Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

George Williams pleaded guilty to sexual contact with a minor. Williams subsequently moved to be sentenced under the version of Ohio Rev. Code 2950 in effect at the time he committed the offense. The trial court denied the motion. At his sentencing hearing, Williams was informed he would be designated a tier II sex offender under the current version of Ohio Rev. Code 2950, otherwise known as S.B. 10. On appeal, Williams argued that the provisions of S.B. 10 could not constitutionally be applied to a defendant whose offense occurred before the major changes to the law took effect. The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that S.B. 10, as applied to Williams and any other sex offender who committed an offense prior to the enactment of S.B. 10, violated the provision of the Ohio Constitution prohibiting the General Assembly from enacting retroactive laws. Remanded. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

Larry Engel filed a medical-malpractice suit in the county court of common pleas against Dr. Marek Skoskiewicz, who practiced general surgery at a county hospital. Skoskiewicz asserted he was entitled to personal immunity pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 9.86 because, at the time of the surgeries, he was acting in his capacity as a volunteer clinical instructor of the University of Toledo College of Medicine and was therefore an officer or employee of the state. Accordingly, Engel filed a malpractice action against the College of Medicine in the court of claims, which possesses exclusive jurisdiction over personal-immunity claims, and sought a determination as to whether Skoskiewicz was entitled to personal immunity as a state employee. The court of common pleas stayed Engel's malpractice suit pending resolution of the personal-immunity issue. The court concluded that Skoskiewicz had performed the operations as a state employee and therefore was entitled to personal immunity. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Skoskiewicz was not an employee of the College of Medicine and that he did hold an appointed office or position with the state. Accordingly, Skoskiewicz was not entitled to personal immunity pursuant to the statute. Remanded. View "Engel v. Univ. of Toledo Coll. of Medicine" on Justia Law

Gayle Sperry, her son, and her daughter-in-law owned and operated a winery at Sperry's residence. The property was in a residentially zoned district. A zoning inspector filed a complaint for preliminary and permanent injunction seeking to enjoin the Sperrys' use of the property as a retail business and restaurant in a residentially zoned district. The trial court granted summary judgment to the zoning inspector, finding that the winery was not exempt from township zoning. The Sperrys appealed, contending that under Ohio Rev. Code 519.21(A) their winery was exempt from township zoning regulations because they also engaged in viticulture on the property within the meaning of the statute. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that exemption from township zoning under the statute does not require for its application that viticulture be the primary use of property engaged in the vinting and selling of wine. Remanded. View "Terry v. Sperry" on Justia Law

This case involved a determination of the value of real property owned by Huntington National Bank. The County Board of Revision (BOR) determined the true value of the property to be $2,000,000, thereby reducing the value from the $2,650,000 originally assigned by the auditor. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed. The Plain Local Schools Board of Education appealed, arguing that the BOR and BTA erred by (1) determining the value of real property based in part on factual material set forth in a written appraisal report when the appraiser who prepared the report did not testify, and (2) considering evidence contained in an appraisal report that offered an opinion of value as of a date other than the tax-lien date. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) because the school board did not object below to the alleged violation of appraisal-practice standards, the school board's claim that the violation made proferred evidence inadmissible was waived; and (2) the appraisal did furnish evidence relevant to determining the value as of the tax-lien date, even though the report itself used that data to arrive at an opinion of value for a different date. View "Plain Local Schools Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

After Michele Hobbs and Kelly Mullen decided to have a child together, Mullen became pregnant through in vitro fertilization procedure with donated sperm. Mullen executed a will in which she nominated Hobbs as the guardian of her child and a health-care power of attorney and durable power of attorney in which she gave Hobbs the authority to make decisions regarding the child. Hobbs and Mullen co-parented for two years, after which the women's relationship deteriorated. Hobbs then filed a complaint for shared custody in the juvenile court, alleging that Mullen had created a contract through her conduct with Hobbs to permanently share legal custody of the child. The juvenile court dismissed Hobbs's complaint for shared legal custody, concluding that a preponderance of the evidence did not conclusively demonstrate that Mullen's conduct created a contract that permanently gave partial custodial rights of the child to Hobbs. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that competent, credible evidence supported the juvenile court's conclusion that Mullen, by her conduct, did not enter into an agreement with Hobbs through which Mullen permanently relinquished sole custody of her child in favor of shared custody with Hobbs. View "In re Mullen" on Justia Law

WCI Steel appealed a final assessment of its personal property valuation for tax purposes to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA). The BTA dismissed WCI's appeal on the authority of Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Levin because its notice of appeal failed to specify error. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that (1) a notice of appeal from an assessment in which the tax commissioner has determined the value of personal property invokes the jurisdiction of the BTA to review that determination if the notice states the appellant's objection to the commissioner's actions in valuing property and identifies the treatment that the commissioner should have applied; (2) BTA's jurisdiction in the appeal permitted it to consider evidence in addition to that considered by the tax commissioner; and (3) the BTA misapplied Ohio Bell to this situation. Remanded. View "WCI Steel, Inc. v. Testa" on Justia Law

Joseph Starkey was injured while working for Builders FirstSource Ohio Valley. The Bureau of Workers' Compensation allowed Starkey's claim for, inter alia, a sprained hip and degenerative osteoarthritis of the left hip. Builders appealed to the county court, challenging Starkey's right to workers' compensation for osteoarthritis. The trial court entered judgment for Builders, holding (1) that a claim for aggravation of a preexisting condition is separate and distinct from a claim for that underlying condition itself, and (2) administrative action on one such claim did not without more confer jurisdiction on the court to consider the other. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Starkey could participate in the fund for degenerative osteoarthritis based on evidence that his work-related injury had aggravated his preexisting medical condition. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) because aggravation of a preexisting medical condition is a type of causation, it is not a separate condition or distinct injury as defined in Ohio Rev. Code 4123.01, and (2) an appeal taken pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4123.512 allows the claimant to present evidence on any theory of causation pertinent to a claim for a medical condition that already has been addressed administratively. View "Starkey v. Builders FirstSource Ohio Valley, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Appellee Timothy Rhodes mailed a public records request to the police department of the city of New Philadelphia requesting certain reel-to-reel tape recordings made by the police dispatch department. The department, however, had disposed of the recordings. Rhodes filed a complaint for civil forfeiture under Ohio Rev. Code 149.351(B) after finding that the police department had unlawfully erased the records without the requisite approval. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the trial court determined there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Rhodes was actually aggrieved by the violations. At trial, the jury found that Rhodes had not been aggrieved by the unauthorized disposition of the requested public records. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court should have granted the portion of Rhodes's motion for summary judgment claiming he was an aggrieved party. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that a party is not aggrieved by the destruction of a record when the party's objective in requesting the record is not to obtain the record but to seek a forfeiture for the wrongful destruction of the record. View "Rhodes v. New Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Gulf Underwriters Insurance issued a general liability policy to United Foundries with an endorsement for employer's liability coverage, known as a stop-gap endorsement. David Ward filed a complaint against his employer, United, alleging claims for employer intentional tort and seeking damages. While the case was pending, United filed an action against Gulf for a declaration that Gulf had a duty to defend and indemnify United for the claims asserted by Ward. The trial court granted summary judgment to United. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding (1) an exclusion in a stop-gap endorsement stating that the insurance does not apply to bodily injury resulting from an act that is determined to have been committed by an insured with the belief that an injury is substantially certain to occur does not require a final determination by either a judge or jury before the insurer can refuse to defend a claim alleging a substantial-certainty employer intentional tort: and (2) that the claims stated in the underlying complaint were neither potentially nor arguably covered under the terms of the policy, and thus, Gulf had no duty under the policy to defend United. View "Ward v. United Foundries, Inc." on Justia Law

Mortgage company Fifth Third filed a foreclosure action against a debtor. Judge Nancy Russo of the county court issued an order stating if the parties reached an agreement to notify the court. Subsequently, the parties negotiated a loan-modification agreement, and Fifth Third filed a notice voluntarily dismissing its complaint without prejudice. Judge Russo issued an entry (1) striking Fifth Third's notice of dismissal, and (2) ordering a show-cause contempt hearing due to Fifth Third's filing a notice of dismissal when the case was settled via loan modification. Fifth Third filed complaints against Judge Russo in the court of appeals for writs of mandamus and prohibition. The court granted a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Russo to vacate her order striking Fifth Third's notice of voluntary dismissal and a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Russo from proceeding on the foreclosure case but denied a writ of prohibition to prevent the judge from proceeding on the contempt order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the court of appeals ruled properly in the underlying writ case because (1) Fifth Third properly dismissed its case without prejudice, and (2) Fifth Third had an adequate remedy at law following the contempt order. View "State ex rel. Fifth Third Mortgage Co. v. Russo" on Justia Law