Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Christopher Barker pleaded guilty to five counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor. On appeal, Barker argued that the entry of his no-contest plea was not voluntary, intelligent, and knowing because the trial judge had failed to fully comply with the requirements of Ohio R. Crim. P. 11(C) when the judge told Barker that by entering the plea he was giving up the "right to call witnesses to speak on his behalf." The court of appeals agreed and reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court's admonition to Barker was insufficient to satisfy the constitutional mandate to compulsory process. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding (1) the language employed by the trial court while addressing Barker was a reasonable explanation of Barker's right to compulsory process, and (2) other portions of the record may be referenced in resolving an alleged ambiguity such as the one here during the oral colloquy. View "State v. Barker" on Justia Law

The Industrial Commission of Ohio found that Angela Benedetti, Inc. (ABI) violated two newly added specific safety requirements that resulted in an injury to an ABI employee. ABI filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in permitting the injured employee to amend his specific safety requirement violations application and in finding violations of the specific safety requirements. The court of appeals upheld the Commission's order and denied the writ. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing with the reasoning provided by the court of appeals but not given in this opinion. View "State ex rel. Angelo Benedetti, Inc. v. Indus. Comm." on Justia Law

American Electric Power operating companies (AEP) had been providing service to a pair of manufacturing customers at discounted rates. AEP had been keeping track of its delta revenue, the difference between what AEP would have collected under its tariffs and what it actually collected with the discount, and intended to collect it through a rider. In the case below, AEP filed an application seeking permission to collect its delta revenue through the rider. Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU) opposed both requests. The Public Utilities Commission rejected IEU's arguments and allowed the American Electric Power operating companies (AEP) to recover the costs arising from the discounted-rate arrangements. IEU appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) IEU did not show that the Commission erred in modifying the phase-in of AEP's rates, and (2) IEU did not show that the Commission erred in calculating AEP's carrying charges. View "In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Thomas Dunlap was convicted of two counts of gross sexual imposition involving victims under the age of thirteen, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2907.05(A)(4), and one count of disseminating obscene matter to juveniles. The court sentenced Dunlap to two years in prison and found Dunlap to be a tier three sex offender under Ohio Rev. Code 2950, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10 (S.B. 10). Dunlap appealed the section 2907.05(A)(4) convictions and his sex-offender classification, arguing that (1) section 2907.05(A)(4) requires a men rea element of recklessness, and (2) the application of S.B. 10 to offenses committed before its effective date violated the retroactivity clause of the Ohio Constitution. The court of appeals affirmed, holding, inter alia, that section 2907.05(A)(4) requires no precise culpable state of mind. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the element of sexual contact in a section 2907.05(A)(4) violation requires a mens rea of purpose, but the indictment and jury instructions in this case sufficiently set forth the required mens rea; and (2) the application of S.B. 10 to Dunlap violated the retroactivity clause of the Ohio Constitution. Remanded. View "State v. Dunlap" on Justia Law

Insured submitted a claim to Insurer after his house was damaged by a storm. Insured returned the payment tendered to him by Insurer, deeming the amount insufficient to cover the damage to his home. Almost two years after the house was damaged, Insured filed suit against Insurer. Insurer argued the lawsuit was barred by a clause in the insurance contract that stated that any action must be started within one year after the date of loss or damage. The trial court granted Insurer's motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed, concluding the policy language was ambiguous and that Insurer, by its actions, had waived its right to enforce the one-year limitation clause. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's grant of summary judgment, holding that Insurer could enforce the limitation-of-action clause contained in its contract because (1) the policy language was not ambiguous, and (2) Insurer did not waive its right to enforce the clause. View "Dominish v. Nationwide Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case originated upon the filing of an original action pursuant to Section 3 of H.B. 1, 2011 Am.Sub. (the Act), which stated that the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction over any claim asserting that any action taken pursuant to the Act violates the state constitution. Petitioners requested a declaratory judgment that H.B. 1 was unconstitutional and a prohibitory injunction preventing Respondents from acting pursuant to its provisions. The Supreme Court dismissed the cause for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding (1) the Court lacked original jurisdiction to grant relief, and (2) insofar as Section 3 of H.B. 1 attempted to confer exclusive, original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to consider the constitutionality of the act's provisions, it was unconstitutional. View "ProgressOhio.org v. Kasich" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a judgment denying a biological father's complaint for a writ of prohibition to prevent Appellees, the Clermont County Probate Court and its judge and magistrate, from proceeding on a stepfather's adoption petition when, at the time the petition was filed, a previously filed, separate adoption proceeding involving the same child initiated in the Hamilton County Probate Court by the stepfather remained pending. The biological father sought a writ of prohibition to prevent Appellees from proceeding on the adoption petition and to immediately dismiss the petition, which the court of appeals denied. The Supreme Court reversed judgment of the court of appeals and granted the writ, holding the Clermont County Probate Court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over the stepfather's adoption petition because the action initiated in Hamilton Court was still pending at the time the Clermont Court petition was filed. View "State ex rel. Otten v. Henderson" on Justia Law

This case was an original action challenging the sufficiency of an initiative petition proposing a constitutional amendment, the purpose of which, as described in the petition, was "to preserve the freedom of Ohioans to choose their health care and health care coverage." Relator Brian Rothenberg brought the action. The Supreme Court denied the challenge, holding (1) the relator's legal claims lacked merit, and (2) the relator's evidence was insufficient to meet his burden of demonstrating that the petition failed to contain a sufficient number of valid signatures to be submitted to the state's electors at the November 8, 2011 general election. View "Rothenberg v. Husted" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Duane Short was found guilty of the aggravated murders of his wife and another man and was sentenced to death. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed Short's judgments of conviction and sentence of death, holding (1) Short's contention that his waiver of the right to present evidence in the penalty phase was not knowing and voluntary and hence was invalid was overruled; (2) the trial court did not violate Short's right to present mitigating evidence by denying Short's request to present mitigating evidence to the judge alone after the penalty phase; (3) the trial court did not err by failing to hold a hearing to inquire into Short's claim that the prosecutor's office unconstitutionally interfered with defense counsel's ability to interview state witnesses before trial; (4) Short did not establish that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance; (5) Short's claims attacking the constitutionality of Ohio's death penalty statutes were overruled; and (6) upon an independent review of Short's death sentence, the evidence supported the jury's finding of aggravating circumstances, the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, and the death sentence was proportionate to those affirmed in similar cases. View "State v. Short" on Justia Law

George Williams pleaded guilty to sexual contact with a minor. Williams subsequently moved to be sentenced under the version of Ohio Rev. Code 2950 in effect at the time he committed the offense. The trial court denied the motion. At his sentencing hearing, Williams was informed he would be designated a tier II sex offender under the current version of Ohio Rev. Code 2950, otherwise known as S.B. 10. On appeal, Williams argued that the provisions of S.B. 10 could not constitutionally be applied to a defendant whose offense occurred before the major changes to the law took effect. The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that S.B. 10, as applied to Williams and any other sex offender who committed an offense prior to the enactment of S.B. 10, violated the provision of the Ohio Constitution prohibiting the General Assembly from enacting retroactive laws. Remanded. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law