Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Michele Hobbs and Kelly Mullen decided to have a child together, Mullen became pregnant through in vitro fertilization procedure with donated sperm. Mullen executed a will in which she nominated Hobbs as the guardian of her child and a health-care power of attorney and durable power of attorney in which she gave Hobbs the authority to make decisions regarding the child. Hobbs and Mullen co-parented for two years, after which the women's relationship deteriorated. Hobbs then filed a complaint for shared custody in the juvenile court, alleging that Mullen had created a contract through her conduct with Hobbs to permanently share legal custody of the child. The juvenile court dismissed Hobbs's complaint for shared legal custody, concluding that a preponderance of the evidence did not conclusively demonstrate that Mullen's conduct created a contract that permanently gave partial custodial rights of the child to Hobbs. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that competent, credible evidence supported the juvenile court's conclusion that Mullen, by her conduct, did not enter into an agreement with Hobbs through which Mullen permanently relinquished sole custody of her child in favor of shared custody with Hobbs. View "In re Mullen" on Justia Law

WCI Steel appealed a final assessment of its personal property valuation for tax purposes to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA). The BTA dismissed WCI's appeal on the authority of Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Levin because its notice of appeal failed to specify error. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that (1) a notice of appeal from an assessment in which the tax commissioner has determined the value of personal property invokes the jurisdiction of the BTA to review that determination if the notice states the appellant's objection to the commissioner's actions in valuing property and identifies the treatment that the commissioner should have applied; (2) BTA's jurisdiction in the appeal permitted it to consider evidence in addition to that considered by the tax commissioner; and (3) the BTA misapplied Ohio Bell to this situation. Remanded. View "WCI Steel, Inc. v. Testa" on Justia Law

Joseph Starkey was injured while working for Builders FirstSource Ohio Valley. The Bureau of Workers' Compensation allowed Starkey's claim for, inter alia, a sprained hip and degenerative osteoarthritis of the left hip. Builders appealed to the county court, challenging Starkey's right to workers' compensation for osteoarthritis. The trial court entered judgment for Builders, holding (1) that a claim for aggravation of a preexisting condition is separate and distinct from a claim for that underlying condition itself, and (2) administrative action on one such claim did not without more confer jurisdiction on the court to consider the other. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Starkey could participate in the fund for degenerative osteoarthritis based on evidence that his work-related injury had aggravated his preexisting medical condition. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) because aggravation of a preexisting medical condition is a type of causation, it is not a separate condition or distinct injury as defined in Ohio Rev. Code 4123.01, and (2) an appeal taken pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4123.512 allows the claimant to present evidence on any theory of causation pertinent to a claim for a medical condition that already has been addressed administratively. View "Starkey v. Builders FirstSource Ohio Valley, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Appellee Timothy Rhodes mailed a public records request to the police department of the city of New Philadelphia requesting certain reel-to-reel tape recordings made by the police dispatch department. The department, however, had disposed of the recordings. Rhodes filed a complaint for civil forfeiture under Ohio Rev. Code 149.351(B) after finding that the police department had unlawfully erased the records without the requisite approval. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the trial court determined there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Rhodes was actually aggrieved by the violations. At trial, the jury found that Rhodes had not been aggrieved by the unauthorized disposition of the requested public records. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court should have granted the portion of Rhodes's motion for summary judgment claiming he was an aggrieved party. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that a party is not aggrieved by the destruction of a record when the party's objective in requesting the record is not to obtain the record but to seek a forfeiture for the wrongful destruction of the record. View "Rhodes v. New Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Gulf Underwriters Insurance issued a general liability policy to United Foundries with an endorsement for employer's liability coverage, known as a stop-gap endorsement. David Ward filed a complaint against his employer, United, alleging claims for employer intentional tort and seeking damages. While the case was pending, United filed an action against Gulf for a declaration that Gulf had a duty to defend and indemnify United for the claims asserted by Ward. The trial court granted summary judgment to United. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding (1) an exclusion in a stop-gap endorsement stating that the insurance does not apply to bodily injury resulting from an act that is determined to have been committed by an insured with the belief that an injury is substantially certain to occur does not require a final determination by either a judge or jury before the insurer can refuse to defend a claim alleging a substantial-certainty employer intentional tort: and (2) that the claims stated in the underlying complaint were neither potentially nor arguably covered under the terms of the policy, and thus, Gulf had no duty under the policy to defend United. View "Ward v. United Foundries, Inc." on Justia Law

Mortgage company Fifth Third filed a foreclosure action against a debtor. Judge Nancy Russo of the county court issued an order stating if the parties reached an agreement to notify the court. Subsequently, the parties negotiated a loan-modification agreement, and Fifth Third filed a notice voluntarily dismissing its complaint without prejudice. Judge Russo issued an entry (1) striking Fifth Third's notice of dismissal, and (2) ordering a show-cause contempt hearing due to Fifth Third's filing a notice of dismissal when the case was settled via loan modification. Fifth Third filed complaints against Judge Russo in the court of appeals for writs of mandamus and prohibition. The court granted a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Russo to vacate her order striking Fifth Third's notice of voluntary dismissal and a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Russo from proceeding on the foreclosure case but denied a writ of prohibition to prevent the judge from proceeding on the contempt order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the court of appeals ruled properly in the underlying writ case because (1) Fifth Third properly dismissed its case without prejudice, and (2) Fifth Third had an adequate remedy at law following the contempt order. View "State ex rel. Fifth Third Mortgage Co. v. Russo" on Justia Law

Appellant Aaron Rents, Inc. (ARI) challenged an order from the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation that retroactively reclassified the jobs of certain ARI employees for purposes of workers' compensation premiums. ARI objected to the retroactive reclassification and argued that the bureau had abused its discretion by failing to adequately explain why it rejected ARI's request for prospective reclassification only. The court of appeals denied ARI's writ of mandamus. On appeal, the Supreme Court found that (1) ARI's ability to challenge the bureau's decision was compromised because the order did not explain why retroactive rather than prospective reclassification was favored and (2) further explanation was required as to why the bureau reached its decision in order for the court to determine whether an abuse of discretion occurred. The Court vacated the judgment of the appellate court and granted a limited writ ordering the bureau to vacate its order and issue an amended order including an explanation for its decision. View "State ex rel. Aaron Rents, Inc. v. Ohio Bureau of Workers Comp." on Justia Law

Defendant Gary Adkins was convicted of a violation of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (OVI). The trial court found that pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4511.19(G)(1)(d) Adkins had been convicted of five or more OVI offenses within the previous 20 years, including a prior juvenile adjudication, making his conviction for an OVI a fourth-degree felony. Pursuant to R.C. 2901.08, effective January 1, 1996, a prior juvenile adjudication constitutes a prior conviction for purposes of Ohio Rev. Code 4511.19(G)(1)(d). Adkins appealed, contending that his juvenile adjudication, which occurred before the effective date of Ohio Rev. Code 2901.08, should not be considered a prior conviction and that an application of Ohio Rev. Code 4511.19(G)(1)(d) to his case would require an unconstitutional retrospective application of Ohio Rev. Code 2901.08. The appellate court affirmed Adkins's conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Ohio Rev. Code 2901.18 is applied prospectively and is not unconstitutionally retroactive. View "State v. Adkins" on Justia Law

Appellant Michael Patton sought a writ of mandamus directing Dusty Rhodes, the county auditor, to provide him with access to the county's financial reports for several years pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 149.43, Ohio's public records act. The court of appeals dismissed Patton's mandamus action as moot in that Patton received access to the requested records when the records were posted on the county auditor's website. The appellate court also denied Patton's request for statutory damages and attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals correctly held that the county auditor satisfied Patton's request by posting copies of the records online within a reasonable period of time pursuant to Section 149.43; and (2) because Patton failed to establish that the county auditor failed to comply with an obligation in accordance with Section 149.43, he was also not entitled to an award of statutory damages. View "State ex rel. Patton v. Rhodes" on Justia Law

Property owner Riser Foods Company appealed a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) in which the BTA determined the true value of Riser's real estate to be $450,000 for tax year 2005 rather than $73,700 as determined by the county auditor and the County Board of Revision (BOR). The BTA's determination of value was predicated on the price paid for the property in 2005 in accordance with a buy-out option agreed to by the parties in a ground lease. The ground lease was entered into in 1998, and ownership was transferred in 2005. The BTA regarded the buy-out-option price as a recent, arm's-length sale price that furnished the criterion of value for the property as of 2005 pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4713.03. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the BTA, holding (1) Riser had the initial burden to show that the 2005 sale was either not recent or not at arm's length; (2) Riser failed to negate the recency of the sale; and (3) Riser did not show that the long-standing contractual obligation to purchase made the sale involuntary or that a lack of open-market elements was significant. View "N. Royalton City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law