Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Attorney submitted attorney-fee applications to the attorney general, requesting $1,563 in attorney fees for representing Client in connection with Client's application for crime-victim reparations. The attorney general granted an award of $1,020 to Attorney. A court of claims panel of commissioners affirmed the award. The attorney general appealed, challenging the jurisdiction of the court of claims. A judge of the court of claims affirmed, concluding that the court of claims had jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the attorney general's award of attorney fees. The tenth district court of appeals issued writs of mandamus and prohibition (1) compelling the court of claims to vacate its decision and dismiss the appeal, and (2) prohibiting the court of claims from hearing similar appeals from decisions of the attorney general on attorney-fee applications in the future. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of claims lacked jurisdiction to consider appeals from decisions of the attorney general granting or denying payment of attorney fees for seeking reparations on behalf of a victim of crime. View "State ex rel. DeWine v. Court of Claims of Ohio " on Justia Law

Relators, Ohioans for Fair Districts and its members, petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel Respondent, Secretary of State Jon Husted, to treat Sections 1 and 2 of H.B. 319, which established new congressional districts for the state based on the 2010 decennial census, as subject to referendum, to accept the submission of Relators' referendum-petition summary, and to discharge the duties of Husted's office as provided by Ohio Const. art. II and Ohio Rev. Code 3519.01. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) the writ was consistent with precedent and the plain language of Ohio Const. art. II, and (2) unless a valid referendum petition was timely filed with the secretary of state, H.B. 319 would become effective ninety days from the date the bill was filed by the governor in the office of the secretary of state. View "State ex rel. Ohioans for Fair Dists. v. Husted" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of various crimes. The judgment entry of conviction did not set out whether the conviction was based upon a guilty or no-contest plea or upon a bench trial or jury trial. The cause was remanded for resentencing for other reasons. On remand, the judgment entry contained the same error. The trial court then sua sponte filed a nunc pro tunc judgment entry supplementing the wording of the original resentencing judgment entry. The appellate court sua sponte dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding no new or substantial right was affected by correction of the sentencing judgment. Appellant subsequently obtained a certification of a conflict of the decision in this case with that of State v. Lampkin. At issue on appeal was whether a nunc pro tunc judgment entry that is issued solely to correct a clerical omission in a prior final judgment entry constitutes a new final order from which a new appeal may be taken. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no new right of appeal is created by such an entry, and therefore, the entry in this case was not a final order from which an appeal could be taken. View "State v. Lester" on Justia Law

The owner of certain property improved with a hotel challenged a valuation of its property, seeking a reduction of true value. The School District filed a countercomplaint, seeking to retain the auditor's valuation. The County Board of Revision (BOR) assigned a reduced value to the property. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed and adopted the BOR's reduced valuation. The School Board appealed, contending that the BTA erred by according deference to the BOR's decision rather than relying on its own independent weighing of the evidence. The Supreme Court agreed and vacated the BTA's decision, holding that the BTA unlawfully accorded a presumption of validity to the BOR's determination of value. Remanded so that the BTA could determine whether there was sufficient evidence to permit it to perform an independent valuation of the property. View "Vandalia-Butler City Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Appellee was injured by a falling tree located near, but outside, an easement maintained by Utility Company. Utility Company had hired Service Contractor to inspect trees along its power lines and to remedy any situation in which trees or vegetation might affect the lines. Appellee filed suit against Appellants, Utility Company and Service Contractor, alleging that they were liable for Appellee's injuries based upon their failure to inspect, maintain, and remove the tree or to warn the landowner and the public of the danger raised by the tree. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellants, concluding that they owed no duty to Appellee and that Appellee was not a third-party beneficiary under the Appellants' contract. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the contract was ambiguous regarding whether Appellee had enforceable rights as an intended third-party beneficiary. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) for an injured party to qualify as an intended third-party beneficiary under a written contract, the contract must indicate an intention to benefit that third party; and (2) because the contract between Appellants did not indicate an intent to benefit Appellee, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Appellants. View "Huff v. FirstEnergy Corp." on Justia Law

A jury convicted Roland Davis of aggravated murder, murder, kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and aggravated robbery. Davis was sentenced to death. The trial court dismissed Davis's petition for postconviction relief, and the court of appeals affirmed. Davis then filed a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to act on a motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding (1) a trial court has jurisdiction over a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence when the specific issue has not been decided on direct appeal; and (2) an appellate court has jurisdiction, in a case in which a death penalty has been imposed, to consider the trial court's denial a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

In 1970, while working for Employer, Employee was injured. In 1989, Employee retired. In 2008, Employee applied for permanent total disability (PTD) compensation. The Industrial Commission of Ohio concluded that Employee was permanently and totally disabled without ruling on the credibility of the assertion that Employee retired because of his injury or determining whether his retirement was voluntary or involuntary. The court of appeals granted Employer a limited writ of mandamus that vacated the Commission's order and ordered the Commission to reconsider the matter. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that because a voluntary retirement from the work force prior to asserting PTD precludes the payment of compensation for that disability, the court of appeals was correct in ordering further consideration of whether Employee retired because of his injury and whether his retirement was voluntary. View "State ex rel. Cinergy Corp. v. Heber" on Justia Law

Appellant Cerena Mackey was employed by the Ohio Department of Education when she suffered an industrial injury. After she retired from the workforce, Mackey filed for permanent total disability (PTD) compensation. The Industrial Commission of Ohio granted compensation to Mackey. The Department moved for reconsideration, alleging that the hearing officer had made a clear mistake of law in failing to determine whether Mackey's retirement was voluntary or involuntary. The Commission granted the motion and, after a hearing, vacated the award, finding (1) Mackey's retirement was unrelated to her injuries and was hence voluntary, and (2) Mackey's voluntary retirement foreclosed PTD compensation. Mackey filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals, which the court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in (1) reopening the issue of Mackey's PTD eligibility in order to consider the effect of her retirement upon it, and (2) finding that Mackey's retirement was voluntary. View "State ex rel. Mackey v. Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

Appellees, members of the Barbee family, were involved in an automobile accident. Appellant, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, insured the automobile. The policy contained a provision that required an action for underinsured motorist coverage be brought against the insurer within three years of the date of the accident. After receiving a judgment against the tortfeasors and more than four years after the accident, the Barbees filed suit against Nationwide to recover the outstanding amounts on their judgments. Nationwide filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Barbees' claims were barred for failure to bring the claims within the three-year period required by the policy's limitation period. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether a conflict between Nationwide's limitation provision and other provisions in the policy, which required that proceeds from any other available insurance be exhausted, rendered the limitation provision unenforceable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the three-year limitation provision was unambiguous and enforceable, and (2) the provision did not conflict with co-existing policy provisions because exhaustion of the tortfeasor's liability limits was not a precondition to filing suit by the insured against his insurer within the limitation period. View "Barbee v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Appellant Greg Bell requested that County Risk Sharing Authority (CORSA), a joint self-insurance pool whose members included the majority of Ohio's counties, provide him with certain CORSA records pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 149.43 and Ohio Rev. Code 149.431. David Brooks, the managing director of property and casualty insurance for CORSA, refused to provide copies of the records, asserting that they were not public records and that CORSA was a private corporation and not a public office subject to section 149.43. Bell filed for writs of mandamus to compel Brooks to provide copies of the requested CORSA records. The court of appeals denied the requested writs. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals insofar as it denied the writs relating to Bell's claim for CORSA's board meeting minutes on grounds that CORSA was not the functional equivalent of a public office for purposes of section 149.43, but (2) reversed to the extent that the court of appeals failed to consider Bell's records requests for CORSA's financial and compensation records as CORSA's status as a private, nonprofit corporation was not dispositive in regard to these claims. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Bell v. Brooks" on Justia Law