Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Buckeye Wind filed an application to construct a proposed wind-powered electric generation facility with the power siting board (the board). A group of neighboring landowners (the neighbors) opposed the application. Several other entities, including the county and several local townships (collectively, the county) also intervened. The board approved construction of most of the proposed turbines. The neighbors and county appealed. Buckeye intervened on behalf of the board. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the board acted in accordance with all pertinent statutes and regulations and based its determinations on the evidence in the record, and therefore, the board's decision was reasonable and lawful. View "In re Application of Buckeye Wind, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant Timothy Smith pleaded guilty to forgery. The trial court sentenced Smith to five years of community control and required him to pay court costs, the fee for his court-appointed attorney, and $4,857 in restitution. Smith appealed, asserting that the trial court erred when it did not inform him that if he failed to pay court costs, the court could require him to perform community service. The court of appeals refused to consider this assignment of error on its merits, holding that the issue was not ripe for review because Smith had not yet failed to pay court costs. Smith filed a motion in the court of appeals to certify a conflict, alleging that the court's holding conflicted with the Fourth District Court of Appeals' holding in State v. Moss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, pursuant to precedent, the court's failure to provide Smith the community-service notice required by Ohio Rev. Code 2947.23(A)(1) was ripe for review regardless of whether Smith had failed to pay costs. Remanded. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

Robert Clifton owned property contiguous to property owned by J&M Precision Machining. The Village of Blanchester annexed J&M's parcel and rezoned the entire parcel for general industrial use. Clifton filed a complaint alleging that the rezoning of J&M's property resulted in a regulatory taking of his property without just compensation. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Village. The court of appeals reversed and remanded in part after finding that the trial court had failed to inquire as to whether the rezoning resulted in a partial taking. On remand, the trial court granted summary judgment to the Village, finding that Clifton had no standing to bring a taking claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was an insufficient nexus between the rezoning of J&M's property and the alleged diminution in value of Clifton's adjacent property to indicate that Clifton was a proper party to bring a regulatory-taking claim; and (2) furthermore, because Clifton's property was outside the Village limits, the Village had no authority to appropriate his property for an alleged regulatory taking, and therefore, Clifton had no redressable claim against the Village for a regulatory taking. View "Clifton v. Blanchester" on Justia Law

Ohio Edison Company owned a transmission-line easement running over property owned by Kurt Wimmer and the Wimmer Family Trust (the Wimmers). When the company sought to remove the trees in the easement on the Wimmers' property, the family objected. The court of common pleas found in favor of Ohio Edison, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated that judgment on the authority of Corrigan v. Illum. Co., which held that the Public Utilities Commission, not a court, was required to decide whether tree removal was reasonable. The Wimmers then took their complaint to the Commission, which ruled in Ohio Edison's favor and permitted it to remove the trees. The Supreme Court affirmed where the Wimmers did not show any error in the Commission's order. View "Wimmer v. Pub. Util. Comm." on Justia Law

This was an action for a writ of mandamus to compel Respondent, the Cuyahoga County fiscal officer, to provide to Relators, private companies that store and index electronic images of records and officials representing those companies, copies of electronic images of all documents recorded in the Cuyahoga County Recorder's Office for two months in 2010, to provide those copies based on their actual cost rather than $2 per electronic image of each page, and to amend the office's public-records policy to comply with the law. The Supreme Court (1) granted the writ to compel the fiscal officer to provide the requested electronic copies at actual cost, as the requested electronic images constituted records subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act and Relators were entitled to copies of those records at actual cost rather than at the higher statutory charge for photocopying documents; and (2) denied the writ insofar as it sought to amend public policy, as the policy it sought to amend was no longer effective and the county's existing public-records policy did not violate the requirement to charge the actual cost of the records. View "State ex rel. Data Trace Info. Servs., LLC. v. Cuyahoga County Fiscal Officer " on Justia Law

Amber Williams and Frederick Ormsby, who were not married, lived together in a house Amber received through her divorce settlement. Frederick eventually paid the remaining mortgage balance, and Amber gave him title to the property by executing a quitclaim deed. As a result of a later separation, Amber and Frederick signed a document in March 2005 to sell the house and allocate the proceeds. The couple subsequently tried to reconcile and, in June 2005, they signed a second document, purportedly making themselves equal partners in the house and providing for property disposition in the event that their relationship ended. After their relationship ended, the parties filed suit against each other. The trial court determined that the March 2005 agreement was supported by consideration but that the June 2005 agreement was not and held that title to the property was vested in Frederick exclusively. The federal court of appeals reversed, concluding that moving into home with another and resuming a relationship can constitute consideration sufficient to support a contract. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that merely moving into a home with another while engaging in a romantic relationship is not consideration for the formation of a contract. View "Williams v. Ormsby" on Justia Law

Lisa Mullins, the widow and administrator of the estate of Charles Mullins, filed a complaint against Appellants, a doctor and a medical facility, alleging negligence in the treatment of Charles that resulted in his death. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the estate. The court of appeals remanded the matter, finding that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on Lisa's alleged contributory negligence and denying Appellants' motion for a new trial. On remand, Lisa filed a complaint in the court of appeals for a writ of prohibition to prevent the judge sitting in the court of common pleas from retrying the issue of the medical negligence of Appellants at a second jury trial. The court of appeals granted the writ to prevent the judge from retrying the negligence issue in the case against Appellants. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and denied the writ, holding that the court erred in determining that a retrial of the negligence claim against Appellants patently and unambiguously violated the court's mandate in the prior appeal. View "State ex rel. Mullins v. Court of Common Pleas (Curran)" on Justia Law

Ohio Edison owned an easement over which an electric transmission line ran. Thomas and Derrell Wilkes owned a portion of the property subject to the easement and built an above-ground swimming pool and storage shed in the area of the easement. When it discovered the structures, Ohio Edison filed a complaint in the court of common pleas to enforce the easement, asking the court to order the Wilkeses to remove their structures. The Wilkeses filed their own complaint a few months later with the public utilities commission, asking the commission to order the company to move its transmission line. The commission dismissed the Wilkeses' complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Wilkeses did not demonstrate that the commission erred in dismissing their complaint for lack of jurisdiction. View "Wilkes v. Ohio Edison Co." on Justia Law

Appellant Jason Carrick was charged with and convicted of disorderly conduct in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2917.11(A)(2) after the police department received complaints about the loud music coming from Carrick's property during a Halloween party Carrick hosted in a building he owned. The court of appeals held that section 2917.11(A)(2) was not unconstitutionally vague but thereafter found its judgment to be in conflict with the judgment of the Fourth District Court of Appeals in State v. Compher and certified the record to the Supreme Court for review. At issue was whether section 2917.11(A)(2) provides sufficient notice for a person of ordinary intelligence to understand what he or she is required to do under the law. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding (1) the statute does provide sufficient notice and thus is not void for vagueness, and (2) therefore, Carrick's due-process rights were not violated. View "State v. Carrick" on Justia Law

Paul Palmer pleaded guilty to sexual battery in 1995 and served an eighteen-month sentence. Based on Palmer's conviction, the Adam Walsh Act of 2007 automatically imposed a sex-offender classification, requiring registration with authorities. Palmer filed a petition challenging the application of the new registration requirements to him. Meanwhile, Palmer was indicted for violating his registration requirements under the Act. The trial court (1) ruled that Ohio's sex-offender regulations did not apply to Palmer and granted his motion to dismiss the indictment, and (2) ordered the removal of Palmer's name from lists of sex offenders. The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the trial court erroneously dismissed the indictment in light of the Act's explicit retroactivity, and (2) because the Act did apply to Palmer, the court erred in requiring removal of Palmer's name from lists of sex offenders. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) State v. Bodyke did not invalidate the statutory petition process for challenging a reclassification under the Act; and (2) a trial court may dismiss an indictment alleging violations of the Act based on the retroactive application of the Act because, after State v. Williams, duties under the Act may not be imposed retroactively. View "State v. Palmer" on Justia Law