Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Josephine Centorbi died intestate in 2007. At the time of her death, Ms. Centorbi received Medicaid benefits. Ms. Centorbiâs sister, Dianne Fiorille administered the estate, and acting without counsel, applied to relieve the estate from administration. When she filed the application, Ms. Fiorille did not check the box on the form to attest that the decedent was over 55 years old and received Medicaid assistance. In addition, as administrator, Ms. Fiorille failed to file some other forms necessary to notify both the probate court and the Ohio Department of Jobs and Family Services (ODJFS) of the decedentâs death. The probate court granted Ms. Fiorilleâs application to relieve the estate from administration on the same day it was filed. Two years later, ODJFS learned of Ms. Centorbiâs death. It filed an application to vacate the probate courtâs order, but its application was denied. The probate court held that because Ms. Fiorille indicated that no notice was required (in the form of the omitted check box), ODJFSâs application was time barred. The appellate court affirmed the probate courtâs decision. The Supreme Court found that failing to check the box on the initial relief-from-administration form tolled the statute of limitations. Without the check, the Medicaid program had not been officially notified of the decedentâs death. The Court reversed the appellate courtâs decision and remanded the case to the probate court for further proceedings.

Attorney Marie Wheeler and the law firm of Roderick Linton, LLP appealed a grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee New Destiny Treatment Center. The Center sued Attorney Wheeler and her firm over representation of a dissident member of the Centerâs board of trustees who tried to regain control of the Center. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether attorneys who were retained by the dissident member of the Center could actually be sued by the Center for malpractice. The Supreme Court found in this case that the law firm represented only the dissident trustee, not the Center. No attorney-client relationship ever existed between the law firm and the Center. Accordingly, there was no basis for the Center to maintain a cause of action against the firm. The Court reversed the appellate court, and reinstated the trial courtâs judgment in favor of Attorney Wheeler and the law firm.

In 2007, grand jury returned an indictment against Defendant Jeremy Damron that charged one count of felonious assault, two counts of domestic violence and one count of rape. In 2009, Defendant entered a guilty plea to the assault charge and to one count of domestic violence. In exchange, the State requested that the trial court enter a nolle prosequi to the remaining two counts. At the plea hearing, Defendant was advised of the applicable statutory maximum penalties for the charges to which he pled guilty. Before the sentencing hearing, each party submitted a sentencing memorandum. Defendant argued that the two charges against him should be merged as âallied offenses.â Defendant conceded that assault and domestic violence were not the same, but that he could not have committed one offense without the other. A merged offense as Defendant sought, would carry less total jail time. The trial court merged Defendantâs offenses, and sentenced him to eight years for assault, and five years for domestic violenceâwith the sentences to run concurrently. The State appealed, and the appellate court found that âEven if [it] were to conclude that the [trial] courtâs decision to impose concurrent sentences had been based on faulty reasoning, the fact remains that the courtâs order that the sentences be served concurrently resulted in a sentence authorized by the statutes governing sentencing.â The Supreme Court disagreed with both lower courtsâ rulings, holding that the offenses for which Defendant was charged were not âalliedâ but two separate and distinct offenses for which Defendant received separate convictions and separate sentences. The Court vacated the sentences and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing.

The state tax auditor assigned a $3.6 million value to an 80-room hotel for the tax year 2005. The owner, KDM and Associates, LLC (KDM) challenged the valuation with the Board of Revision in March 2006. KDM sought to reduce the valuation to $2.4 million, the original purchase price of the hotel. The Hilliard City Schools Board cross complained, and sought to maintain the assessorâs original valuation. The Supreme Court affirmed the original $3.6 million valuation, finding that accounting discrepancies did not entitle KDM to the reduced assessed-value in the hotel.

Appellee John Reinhold is an appraiser. He performed appraisals on three properties in 2001 and 2002 that served as collateral for three separate mortgage loans made by Airline Unionâs Mortgage Company (AUM). Appellee completed the last of these appraisals on June 12, 2002. In these various transactions, Appellant Flagstar Bank received and reviewed Appelleeâs appraisals and accordingly purchased the mortgage loans from AUM. These properties were later subjected to foreclosure actions leaving deficiencies on the loans. Flagstar filed a complaint against AUM and Appellee. In the complaint, Flagstar alleged that the three appraisals were materially inaccurate and that the actual fair market value of each of these properties was significantly lower than the appraised values. Appellee denied any professional negligence and filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted. Flagstar appealed this decision. The appellate court affirmed the trial courtâs judgment. The Supreme Court found that the record supported the lower courtsâ decisions to grant Appellee summary judgment. The Court disagreed with Flagstar that the state âdelayed damagesâ rule applied in this case, and used the âdiscovery rule.â The Court affirmed the appellate courtâs decision.

Disciplinary Counsel filed a complaint charging Respondent Kevin Hallquist with professional misconduct arising from his failure to reasonably communicate with two clients, his neglect of their legal matters, and his failure to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary investigations. The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline concluded that Respondent's conduction was a violation of the rules of attorney conduct. Because Respondent has practiced law for more than 20 years without a disciplinary violation, and although serious, his misconduct has not caused irreparable harm to any clients, the Supreme Court agreed with the recommended sanction of a two-year suspension, with the last six months stayed on condition that he commit no further misconduct and pay restitution to clients harmed by his acts.

Appellee Loudin appeals judgment from the lower court that found that her medical-malpractice claim could survive summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirms the appellate court's holding, and remands the case to the trial court to decide an award of damages for infliction of emotional distress. Appellant received regular breast cancer screenings from Appellant Radiology & Imaging Services, and had always received normal prognoses. During self-examination, Appellee detected a lump that was found to be cancerous. Experts testified the lump grew from one to two centimeters between 2003 and 2004, the years when Appellee received "normal" mammograms. Appellee commenced suit against Appellant asserting medical negligence claims; appellant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. Appellants characterized the complaint as one solely for infliction of emotional distress, and that Appellee had not established a medical malpractice claim. Because both parties' arguments relied on facts outside the pleadings, the trial court converted the appellant's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, and granted appellant's motion against all claims for relief in the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding the metastasis of cancer is a compensible physical injury and that the medical negligence claim should have survived summary judgment. The Supreme Court granted this discretionary appeal, and affirmed the appellate court's judgment.

In this appeal, the Supreme Court interpreted an exclusion in a homeowner's insurance policy that denied coverage for claims "arising out of" premises that are owned by the insured, but are not an insured location under the policy. Appellee Westfield Insurance provided Appellants Michael and Marilyn Hunter's insurance on their Ohio home; the Hunters hold an additional policy for any personal liability that arises from bodily injury or property damages. The Hunters also own a farm in Indiana that is not a named insured location under the Westfield policy. The Hunters purchased liability insurance for the Indiana property from co-appellant Grinell Mutual Reinsurance Company. Children playing on the Indiana property suffered bodily injuries on the property, and brought suit against the Hunters for negligence. The Hunters applied to Westfield seeking indemnification under their personal liability policy. Westfield brought a declaratory judgment action against the Hunters and Grinell seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the Hunters for claims asserted in the Indiana lawsuit. At trial, the court reasoned that the claims raised by the injured children "arose out of" premises that were not insured by Westfield, therefore Westfield had no duty to indemnify the Hunters for personal liability claims. Grinnell appealed to the Supreme Court for discretionary review, and secured an order from the appellate court certifying that its decision in this case was in conflict with that of another state appellate court. On review of the lower courts' holdings, the Supreme Court found that the Westfield policy does exclude coverage for claims arising from the Indiana property, or any claims based solely on the insured's ownership of the property on which the injury occurred.

In 2008, the Ohio General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 221, which substantially revised the regulation of electric service in Ohio. The cost of electric power generation increased significantly. Faced with a lack of competition, rising electricity prices and unfavorable market-based rates, the commission and utilities responded with various rate plans not expressly contemplated by statute. The state legislature revised its bill to address areas of concern with electric markets, in particular, it established new standards to govern generation rates. This appeal stems from a proceeding in which the Ohio Public Utilities Commission authorized new generation rates for the American Electric Power operating companies (AEP) Columbus Southern Power Company and Ohio Power Company. AEP applied for an "electric security plan" instead of a market-rate offer. Appellants, the Office of the Ohio Consumers' Counsel (OCC) and Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU) raised 13 propositions of law in its suit all relating to purchase of electricity. The Supreme Court found that the commission committed reversible error on three of the thirteen grounds, and affirmed the commission's ruling on all other issues. The case was then remanded to the commission for resolution of three issues: (1) the commission unlawfully granted a retroactive rate increase, but the OCC is not entitled to a refund; (2) in approving a provider-of-last-resort (POLR), the commission relied on a justification lacking any record support; and (3) the commission erred in determining that electric security plans (ESPs) may include items not specifically authorized by statute.

Appellants Jason and Christy Vaughn appeal the judgment against them from the Court of Appeals that dismissed their application for writ of habeas corpus to compel the biological father of their prospective adopted child to return custody of her. The appellate court dismissed Appellants' petition on the grounds that it "lacked jurisdiction over child custody decisions and proceedings" of the lower court. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals indeed had general subject-matter jurisdiction over Appellants' habeas corpus petition, but still affirms its holding. The Court disagreed with the appellate court over the rationale for dismissing Appellants' petition. The Court found that dismissal of the habeas corpus petition was appropriate because Appellants did not comply with the pleading requirements in accordance with state procedure.