Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellee Joseph Wilson was tried before a jury and found guilty on three counts of aggravated robbery, felonious assault, and kidnapping. Wilson appealed, arguing the three offenses for which he was convicted were allied offenses of similar import and should have been merged into one offense for sentencing. The court of appeals held that kidnapping and felonious assault were allied offenses and kidnapping and aggravated robbery were allied offenses. The court vacated Wilson's sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing at which the state could elect which of the allied offenses it wanted to pursue for sentencing. The state appealed, arguing the scope of a resentencing judge's authority upon a remand to correct an allied-offenses sentencing error is limited to accepting the state's election among allied offenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when a cause is remanded to a trial court to correct an allied-offenses sentencing error, the trial court must hold a new sentencing hearing for the offenses that remain after the state selects which allied offense or offenses to pursue. The Court also held res judicata does not preclude a defendant from objecting to issues that arise at the new sentencing hearing.

D.B. and another boy were under 13 years of age when they engaged in sexual activity. The juvenile court adjudicated D.B. delinquent for rape based on the violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2907.01(A)(1)(b), which prohibits one from engaging in sexual conduct with a person under the age of 13. On appeal, D.B. argued that application of the statute violated his federal rights to due process and equal protection. At issue was whether a child's constitutional rights are violated when, as a member of the class protected by the statute, the child is adjudicated as a delinquent based upon a violation of the statute. The appeals court affirmed, and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court held that (1) as applied to offenders who are under 13 themselves, the statute is unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process because arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is encouraged; and (2) application of the statute in this case violates equal protection because only one child was charged with being delinquent, while others similarly situated were not.

Warren Lewis, a convicted misdemeanant, unsuccessfully sought a stay from the trial court and thereafter paid the fine and costs while on inactive probation that expired during the pendency of his appeal. At issue was whether Lewis's completion of his sentence was voluntary, thus making his appeal moot. The Supreme Court held that the completion of a sentence is not voluntary and will not moot an appeal if the circumstances surrounding it demonstrate that the appellant neither acquiesced in the judgment nor abandoned the right to appellate review. The Court concluded that the expiration of an inactive period of probation during the pendency of appeal does not render the appeal moot because the misdemeanant failed to file a motion to stay in the appellate court where the misdemeanant unsuccessfully sought a stay of execution from the trial court to prevent an intended appeal from being declared moot and subsequently filed a notice of appeal to challenge the conviction.

The Public Utilities Commission allowed two electric power operating companies to adjust their economic-development cost-recovery riders and recover additional revenues. Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU) sought a rehearing, which the commission denied. IEU appealed the order, arguing that the commission approved the rate increase without reviewing its reasonableness. The Supreme Court found the order prejudiced IEU because some of IEU's members paid higher rates as a result of the order. The Court then affirmed, holding that IEU failed to meet its burden to identify a legal problem with the order. Because the Court presumes that orders are reasonable, IEU must upset that presumption, and IEU did little more than disagree with the order, giving the Court no reason to reverse.

The Ohio Public Utilities Commission approved a âprogram portfolio planâ proposed by Appellee American Electric Power (SEP). The plan contained a variety of programs designed to increase energy efficiency and reduce peak demands on AEPâs system. Appellant Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU) challenged the PUCâs approval of the plan to the district court, arguing that the plan was too costly, was not energy-efficient, and did not meet the requirements imposed under the applicable state laws. The Supreme Court reviewed the record and found that IEUâs challenges âall lack merit.â The Court affirmed the lower courtâs and PUCâs decisions approving the plan.

The Ohio Public Utilities Commission (PUC) approved âreasonable arrangementsâ between American Electric Power Company (AEP) and two manufacturing firms, Ormet Primary Aluminum (Ormet) and Eramet Marietta, Inc. (Eramet). The arrangements gave substantial price discounts on electric service. The PUC approved the arrangements and allowed AEP to collect from other customers most of the revenue foregone to the discounts. Ormet asked the commission to approve an arrangement linking Ormetâs electric rate to the market price of aluminum; Eramet asked for a fixed discounted rate. The PUC held public hearings to consider the manufacturersâ applications, and numerous parties intervened, including Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU). Disagreements regarding both applications centered on the amount of the discount and who should pay for it. The PUC issued orders permitting discounted rates to the manufacturers, but the PUCâs plan was not exactly what AEP had proposed. AEP appealed the PUCâs decision, arguing that the discounts do not allow the power company to recoup its losses from the plan discounts. The Supreme Court found that state law âaffirmatively gives the commissionânot the utilitiesâfinal say over arrangementsâ like the ones decided for Ormet and Eramet. The Court affirmed the PUCâs decisions regarding the manufacturing companiesâ arrangements.

Appellant Fairfield City Schools (Fairfield) sought reimbursement for a total disability compensation award given to one of its employees. Edward Carpenter, Jr. had hypertension since 1995. In 2002, he injured his back while at work. Mr. Carpenterâs injury resulted in a considerable amount of disability compensation. In 2008, Fairfield requested handicap reimbursement from the Ohio Bureau of Workersâ Compensation for at least part of the disability payments it made to Mr. Carpenter. Fairfieldâs application alleged that Mr. Carpenterâs pre-existing hypertension is a cardiac disease that delayed his recovery from back surgery, contributing to prolonged disability payments. The Bureau rejected Fairfieldâs application as âinsufficient to establish cardiac disease as a pre-existing condition.â Fairfield appealed the Bureauâs decision multiple times. With every appeal, Fairfield added additional doctorâs reports and Bureau datasheets to support its argument that hypertension is a cardiac disease. The court of appeals eventually denied Fairfieldâs appeal and application for a writ of mandamus. The appellate court found that the Bureau had exclusive authority to weigh the evidence Fairfield submitted, and the Bureau could find Fairfieldâs evidence insufficient to prove hypertension was a cardiac disease. Fairfield appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Court agreed with the Bureauâs and appellate courtâs decisions. The Court affirmed the lower courtâs judgment.

The criminal prosecution of the Appellees in this case arose from conduct that allegedly occurred during the election recount of the November, 2004 presidential election. Appellee Jacqueline Maiden was the coordinator for the elections board, and Appellees Kathleen Dreamer and Rosie Grier were the manager and assistant manager, respectively, of the board's Ballot Department. Maiden was in charge of preparing the board's staff for the recount, and Dreamer and Grier were involved in organizing and conducting the recount. In December, 2004, the board met and certified the recount results. During that meeting, information was disclosed that suggested that personnel might not have conducted the recount in accordance with Ohio law. The board did not launch an investigation and did not refer the matter to the prosecutor. In August, 2005, a grand jury was convened, and indicted Dreamer and Grier on election-law violations regarding the recount. The elections board agreed that it would pay the legal fees and expenses of Dreamer, Maiden and Grier in all matters related to their criminal cases if they were not convicted of criminal conduct. In January, 2007, a jury tried Dreamer, Maiden and Grier. Grier was found not guilty on all charges, and the charges against Dreamer and Maiden were eventually dismissed. In 2009, Appellees filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus to compel the prosecutor and commissioners to appoint an independent counsel and to order the commissioners to pay for their legal expenses. The appellate court granted Appellees' the writ, but the Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court found that the writ was available to "county officers" under the applicable state law under which Appellees sought relief. Appellees were "employees" and not "officers." Accordingly, the Court held that the appellate court erred by granting Appellees the writ of mandamus.

During the divorce proceedings of Jeffrey Kissinger and Beth Wilhelm-Kissinger, a dispute arose: Ms. Wilhelm-Kissinger allegedly illegally took privileged e-mail messages between Mr. Kissinger and his attorney from Mr. Kissinger's computer, and gave them to her attorney. Mr. Kissinger moved to disqualify Ms. WIlhelm-Kissinger's attorney. Ms. Wilhelm-Kissinger's attorney denied seeking or reviewing any of the messages in question. The trial court subsequently denied Mr. Kissinger's motion. Mr. Kissinger appealed, arguing that the denial of his motion to disqualify counsel is a final and appealable order. The appellate court found that the denial was not a final order that it could review. The Supreme Court agreed, finding that the denial of the motion to disqualify was not a final order. The Court affirmed the lower courts' judgments.

This case came before the Supreme Court twice. The property owner challenged the Board of Tax Appeals' (BTA) use of a propertyâs sale price as an indicator of its value, arguing that it was an unreliable way to value property. The BTA rejected that challenge and adopted use of the sale price. In the first appeal, the Supreme Court held that the BTA failed to give full consideration to whether the sale was "recent" which was one of the criteria that must be satisfied before a sale price may be used to value a property for tax purposes. The BTA responded by relying solely on the temporal proximity of the sale to the tax-lien dates. Because proximity was not the only factor affecting recency, and because the property owner made a persuasive argument, the Supreme Court vacated the BTA's decision and remanded the case for a proper determination of "recency" based on the entire record. BTA then issued its decision on remand. The BTA again adopted the sale price as the value of a property based on a conclusion that "recency" had not be rebutted. The property owner appealed again to the Supreme Court, arguing that the BTA disregarded the Supreme Court's earlier holding. The Supreme Court reviewed the BTA's findings of fact and found that its decision was "reasonable and lawful," and that it "fulfilled the instruction of the Court." The Court affirmed the decision of the BTA.