Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A property owner, Sheldon Road Associates, filed a valuation complaint in December 2008 that challenged the auditor's June 2008 correction of a clerical error relating to the 2007 tax year. The county Board of Revision (BOR) issued a decision that treated the complaint as pertaining to the tax year 2008. On appeal, the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) decided that, because Sheldon's complaint was untimely as to the 2007 tax year, the BOR lacked jurisdiction. The BTA remanded with the instruction that the BOR dismiss the complaint. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the BTA, holding that the BOR did have jurisdiction under the particular facts of this case. Remanded. View "Sheldon Rd. Assocs., LLC v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

This was an original action in which Relators, thirty-six electors living in various districts for the Ohio House of Representatives as reapportioned by the Ohio Apportionment Board on September 30, 2011, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against Respondents, the four republic members of the five-member Ohio Apportionment Board. Relators sought (1) a declaration that the apportionment plan adopted by the Board was invalid because the Board failed to comply with Ohio Const. art. XI, which governs the decennial apportionment of districts in the General Assembly and the Open Meetings Law, Ohio Rev. Code 121.22; and (2) a prohibitory injunction preventing those Board members from calling, holding, supervising, administering, or certifying any elections under their apportionment plan. The Supreme Court (1) dismissed Relators' open-meetings claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; (2) denied Relators' Article XI claims based on laches insofar as they attempted to challenge the use of the apportionment plan for the 2012 election cycle; and (3) held that Relators' remaining Article XI claims were not barred by laches. The Court stated that it would issue a separate order for further briefing and oral argument on those claims. View "Wilson v. Kasich" on Justia Law

After Jose Agosto was convicted and sentenced on criminal charges, Agosto unsuccessfully sought resentencing by raising claims for writs of mandamus and procedendo. Agosto again petitioned for writs of mandamus and procendendo to compel Appellees, a judge and the county court of common pleas, to resentence him to a lawful sentence that constitutes a valid final judgment. The court of appeals denied relief, concluding that res judicata barred Agosto from instituting a successive writ action for the same relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err where (1) res judicata barred Agosto's claims, and (2) some of Agosto's claims were not cognizable in an extraordinary-writ action. View "State ex rel. Agosto v. Gallagher" on Justia Law

Employee alleged that his political-subdivision Employer committed an intentional tort against him and engaged in negligent conduct. Employer filed a motion for summary judgment on the claims, alleging immunity from suit under the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act. The trial court denied the motion, concluding (1) a genuine issue of material fact existed, and (2) the express exception to immunity contained in the Act did not apply because Employee's claims did not arise out of the employment relationship. The appellate court affirmed and concluded that the express exception to immunity in the Act prevented Employer from raising immunity pursuant to the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the exception to the Act removed the protection of immunity for a political-subdivision employer for injuries to its employees that arise out of the employment relationship, and a political subdivision was at risk for liability in intentional-tort suits that satisfied the terms of Ohio Rev. Code 2745.01. View "Sampson v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth." on Justia Law

Employee injured his back while working for Employer. Employee returned to light-duty work but complained about his job duties. Employer offered him another position within his physical limitations, but Employee resigned. Employee subsequently filed a motion for temporary total disability (TTD) benefits. The Industrial Commission of Ohio initially denied the request. After Employee's claim was additionally allowed for another medical condition, Employee filed a new motion for TTD benefits. The Commission awarded Employee benefits based on new and changed circumstances from the Commission's previous order. The court of appeals issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Commission to vacate its second order and to enter an order denying TTD compensation, concluding that the Commission had abused its discretion when it relied on the additionally allowed medical condition as a new and changed circumstance since the previous order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Employee did not present evidence to justify the Commission's exercise of continuing jurisdiction; and (2) Employee was ineligible to receive TTD compensation for the period requested because his injury was not the reason that he could not return to his former position of employment. View "State ex rel. Akron Paint & Varnish, Inc. v. Gullotta" on Justia Law

The Eighth District Court of Appeals certified a conflict between its decision in this case and a decision of the Tenth District Court of Appeals on the question of whether Ohio Rev. Code 2315.21(B), as amended by S.B. 80, was unconstitutional, in violation of the Ohio Constitution, because it was a procedural law that conflicted with Ohio R. Civ. P. 42(B). Section 2315.21(B) created a substantive right to bifurcation in tort actions when claims for compensatory and punitive damages had been asserted. The state Court of Appeals held that section 2315.21(B) was unconstitutional because it conflicted with Rule 24(B), in violation of the separation of powers required by the state Constitution, by purporting to "legislate a strictly procedural matter already addressed by the Civil Rules." The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that section 2315.21(B) creates, defines, and regulates a substantive, enforceable right to separate stages of trial relating to the presentation of evidence for compensatory and punitive damages in tort actions and therefore takes precedence over Rule 42(B) and does not violate the Ohio Constitution, as it is a substantive law that prevails over a procedural rule. View "Havel v. Villa St. Joseph" on Justia Law

Dennis Varnau, an independent candidate for sheriff of Brown County, filed a protest against Dwayne Wenninger's candidacy for sheriff in the 2008 elections. The board of elections denied the protest because it was not filed by a member of the appropriate party. Following the election victory by Wenninger, Varnau filed a complaint for a writ of quo warranto to oust Wenninger from the office and to place Varnau in that office. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Varnau did not establish that Wenninger lacked the qualifications under Ohio Rev. Code 311.01(B) to hold the office of sheriff for his third four-year term, and the court of appeals properly denied the writ; and (2) the court of appeals did not err by denying Wenninger's request for attorney fees when he prevailed on Varnau's quo warranto claim. View "State ex rel. Varnau v. Wenninger" on Justia Law

Father and Mother divorced, and Mother was granted custody of Child. Husband made child support payments until 2007. Afterwards, he sent Child a Christmas and birthday gift. Mother's husband, Stepfather, subsequently filed a petition to adopt Child. The probate court determined that Father's gifts to Child did not constitute maintenance and support for purposes of R.C. 3107.07(A), that Father had failed without cause to provide maintenance and support preceding the filing of the adoption petition, and thus, Father's consent was not needed for the adoption. The appellate court reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the judgment of the probate court, holding (1) de minimis monetary gifts from a biological parent to a minor child do not constitute maintenance and support for purposes of section 3107.07(A); and (2) a probate court determination of whether a financial contribution constitutes maintenance and support for purposes of section 3107.07(A) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, but whether justifiable cause for the failure to pay child support has been proved by clear and convincing evidence is a separate question for the probate court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. View "In re Adoption of M.B." on Justia Law

Law Firm filed a verified petition for a writ of mandamus to compel Housing Authority to provide copies of all records that documented any and all instances of lead poisoning in the last fifteen years in any dwelling owned or operated by Housing Authority. The court of appeals (1) granted Law Firm's motion for summary judgment regarding the request for lead-poisoning documents and ordered Housing Authority to produce the documents, and (2) granted $7,537 in attorney fees to Law Firm. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) to the extent that Law Firm's request properly sought the lead-poisoning records, the court of appeals did not err in granting the writ of mandamus to compel Housing Authority to provide access to them; (2) the personal identifying information in Housing Authority's lead-poisoning documents was not obtainable under the Public Records Act, but the remainder of the completed forms was subject to disclosure; and (3) the court of appeals erred in awarding attorney fees to Law Firm. Remanded. View "State ex rel. O'Shea & Assocs. Co., L.P.A. v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth." on Justia Law

Appellant, Marquise Jones, petitioned for writs of mandamus and procendendo to compel Appellee, Sandusdy County Court of Common Pleas Judge Barbara Ansted, to issue a new sentencing entry in Jones's criminal case. The court of appeals dismissed the petition. Jones appealed, arguing that the entry issued in his case was not a final, appealable order because it failed to dispose of every firearm specification of which he was found guilty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the sentencing entry constituted a final, appealable order because it set forth the fact of Jones's convictions, the sentence, the judge's signature, and the time stamp indicating the entry upon the journal by the clerk; and (2) Jones had an adequate remedy by way of appeal to raise his claim of sentencing error. View "State ex rel. Jones v. Ansted" on Justia Law