Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After it was granted temporary custody of C.B. in a dependency proceeding, the county department of children and family services sought to be awarded permanent custody of the child. The juvenile court denied the motion, terminated the department's temporary custody of the child, and ordered that the child be placed with the father. The mother appealed that order, and the child's guardian ad litem (GAL) filed a cross-appeal, challenging the trial court's decision. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that there was no final, appealable order in this case. The GAL sought review, which the Supreme Court granted. The Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that when a trial court denies a children-services agency's motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody, terminates the placement of temporary custody with the agency, and awards legal custody to a parent, the order is final and appealable under Ohio Rev. Code Ann 2505.02. Additionally, the Court found that there was no reasonable basis for the juvenile court to have appointed independent counsel separate from the GAL under the circumstances. View "In re C.B." on Justia Law

After being found guilty of domestic violence, appellant Mor Mbodji appealed, contending the trial court did not have jurisdiction because the domestic-violence complaint and affidavit filed by appellant's wife were not reviewed by a reviewing official pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2935.09. The court of appeals held the trial court had jurisdiction despite lack of review and later denied a motion for reconsideration. Appellant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a complaint that meets the requirements of Ohio R. Crim. P. 3 invokes the subject-matter jurisdiction of a trial court; (2) when a complaint and affidavit are signed by a private citizen but are not reviewed by a reviewing official before filing pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2935.09, the defect is not jurisdictional but may be the subject of a Ohio R. Crim. P. 12(C) motion before trial; and (3) because a Ohio R. Crim. P. 12(C) motion was not filed in this case, the procedural defect was waived by appellant. View "State v. Mbodji" on Justia Law

Appellant Raleigh Striker filed a pro se complaint in the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus to compel a clerk of the municipal court to provide access to requested court records. After the complaint was filed the clerk provided Striker with three of the four requested records. Striker then secured counsel and filed a motion for an award of statutory damages and attorneys fees. The court of appeals denied the writ, finding the claim was moot as Striker admitted the clerk had provided three of the four requested records and the evidence showed the parties agreed the fourth item was not a public record. Striker appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) that although there was a dispute as to whether the parties agreed the fourth record existed, Striker obtained a copy of the record by the time the mandamus complaint was filed, thus rendering his claim moot; and (2) because Striker's public-records mandamus claims lacked merit, the court of appeals did not err in denying his request for statutory damages and attorneys fees. View "State ex rel. Striker v. Smith" on Justia Law

Ohio State University entered into an agreement for construction-management services with Turner Construction Company for a construction project. Later, Ohio State selected Turner to serve as construction manager at risk through a qualifications-based selection process rather than going through a traditional competitive bidding process. Ohio State did not require Turner to furnish a surety bond to secure the performance of Turner and its subcontractors. Three trade associations, two that advance the interests of subcontractors (ASA and ASA-Ohio) and one that advances the interests of sureties (SFAA), filed an action for a writ of mandamus to compel Ohio State to require that Turner furnish a bond as construction manager at risk. The Supreme Court dismissed the claims of ASA and ASA-Ohio and denied SFAA's mandamus claim, holding that (1) because ASA and ASA-Ohio did not establish that any of their members had been injured by Ohio State's decision, they lacked standing to raise their mandamus claim; and (2) because the applicable legislation does not require a bonding requirement, SFAA was not entitled to the requested relief in mandamus.

In June 2008, appellant Thomas Everette was convicted of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and grand theft of a motor vehicle. The next year Everette submitted a petition for postconviction relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. The state moved to dismiss Everette's petition as untimely because it had been filed more than 180 days after the filing of the transcript of proceedings, which the state deemed to be the videotapes of the trial and hearings. Everette opposed the motion, arguing that his 180-day time limitation did not begin until the written transcripts were filed and thus his appeal was timely. The trial court dismissed Everette's petition, holding it was untimely under Ohio Rev. Code 2953.21(A)(2). The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the videotaped recordings constituted the transcript of the proceedings. The Supreme reversed and remanded, holding that for purposes of determining when the 180-day time period for filing a postconviction relief petition shall accrue, only the certified, written transcript constitutes a "transcript" under Ohio R. App. P 9(A) and Ohio Rev. Code 2953.21(A)(2) when both a videotape recording and the written form of the proceedings are available.

Appellant Luiz Paneto injured his left foot and ankle at work. After surgery, Paneto still used a cane to walk and had a limp. Paneto moved appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio for scheduled loss compensation, alleging a total loss of use of his left leg. The commission denied the application after finding Paneto's loss of use was not total. After being awarded permanent total disability (PTD) compensation, Paneto reapplied for total-loss-of-use compensation, alleging his PTD award was a new or changed circumstance that warranted reconsideration of the previous denial. The commission disagreed and further appeal was refused. The court of appeals upheld the commission's order. After Paneto filed his notice of appeal the commission terminated Paneto's PTD compensation after learning Paneto concealed his full-time employment. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, finding (1) because the PTD compensation was terminated, it is not a new or changed circumstance sufficient to permit the commission to reopen the issue of scheduled loss benefits; and (2) the evidence supports the commission's determination that Paneto did not have a total loss of use, which negates the need for any further discussion.

Appellee Sutton injured his back while on the job at Tomco. Sutton reported the injury to Tomco's president, after which Sutton was fired. Sutton filed suit against Tomco asserting a statutory claim for unlawful retaliation under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.90 and a tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The trial court granted Tomco's motion for judgment on the pleadings, and Sutton appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment against Sutton on the statutory claim and reversed the judgment against Sutton on the public-policy claim, holding that the discharge violated public policy as expressed in Ohio Rev. Code 4123.90. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute expresses a clear public policy prohibiting retaliatory employment action against injured employees; (2) Ohio recognizes a common-law tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy when employees are retaliated against after they are injured on the job but before they file, institute, or pursue a workers' compensation claim; and (3) the remedies available for wrongful discharge in violation of the public policy against retaliatory employment actions are limited to those listed in the statute.

Sunoco, the owner and operator of several petroleum-refining facilities, purchased electric service from Toledo Edison. The contract between the two companies permitted arrangements that differed from the standard rate schedules. BP Oil Company, which owns a competing refined located next to Sunoco's refinery, also had a contract with Toledo Edison. Both contracts contained 'most favored nation' clauses, which allowed Sunoco and BP to utilize any "arrangement, rates or charges" for their facilities that Toledo Edison had given to the other. At issue was whether Sunoco could invoke the clause to extend the duration of its contract with Toledo Edison to match the duration of BP's contract with Toledo Edison, which would result in a $13 million savings for Sunoco. The commission found the clause did not allow Sunoco to extend the duration of its contract. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the plain language of the clause, the word "arrangement" encompasses all non-price terms of a competitor's contract. Because duration is a non-price term of contract, it is subject to the clause.

Appellee Lynn was indicted on one count of aggravated burglary. The indictment contained a clerical error naming the underlying offense as theft. During the trial the trial court denied the state's request to amend the indictment to remove the word 'theft.' At the conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury on the elements of assault and theft. The jury found Lynn guilty of aggravated burglary, concluding Lynn had committed the underlying offense of assault but had not committed the underlying offense of theft. Lynn argued that once the indictment stated the underlying offense as theft, a jury instruction on assault or any other predicate offense was error. The court of appeals held the trial court erred in instructing the jury on assault and reversed the conviction. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that when an aggravated burglary indictment incorrectly states the underlying criminal offense, the trial court does not violate defendant's due process rights by conforming the jury instructions to the evidence presented at trial and instructing the jury on the correct underlying offense.

Appellant Jamey Baker was struck in the right eye by a piece of metal while working for appellee. After the piece was removed and the laceration of the cornea was repaired, Baker underwent cataract surgery. Immediately following the accident and prior to the cataract surgery several months later, Baker experienced an eight percent visual impairment. At issue was whether the surgical removal of the lens of an eye in the course of treatment for a workplace injury entitles the injured worker to compensation pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 42123.57(B) for a total loss of sight. A staff hearing officer with the Bureau of Workers' Compensation granted an award for a total loss of vision in the right eye, and the Industrial Commission vacated the order. The court of appeals denied Baker's writ of mandamus, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court calculated Baker's loss of sight based on the percentage of vision actually lost as a result of the injury, prior to any corrective surgery. Because Baker's loss of uncorrected vision did reach the statutory threshold of twenty-five percent, Baker's injury was not compensable under the statute.