 months. Because Williams did not obtain her LISW certification within the time required, she was terminated. Williams' application for unemployment compensation was disallowed by the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, which determined that Williams had been discharged with just cause. On appeal, the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission affirmed. The court of common pleas denied Williams's subsequent appeal. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Williams's requirement to obtain an LISW certification was not fairly applied to other program managers. Bridgeway appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, holding that when employment is expressly conditioned upon obtaining or maintaining a license or certification and an employee agrees to the condition and is afforded a reasonable opportunity to obtain or maintain the license or certification, an employee's failure to comply with that condition is just cause for termination for unemployment compensation purposes. View "Williams v. Ohio Dep't of Job & Family Servs. " on Justia Law

Appellant Ruby Pula, a resident of Hawaii, was the custodian of the child of Adrienne Pula-Branch, a resident of Ohio. On Pula's behalf, the Cuyahoga Support Enforcement Agency (CSEA) filed a petition for child support and medical coverage against Pula-Branch under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). The domestic relations court issued a child-support order. The CSEA appealed, challenging the court's calculation of child-support obligations. The appellate court held that the domestic relations court had no jurisdiction to address a UIFSA support order because the lower court's jurisdiction was limited by Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2301.03(L)(1) to matters involving divorce, dissolution of marriage, legal separation, or annulment. CSEA appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the domestic relations court does have jurisdiction over an action for support brought pursuant to the UIFSA, even if the action does not arise from one of the enumerated matters in the statute. View "Pula v. Pula-Branch" on Justia Law

After it was granted temporary custody of C.B. in a dependency proceeding, the county department of children and family services sought to be awarded permanent custody of the child. The juvenile court denied the motion, terminated the department's temporary custody of the child, and ordered that the child be placed with the father. The mother appealed that order, and the child's guardian ad litem (GAL) filed a cross-appeal, challenging the trial court's decision. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that there was no final, appealable order in this case. The GAL sought review, which the Supreme Court granted. The Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that when a trial court denies a children-services agency's motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody, terminates the placement of temporary custody with the agency, and awards legal custody to a parent, the order is final and appealable under Ohio Rev. Code Ann 2505.02. Additionally, the Court found that there was no reasonable basis for the juvenile court to have appointed independent counsel separate from the GAL under the circumstances. View "In re C.B." on Justia Law

After being found guilty of domestic violence, appellant Mor Mbodji appealed, contending the trial court did not have jurisdiction because the domestic-violence complaint and affidavit filed by appellant's wife were not reviewed by a reviewing official pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2935.09. The court of appeals held the trial court had jurisdiction despite lack of review and later denied a motion for reconsideration. Appellant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a complaint that meets the requirements of Ohio R. Crim. P. 3 invokes the subject-matter jurisdiction of a trial court; (2) when a complaint and affidavit are signed by a private citizen but are not reviewed by a reviewing official before filing pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2935.09, the defect is not jurisdictional but may be the subject of a Ohio R. Crim. P. 12(C) motion before trial; and (3) because a Ohio R. Crim. P. 12(C) motion was not filed in this case, the procedural defect was waived by appellant. View "State v. Mbodji" on Justia Law

Appellant Raleigh Striker filed a pro se complaint in the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus to compel a clerk of the municipal court to provide access to requested court records. After the complaint was filed the clerk provided Striker with three of the four requested records. Striker then secured counsel and filed a motion for an award of statutory damages and attorneys fees. The court of appeals denied the writ, finding the claim was moot as Striker admitted the clerk had provided three of the four requested records and the evidence showed the parties agreed the fourth item was not a public record. Striker appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) that although there was a dispute as to whether the parties agreed the fourth record existed, Striker obtained a copy of the record by the time the mandamus complaint was filed, thus rendering his claim moot; and (2) because Striker's public-records mandamus claims lacked merit, the court of appeals did not err in denying his request for statutory damages and attorneys fees. View "State ex rel. Striker v. Smith" on Justia Law

Ohio State University entered into an agreement for construction-management services with Turner Construction Company for a construction project. Later, Ohio State selected Turner to serve as construction manager at risk through a qualifications-based selection process rather than going through a traditional competitive bidding process. Ohio State did not require Turner to furnish a surety bond to secure the performance of Turner and its subcontractors. Three trade associations, two that advance the interests of subcontractors (ASA and ASA-Ohio) and one that advances the interests of sureties (SFAA), filed an action for a writ of mandamus to compel Ohio State to require that Turner furnish a bond as construction manager at risk. The Supreme Court dismissed the claims of ASA and ASA-Ohio and denied SFAA's mandamus claim, holding that (1) because ASA and ASA-Ohio did not establish that any of their members had been injured by Ohio State's decision, they lacked standing to raise their mandamus claim; and (2) because the applicable legislation does not require a bonding requirement, SFAA was not entitled to the requested relief in mandamus.