Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Ohio Department of Health (ODH) issued several notices of violations of the Smoke Free Act to Appellants, a privately owned bar and its CEO. ODH subsequently filed a complaint seeking injunctive relief ordering Appellants to comply with the Smoke Free Act. Appellants filed a counterclaim for declaratory and injunctive relief against ODH and a cross-claim against the attorney general, alleging that the Smoke Free Act operated in violation of Appellants' constitutional rights, that the Act was invalid as applied to them, and that ODH engaged in rulemaking that exceeded its authority. The trial court held that ODH had exceeded its authority in implementing a policy of strict liability for violations of the Act by issuing fines regardless of whether Appellants were at fault and denied ODH's request for a permanent injunction. The court of appeals reversed and granted a permanent injunction to ODH. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Appellants failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and could not use declaratory judgment to vacate final orders, the previous violations of the Act were res judicata; and (2) the Act was a valid exercise of the state's police power and did not amount to a regulatory taking. View "Wymsylo v. Bartec, Inc." on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant Donald Eafford guilty of permitting drug abuse and possession of cocaine. The court of appeals vacated Eafford's felony sentence for possession of cocaine and remanded for resentencing, holding that Eafford was convicted only of misdemeanor possession of drugs because the jury-verdict form did not state the degree of the offense or specify that Eafford had possessed cocaine. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the sentence, holding that the trial court did not plainly err in imposing sentence, as (1) the indictment charged Eafford with possession of cocaine, and the least degree of that offense is a felony of the fifth degree; (2) the evidence presented at trial proved Eafford possessed cocaine; (3) the trial court instructed the jury that it could find Eafford guilty only if it found the drug involved to be cocaine; and (4) the jury, which found Eafford guilty as charged in the indictment, thus found him guilty of possession of cocaine as a felony. . View "State v. Eafford" on Justia Law

Paula Eastley, as the administrator of the estate of her son, Steven Hieneman, filed an amended complaint against Dr. Paul Volkman and Tri-State Healthcare, LLC, the clinic where Volkman practiced, and Denise Huffman, doing business as Tri-State Health Care. The jury found that Volkman's medical malpractice and Huffman's negligence had proximately caused Hieneman's death, and the trial court entered judgment in Eastley's favor. The court of appeals affirmed. Although two of the three judges on the court found that based on an ordinary negligence theory, the jury's verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, a dissenting judge prevented a reversal by concluding that because Huffman had not renewed her motion for a directed verdict or filed a motion for new trial or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, she had forfeited all but plain error review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when the evidence to be considered is in the court's record, motions are not required to challenge manifest weight of the evidence on appeal; and (2) in civil cases, the sufficiency of the evidence is quantitatively and qualitatively different from the weight of the evidence. Remanded for consideration of the issue based upon the appropriate standard. View "Eastley v. Volkman" on Justia Law

In this case the Supreme Court was asked to resolve a conflict between the second and seventh district courts of appeals concerning whether a certified police officer who was appointed chief of police in a township with less than 10,000 residents, a police department with less than ten officers, and no civil service commission had the automatic right upon termination to return to the position he held before his appointment as chief of police pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 505.49. The trial court concluded that Plaintiff, a former chief of police, had no right to return to the position in the police department that he held before his police chief appointment. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed based upon its reading of section 505.49, holding that the former chief of police had no automatic right to return to a position that he held prior to appointment. View "Blair v. Sugarcreek Township Bd. of Trustees" on Justia Law

After Employee, an electrician, received a work-related injury, Employee sought additional workers' compensation benefits, alleging that Employer committed a violation of a specific safety requirement (VSSR), which proximately caused his industrial injury. The requirement in question directs employers to supply protective apparatus to employees working on specified electrical equipment. A staff hearing officer (SHO) for the Industrial Commission of Ohio granted Employee's VSSR application after finding that Employer had violated Ohio Adm. Code 4123:1-5-12(A). Employer filed a complaint in mandamus, alleging that the commission had abused its discretion in finding a VSSR. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Employer violated section 4123:1-5-12(A) because it did not supply Employee with protective equipment for the main breaker cabinet Employer worked on when he was injured. View "State ex rel. Glunt Indus., Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals stemmed from a general election on Issue 6 in Lake Township, Stark County, that approved expansion of the a police district to include all of Lake Township's unincorporated territory and levied a property tax for that purpose. The issue was approved by the voters. Subsequently, many of those who had voted in the election filed a petition contesting the election approving Issue 6 due to an error in ballot language and requesting that the election be set aside. The common pleas court entered a judgment granting the contest and setting aside the election result approving Issue 6, determining that the error in ballot language constituted an election irregularity and that the election irregularity made the election result on Issue 6 uncertain. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this case presented the extreme circumstances of a misstatement in ballot wording that understated a proposed tax levy by ten times less than the true amount to be collected, which misled the voters and affected the integrity of the election on Issue 6; and (2) based on the applicable law, the common pleas court did not err in granting the contest and setting aside the election. View "In re Election held on Stark County Issue Six" on Justia Law

Reporters for the Cincinnati Enquirer requested that the Cincinnati police department provide the newspaper with certain records related to a shootout at a local bar, including the names of the two police officers shot, their personnel files, and an unredacted copy of the incident report of the shootout. The Cincinnati police chief denied the requests insofar as the newspaper sought names and identifying information regarding the officers involved in the shootout. The Enquirer subsequently filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel the police chief to make the requested records available for inspection and copying and seeking attorney fees. The court of appeals denied the writ and the request for attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not in denying the writ and request for attorney fees, as the requested identifying information of the police officers wounded in the shooting was exempted from disclosure under the Public Records Act by the constitutional right of privacy. View "State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Craig" on Justia Law

Appellant Wesley Lloyd was convicted in Texas of aggravated sexual assault. Lloyd subsequently moved to Ohio. Lloyd was later convicted of several charges relating to his failure to register as a sex offender. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the offense for which Appellant was convicted in Texas was a sexually oriented offense under Ohio law because it is substantially equivalent to rape, a listed Ohio offense, and therefore, Appellant's offense triggered a duty to register in Ohio; but (2) because the State failed to prove that at the time Appellant moved to Ohio, he was under a duty to register in Texas as a result of his conviction for aggravated sexual assault, Appellant's convictions must be vacated. View "State v. Lloyd" on Justia Law

Appellee, AT&T Communications of Ohio, applied to the City of Cleveland for an income-tax refund for 1999 through 2002. Appellant, the City's income-tax administrator, denied AT&T's appeal in all respects, (1) dismissing AT&T's application for the refund for 1999 after finding that the statute of limitations on the request for a refund had expired, and (2) determining that any refund AT&T was claiming for 2000 through 2002 was offset in part by its other tax obligations. The board of income tax review reversed in part, determining that AT&T should receive the entire refund requested for the tax years 2000 through 2002. AT&T appealed. The court of common pleas reversed and entered judgment in favor of the administrator regarding AT&T's refund for 2000 through 2002. The court of appeals reversed the common pleas court's judgment, concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the administrator's assignments of error because the administrator did not file a notice of appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the administrator failed to perfect a separate appeal in the court of common pleas, the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction to consider the administrator's assignments of error. View "AT&T Commc'ns of Ohio, Inc. v. Lynch" on Justia Law

This appeal involved two criminal cases against Mario Harris. In Harris I, Harris pleaded guilty to two offenses with forfeiture specifications. After the trial court imposed a sentence, Harris filed a motion for resentencing, which the court denied. The appellate court held that the trial court's denial of Harris's motion was not a final, appealable order because the sentencing court had failed to include the terms of forfeiture in the judgment of conviction. In Harris II, Harris pled guilty to an offense with an automobile-forfeiture specification. The trial court imposed a prison sentence and ordered the forfeiture. The court denied Harris's subsequent motion for resentencing. The appellate court held that the sentence was void because the trial court had failed to include a mandatory driver's license suspension as part of Harris's sentence. The Supreme Court consdoliated the cases and held (1) a journal entry of conviction need not include a related forfeiture in order to be a final appealable order; and (2) when a trial court fails to impose a mandatory driver's license suspension as part of an offender's sentence, that part of the sentence is void, and resentencing is limited to the imposition of the statutorily mandated term. View "State v. Harris" on Justia Law