Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State Employment Relations Board (SERB) appointed Kay Kingsley as an administrative law judge (ALJ), which was a classified position. Several years later, the General Assembly enacted H.B. 1, which changed the position of SERB ALJ from the classified service to the unclassified service. That same year, SERB terminated Kingsley's employment. Kingsley requested a writ of mandamus to declare H.B. 1 unconstitutional as applied to her and to order SERB to recognize her as a classified employee and to reinstate her to her former ALJ position. The court of appeals dismissed Kingsley's mandamus complaint, determining that Kingsley had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by way of an administrative appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Kingsley did not set forth a viable claim for the requested extraordinary relief in mandamus as she had an adequate remedy by way of civil-service appeal to raise her claims. View "State ex rel. Kingsley v. State Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Ohio State University filed an application to exempt a two-story building to which it had title, predicating the exemption claim on Ohio Rev. Code 3345.17, which provides that state-university property is exempt for real property taxation if it is "used for the support of such university." The tax commissioner granted tax-exempt status, and the Board of Tax Appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the property, which generated rental income from a first-floor commercial tenant and second-floor residential tenants, qualified for exemption to the extent that the income generated by the property was devoted to university purposes. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of exemption, holding that income-producing property may not be exempted under section 3345.17 unless the activity conducted on the property bears an operational relationship to university activities. View "Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Testa " on Justia Law

In the civil case underlying this appeal, John Poss filed a motion for an order that Marilyn Morris transfer to him property that was the subject of a constructive trust. Before the court ruled on Poss's motion, Morris transferred the property to Skyway Investment Corporation. Poss then filed a motion to appoint a receiver to take possession of the property and to appoint a person to execute the conveyance of the property. The court of common pleas granted the motion. Skyway, which had been joined as a party defendant in the proceeding by the common pleas court, subsequently filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent Appellee, the county court of common pleas, from proceeding to place the property in receivership and a writ of mandamus to compel the court to vacate its orders concerning the property. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the common pleas court did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to appoint a receiver and a person to effect the conveyance of the property in the underlying case; and (2) Skyway had an adequate remedy by appeal to raise its claims. View "State ex rel. Skyway Invest. Corp. v. Court of Common Pleas " on Justia Law

For several years, Appellant Paul Lane worked for the City. Later, the interim city manager terminated Lane's employment for disciplinary reasons. Lane subsequently submitted to the City's personnel director a request for a hearing from the City Personnel Appeals Board regarding his termination. Via letter, the City declined Lane's request. Lane filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel Appellees, the City and Board, to conduct a hearing and issue a determination on the merits of his appeal, reinstate him to his position of employment, and award back pay and corresponding employment benefits. The court of appeals denied the writ, determining that Lane had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by administrative appeal from the Board's decision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that in the absence of a final, appealable order by the Board on Lane's request for a hearing, he did not have an adequate remedy by way of administrative appeal to raise his claims. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Lane v. Pickerington" on Justia Law

Anthony Belton was charged with aggravated murder with death-penalty specifications and aggravated robbery with firearm specifications. Belton filed a motion challenging the constitutionality of Ohio Rev. Code 2929.03 and Ohio R. Crim. P. 11(C)(3), claiming these provisions were unconstitutional because they precluded him from entering a guilty plea without waiving his right to a jury trial during the sentencing phase of his capital case. The common pleas court denied the motion and upheld the provisions as constitutional. Belton later filed a motion for leave to file a delayed appeal from the common pleas court's order. The court of appeals granted the motion. The State subsequently filed an action for a writ of prohibition to prevent the court of appeals from proceeding in Belton's delayed appeal and to compel dismissal of the appeal. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the court of appeals patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to proceed with the appeal when the order did not constitute a final, appealable order. View "State ex rel. Bates v. Court of Appeals " on Justia Law

A family partnership purchased 749-acres for use as a farm. The entire farm enjoyed current-agricultural-use-valuation (CAUV) status until a seventy-acre parcel was transferred to Maralgate, LLC, after which the county auditor denied the CAUV application. Maralgate filed a complaint with the County Board of Revision, which also denied the application. The Board of Tax Appeals reversed and granted CAUV status. At issue on appeal was whether the parcel was under common ownership with the rest of the farm for purposes of Ohio Rev. Code 5713.30(A)(1) because almost sixty percent of the parcel had trees that were not grown for commercial purposes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the parcel was under common ownership with the rest of the farm because the family partnership owned Maralgate; (2) the statute does not require that the trees in question be grown as a crop; and (3) a land survey showing how much of the parcel is devoted to different uses is required only if there is a commercial use of part of a parcel that is not an agricultural use, and, in this instance, those portions of the parcel not actively cultivated were not used for any commercial purpose. View "Maralgate, L.L.C. v. Greene County Bd. of Revision " on Justia Law

Employee was involuntarily separated from his employment due to disability. Employee's treating physician later certified that Employee was able to return to work, and Employee was subsequently reinstated to the payroll by Employer. Employee appealed the reinstatement order to the extent that the order did not award him back pay or credit his vacation leave from the date his treating physician certified that he could return to work to the day before he was returned to the payroll. The State Personnel Board of Review dismissed Employee's administrative appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Employee then filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel Employer to remit back pay or restore vacation-leave credit. The court of appeals dismissed Employee's complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that neither Ohio Rev. Code 124.32 nor Ohio Adm. Code 123:1-30-04 required that Employer remit back pay or credit the vacation leave Employee used between the date Employee's treating physician certified that he could return to work to the day before he was returned to the payroll. View "State ex rel. Baroni v. Colletti" on Justia Law

Appellant Raleigh Striker filed a pro se complaint in the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus to compel Respondents, the clerk and the city of Shelby, to make certain records available for inspection and copying under the Ohio Public Records Act. The court of appeals denied Striker's request. Respondents subsequently filed a motion for sanctions against Striker, claiming that Striker had engaged in frivolous conduct in the public-relations mandamus case. The court of appeals awarded the clerk $3,503 in attorney fees as sanctions pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2323.51 for responding to Striker's frivolous assertions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in awarding the clerk attorney fees for Striker's frivolous conduct because (1) the court properly determined that Striker had engaged in frivolous conduct that would authorize an award of reasonable attorney fees against him pursuant to section 2323.51, and (2) the reasonable fees incurred as a result of Striker's frivolous assertions were $3,503. View "State ex rel. Striker v. Cline" on Justia Law

The superintendent of insurance, in her capacity as the liquidator of an insolvent insurer, filed an action in the county court of common pleas against an independent accounting firm that provided auditing services to the insurer, alleging negligence and that the firm had received preferential or fraudulent payments. The accounting firm moved to dismiss the complaint or to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause that was contained in an engagement letter signed by the insurer and accounting firm. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that because the liquidator had not signed the arbitration agreement, there was a presumption against arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed but in part for different reasons, holding that the liquidator was not bound by the insurer's agreement when the liquidator's claims did not arise from the contract that contained the arbitration provision. View "Taylor v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P." on Justia Law

Appellant Carlos Galloway filed requests for writs of mandamus and procedendo to compel Appellees, the county court of common pleas and its judge, to issue judgments in Appellant's criminal cases that complied with Ohio R. Crim. P. 32(C) and constituted final, appealable orders. The court of appeals denied Appellant's request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the sentencing entries in Appellant's criminal cases fully complied with rule 32(C); (2) insofar as Appellant's claimed that one of his sentencing entries did not properly reflect the jury's verdict, he raised mere error and had an adequate remedy by appeal to raise the issue; and (3) any error regarding the imposition of court costs could be challenged by appeal. View "State ex rel. Galloway v. Lucas County Court of Common Pleas" on Justia Law