Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Madison County Board of Commissioners filed an appropriation action against Greg and Marcia Bell. The common pleas court entered judgment in favor of the Board. The court of appeals affirmed. The Bells then filed a civil action against various Defendants, including the Board and the common pleas court judge. The common pleas court entered judgment in favor of Defendants. The court of appeals affirmed. Greg Bell subsequently sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court judge that presided over the earlier action, a magistrate, and certain attorneys and entities, from proceeding in the case. The court of appeals denied Bell's request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Bell could prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested writ of prohibition. View "State ex rel. Bell v. Court of Common Pleas (Pfeiffer)" on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Waters filed a petition to be a candidate for the Warren County Republican Party Central Committee for the 15th Precinct of Lebanon at the March 6, 2012 Republican primary election. Respondent Warren County Board of Elections voted to not certify Waters's candidacy. Waters then filed an expedited-election action for a writ of mandamus to compel the board and its members to certify his candidacy. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Waters was barred from candidacy in the March 6, 2012 Republican primary election because he voted in a primary election as a member of a different political party within the preceding two calendar years. View "State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth" on Justia Law

Appellant filed for disability-retirement benefits with Appellee, the Ohio Police and Fire Pension Fund (OP&F), claiming that he was disabled as a result of the performance of his official duties of the police department. The OP&F board denied Appellant's application for benefits. Appellant subsequently requested a writ of mandamus to compel the OP&F board to award him disability-retirement benefits. The court of appeals denied the writ, determining that the report of a psychiatrist supported the board's determination that Appellant was not permanently and totally disabled due to a psychiatric or psychological impairment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) OP&F did not abuse its discretion by relying on the psychiatrist's report to support its decision; and (2) Appellant waived his argument that the OP&F board abused its discretion in denying him benefits because he was also physically disabled from continuing work. View "State ex rel. Kolcinko v. Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund" on Justia Law

In an underlying civil case, Appellant filed a notice of dismissal, voluntarily dismissing the case without prejudice. Minutes later, a deputy clerk responsible for processing the queue of electronically transmitted documents clicked on the court of common pleas judge's journal entry granting summary judgment in favor of the respondents, which had been transmitted earlier that day. The judge subsequently struck Appellant's notice of dismissal and held that the summary judgment was the final judgment on the merits of the case. Appellant requested a writ of prohibition and a writ of mandamus, which the court of appeals denied. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the court of appeals erred in denying Appellant's request for (1) a writ of prohibition to prevent the judge from proceeding on the merits of the underlying case where the judge lacked jurisdiction because, pursuant to Ohio R. Civ. P. 58(A), the entry of summary judgment was not effective until after Appellant's notice of dismissal; and (2) a writ of mandamus to compel the judge to vacate her entry striking the notice of dismissal and her entry of summary judgment in the underlying case and to compel the judge to reinstate her notice of dismissal. View "State ex rel. Engelhart v. Russo" on Justia Law

Stanley and Kathryn Wasserman requested a writ of mandamus to compel the city and its mayor to commence an appropriation action to determine whether a taking occurred when the city's actions when constructing a reservoir on the Wasserman's property constituted a taking and how much compensation, if any, was due to the Wassermans. The court of appeals granted the writ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in granting the a writ of mandamus to compel the city and its mayor to commence an appropriation proceeding when the court had not yet determined that the Wassermans' property had been taken by the city. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Wasserman v. Fremont" on Justia Law

Terrance House filed complaints for writs of mandamus and procedendo to compel a court of common pleas judge to issue final, appealable orders on the judge's denial of Hough's motion for the judge to recuse herself and his motion to supplement his petition for postconviction relief. The court of appeals denied the claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Hough was not entitled to a final, appealable order on the judge's denial of his motion to recuse herself because the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to review those decisions; and (2) the judge had no duty to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law in denying Hough's motion to supplement his previously denied, untimely, successive petition for postconviction relief. View "State ex rel. Hough v. Saffold" on Justia Law

Frank Bilaver left his job with Fluid Line Products after Fluid Line denied him an extended leave of absence. Bilaver later applied for temporary total disability (TTD) compensation, which the Industrial Commission of Ohio denied after finding that Bilaver's decision to leave Fluid Line constituted a voluntary abandonment of employment that barred compensation. The court of appeals upheld the Commission's decision. Bilaver appealed, arguing that his departure from Fluid Line was involuntary because he did not quit his job but was instead fired in a manner that did not comply with State ex rel. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Indus. Comm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm. controlled in this case, and (2) lacking evidence that Bilaver secured another job and was prevented from doing it by his industrial injury, the Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying TTD compensation. View "State ex rel. Bilaver v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

A jury found Jack Carlisle guilty of kidnapping and gross sexual imposition (GSI) and sentenced him to three years' imprisonment for kidnapping and one year of imprisonment for GSI, to be served concurrently. The trial court later vacated Carlisle's sentence due to change of circumstances, namely the cost of Carlisle's dialysis, and imposed a sentence of five years of community control. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court lacked authority to modify Carlisle's sentence because his convictions had been affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding that the trial court in this case lacked the requisite authority to modify Carlisle's sentence, as absent statutory authority, a trial court is generally not empowered to modify a criminal sentence by reconsidering its own final judgment. Remanded. View "State v. Carlisle" on Justia Law

A three-judge panel convicted Lamont Hunter for the aggravated murder and rape of a three-year-old and child endangerment. The panel sentenced Hunter to death based on two death-penalty specifications: aggravated murder while committing or attempting to commit rape and aggravated murder of a child under the age of thirteen. The Supreme Court affirmed Hunter's convictions and sentence of death, holding (1) Hunter did not meet his burden of demonstrating that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that Hunter had previously abused the child; (3) the panel did not create a miscarriage of justice in convicting Hunter of all counts and specifications; (4) the panel did not err in denying multiple defense motions; (5) the panel did not err in sentencing Hunter to consecutive sentences for his noncapital offenses in violation of his constitutional rights; and (6) the aggravating factors clearly outweighed any mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, and the penalty imposed in this case was appropriate and proportionate when compared to death sentences approved for other rape-murders. View "State v. Hunter" on Justia Law

Employee was injured in an industrial accident in 1987. The last injury-related bill submitted to either self-insured Employer or its third-party administrator (collectively, Employer) was paid in 1997. In 2008, Employee asked Employer to authorize further treatment. Employer denied the request, relying on former Ohio Rev. Code 4123.52, under which claim inactivity in excess of ten years permanently closed a worker's compensation claim. In an effort to toll the statute, Employee revived an issue relating to a 1998 doctor's visit and requested a hearing on the payment of that outstanding bill. An Industrial Commission staff hearing officer ordered Employer to pay the outstanding bill. The court of appeals vacated the decision and directed the Commission to issue a new order denying payment of the bill. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission abused its discretion in ordering the bill to be paid because the visit related to a low-back condition that was not allowed in Employee's claim and there was no evidence establishing a potential connection between Employee's 1987 injury and his 1998 back symptoms. View "State ex rel. Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law