Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Roland Nickleson filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel Appellee, the county court of common pleas judge, to issue a final, appealable order in his criminal case. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) notwithstanding Nickleson's claims, his sentencing entry was a final, appealable order because it contained a full resolution of all the counts of his indictment for which there were convictions; and (2) Nickleson had an adequate remedy by appeal from his sentencing entry to raise his other claims contesting the validity of the indictment, the propriety of the jury instructions, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. View "State ex rel. Nickleson v. Mayberry" on Justia Law

While receiving permanent total disability compensation, Appellant Donald McNea's was engaged in the illegal sale of narcotics. Appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio terminated McNea's benefits after finding that he had engaged in sustained remunerative employment while receiving those benefits. McNea filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals. The court found no abuse of discretion had occurred and denied the writ. McNea appealed, challenging the Commission's finding that he was performing, or capable of performing, sustained remunerative work while receiving benefits, a determination that generated a declaration of overpayment for compensation paid during that period. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in characterizing McNea's remunerative employment as sustained, and the Commission did not violate McNea's due process rights by terminating his benefits while he was in prison. View "State ex rel. McNea v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Rick Warner was a construction worker who had periods of unemployment each year that were the result of seasonal layoffs. After being injured at work, Warner asked the Industrial Commission of Ohio to establish his average weekly wage (AWW) for the purpose of awarding future compensation. At issue was the treatment to be accorded those weeks of unemployment in calculating Warner's AWW. A commission staff hearing officer excluded from the wage total the amount of unemployment compensation received but included in the weekly divisor the number of weeks that Warner did not work. The court of appeals subsequently issued a limited writ of mandamus ordering the commission to further consider Warner's request. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals judgment ordering further consideration of the adequacy of Warner's job search, as, in setting the AWW, any period of unemployment due to causes beyond the employee's control shall be eliminated from the weekly divisor; and (2) reversed the portion of the court of appeals judgment ordering the commission to include the amount of Warner's unemployment compensation from his wage total. View "State ex rel. Warner v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to aggravated murder and kidnapping. At his sentencing hearing, Defendant was notified of postrelease control, but the language indicating notification had been made was inadvertently omitted from the sentencing entry that resulted from that hearing. When the omission came to light, the trial court corrected the sentencing entry through a nunc pro tunc entry that stated that the notification had been made and denied Defendant's request for a new sentencing hearing. The appellate court upheld the trial court's actions as a permissible use of a nunc pro tunc entry. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's use of a nun pro tunc entry was appropriate in the specific circumstances of this case. View "State v. Qualls" on Justia Law

Gerald Strothers requested that East Cleveland Mayor Gary Norton provide access to review, inspect, and copy at cost various public records. A week after Strothers's public-records request was received by Norton, Strothers filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel Norton to provide access to the requested records. Norton subsequently made available to Strothers all of the requested records. The court of appeals denied the writ of mandamus but awarded Strothers $1,000 in statutory damages. The Supreme Court affirmed the portion of the judgment denying the writ of mandamus and reversed the portion awarding statutory damages, holding that the court of appeals (1) correctly held that Norton's evidence established that Strothers had been given access to all of the requested records, which rendered his mandamus claim moot; and (2) abused its discretion in granting statutory damages to Strothers, as Norton produced the records within a reasonable period of time. View "Strothers v. Norton" on Justia Law

After receiving a dispatch that a male driving a tow truck was armed and planned to kill himself, two police officers stopped the driver, Richard Dunn. Because they were dealing with an allegedly suicidal person, they handcuffed Dunn and placed him in a police cruiser. The officers subsequently found a loaded gun in the truck's glove compartment. Dunn was indicted on one count of improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle. Dunn filed a motion to suppress, contending that the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment. The trial court overruled the motion, holding that the stop was a legitimate response to an emergency situation. Dunn then pleaded no contest to the charge. The court of appeals reversed and granted the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding that the officers in this case were authorized to stop Dunn because the community-caretaking/emergency-aid exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement allows a low-enforcement officer with objectively reasonable grounds to believe that there is an immediate need for her assistance to protect life or prevent serious injury to effect a community-caretaking/emergency-aid stop. View "State v. Dunn" on Justia Law

Appellant Robert Watson, who was serving a custodial sentence, filed a writ of mandamus to compel Appellees, various correctional officials and employees, to provide certain public and nonpublic records directly related to Watson. The court of appeals conditionally granted the writ, stating that Watson must pay for the copies. After Appellees failed to provide the copies to Watson, Watson requested statutory damages in connection with his mandamus case. The court of appeals denied the request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying Watson's request, as (1) the court did not conclusively determine that Watson had submitted the applicable cost for the copies; (2) the court did not specify that Appellees had breached any duty owed to Watson; and (3) Watson's mandamus claim was based in part on his request for nonpublic records, which claim was not authorized by Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, and therefore, Watson could not be awarded statutory damages for that claim. View "State ex rel. Watson v. Mohr" on Justia Law

Appellant Peggy Hodge sought to compel Appellee, the administrator of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation, to pay Vicki Hulbert, a licensed practical nurse, higher wages for the in-home care that Hulbert provided to her. A staff hearing officer (SHO) determined that he had no jurisdiction to order an increase. A few months later, Hodge again moved the Commission to increase Hulbert's wages. A district hearing officer (DHO) dismissed the motion of jurisdictional grounds, citing the SHO order. Thereafter, a different SHO affirmed the DHO's order. Hodge then sought a writ of mandamus against the bureau. The court of appeals denied the writ after finding, among other things, that Hodge's failure to appeal the SHO orders constituted a failure to exhaust her available administrative remedies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals was correct in denying the writ, as Hodge's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies precluded mandamus. View "State ex rel. Hodge v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Appellants, homeowners, filed suit against Centex Homes, alleging various causes of action, including breach of contract, breach of express and implied warranty, and failure to perform in a workmanlike manner. Centex Homes moved for summary judgment, arguing that Appellants had waived all warranties except the specific limited warranty that Centex Homes provided in the sales agreements. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded for a trial on Appellants' tort claims that Centex Homes breached its duty to construct their homes in a workmanlike manner using ordinary care, as (1) in Ohio a duty to construct houses in a workmanlike manner using ordinary care is imposed by law on all home builders; and (2) a home buyer cannot waive his right to enforce the home builder's duty to construct the house in a workmanlike manner. Remanded. View "Jones v. Centex Homes" on Justia Law

Employee filed a workers' compensation claim against Employer, which was denied by the Industrial Commission. Employee filed a notice of appeal but failed to name as an appellee the administrator of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation. Employee later filed a motion for leave to amend his petition, this time naming the administrator as a party pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4123.512. The court of common pleas dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and denied Employee's motion to amend his petition. The court of appeals reversed, finding that Employee's failure to name the administrator in the notice of appeal did not deprive the court of common pleas of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 4123.412's requirements that a party appealing from an Industrial Commission order name the administrator as a party of the appeal and serve the administrator with notice of the appeal are not jurisdictional requirements; and (2) Employee perfected his appeal by amending the complaint to name the administrator as a party and then notifying him by serving him with a copy of the amended complaint, thus vesting the common pleas court with jurisdiction to rule on his motion to amend. View "Spencer v. Freight Handlers, Inc." on Justia Law