Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, Appellants, Cincinnati Golf Management, Inc. (CGMI) and the City of Cincinnati, challenged a consumer's use-tax assessment issued by the tax commissioner against CGMI. The commissioner assessed tax with respect to purchases that the commissioner deemed to be taxable under the sales and use tax laws of Ohio. Appellants asserted that because CGMI made the purchases as an agent for the City, the purchases were exempt as sales to a political subdivision pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 5739.02(B)(1). Both the commissioner and the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) found that CGMI, acting in its capacity as an independent contractor under the management agreement between it and the City, did not qualify as an agent of the City with respect to the sales at issue. Accordingly, the BTA upheld the assessment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellants' arrangements did not satisfy the elements of agency for purposes of section 5739.02(B)(1); and (2) purchases by CGMI did not constitute sales to the City under the sales tax law's definition of a sale. View "Cincinnati Golf Mgmt., Inc. v. Testa " on Justia Law

In this appeal, a property owner challenged an increase to the 2006 valuation of its property that was ordered by the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) at the instigation of the Bedford Board of Education. The BTA reversed the decision of the Cuyahoga County Board of Revision (BOR), which had retained the auditor's valuation of $3,713,500. The BTA valued the property by using the allocated portion of the March 2006 sale price, which increased the valuation to $4,835,000. The owner appealed, contending that the allocated sale price was not reflective of market value. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the BTA erred by ignoring and failing to weigh the significance of testimony regarding the seller's tax motivations in allocating the sale price to the subject property; and (2) because it is the duty of the BTA to weigh the evidence and determine the facts concerning valuation, the case was remanded for proper consideration of the effect of that testimony. View "Bedford Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Appellant was indicted on twelve counts of deception to obtain a dangerous drug. Appellant moved for intervention in lieu of conviction (ILC). The trial court ordered an intervention plan, and Appellant pled guilty to the charges, pending successful completion of her intervention program. After Appellant successfully completed the intervention program, the trial court dismissed the twelve pending charges against her. Appellant then filed an application for sealing of her record after dismissal of the proceedings. The trial court denied Appellant's application. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a trial court has discretion to determine that successful completion of the ILC program entitles the defendant to immediate sealing of his or her record under Ohio Rev. Code 2953.52(A)(1) or to impose the waiting period set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 2953.23(A)(1). View "State v. Niesen-Pennycuff" on Justia Law

In this case the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying the request by Appellant, Terrie Sizemore, a veterinarian, for a writ of mandamus to compel Appellee, the Ohio Veterinary Medical Licensing Board, to reissue a 2007 adjudication order finding her guilty of misconduct and imposing fines. Sizemore contended that the original order was not in compliance with Ohio Rev. Code 119.09, preventing her from pursuing an appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) because the Board dismissed the charges against Sizemore, the mandamus claim was moot; (2) the Board have any duty to reissue its prior adjudication order finding Sizemore guilty of misconduct; and (3) Sizemore had an adequate remedy by way of a motion for contempt to raise her claim that the board violated the court of appeals mandate to reissue its adjudication order. View "State ex rel. Sizemore v. Veterinary Med. Licensing Bd." on Justia Law

After giving birth to a child in Ohio, Rachel Arnold placed the child for adoption. Relators' adoption of the child was finalized in May 2010. In October 2010, Todd Roccaro filed a complaint to establish paternity in the county court of common pleas. Roccaro named only Arnold as a defendant and did not name the child as a party to the case. In November 2011, Judge Thomas Capper ordered the parties to the parentage action, as well as a nonparty, the minor child, to submit to genetic testing. In January 2012, Relators, the child's adoptive parents, filed an action for a writ of prohibition to prohibit Judge Capper from proceeding in the parentage action and to direct him to enter a finding that all orders that had been entered in that case were void. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that Judge Capper patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to proceed in the parentage proceeding since the child was not made a party to the case and good cause was not shown for not making the child a party. View "State ex rel. Doe v. Court of Common Pleas (Capper)" on Justia Law

In this appeal, 1495 Jaeger LLC challenged the denial by the board of tax appeals (BTA) of a motion through which Jaeger sought to carry forward a stipulated value for tax year 2008 to subsequent tax years. On February 1, 2011, the BTA issued a dispositive order that adopted a property value that had been stipulated by the parties for the tax year 2008. On July 11, 2011, Jaeger filed its motion for an additional BTA order that would require that the stipulated value be carried forward through tax year 2011. The BTA denied Jaeger's motion on the grounds that it had no jurisdiction, reasoning that it lost jurisdiction when the thirty-day period for appealing its February 1 dispositional order expired. Jaeger appealed, arguing that the continuing-complaint provision of Ohio Rev. Code 5715.19(D) conferred jurisdiction on the BTA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA correctly concluded it lacked jurisdiction to modify its decision after expiration of the thirty-day appeal period. View "1495 Jaeger LLC v. Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Appellee received temporary total disability compensation (TTC) for a period of a year and a half during which time Appellee also helped his wife with her business. Appellee was not paid for his services. Appellant Industrial Commission of Ohio learned of these activities, determined that they constituted "work," and concluded that TTC should not have been paid. Accordingly, the TTC award was vacated and overpayment was declared. In addition, the Commission found McBee had committed fraud by submitting disability paperwork during the relevant time period, in which Appellee certified he was not working. The court of appeals overturned the finding of fraud after concluding that the evidence did not prove McBee knew that his unpaid activities for his wife's company constituted "work" for purposes of TTC eligibility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no evidence that McBee knowingly misled the Commission because there was no evidence McBee knew his unpaid activities constituted work that would preclude TTC. View "State ex rel. McBee v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

This case was a public-records action in which relator, ESPN, Inc., sought certain records from respondent, Ohio State University. Ohio State rejected ESPN's requests because the university deemed them to be "overly broad per Ohio's public record laws." EPSN then filed this action for a writ of mandamus to compel Ohio State to provide access to the requested records. The Supreme Court (1) granted the writ for limited records that should have been disclosed because they were not exempt from disclosure based on the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA); but (2) denied the writ for the rest of the records because Ohio State established that FERPA and the attorney-client privilege prohibited the disclosure of the requested records. View "State ex rel. ESPN, Inc. v. Ohio State Univ." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant Maxwell White was convicted of aggravated murder with capital specifications and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed. White subsequently obtained federal habeas corpus relief from his death sentence, obliging the trial court to resentence him. Before the federal court invalidated White's death sentence but after White killed the trooper, the Legislature enacted Ohio Rev. Code 2929.06(B), which requires the trial court, when resentencing a capital offender whose death sentence has been set aside, to empanel a new jury and conduct a fresh penalty hearing, at which death may be a penalty to be considered by the jury. The trial court held it could not retroactively apply the statute in resentencing White, and therefore, White was ineligible for a death sentence. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution does not bar the statute's retroactive application in cases where the aggravated murder was committed before its enactment but the death sentence was set aside after its enactment; (2) the statute's application in this case does not violate the ex post facto clause; and (3) retroactive application of the statute does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. View "State v. White" on Justia Law

Appellant had an allowed workers' compensation claim arising from a 2002 injury. Appellant retired from Appellee a year later and never worked again. In 2009, the Industrial Commission of Ohio denied Appellant's application for temporary total disability compensation (TTC) after finding, among other things, that Appellant had abandoned the work force for reasons unrelated to his injury. Appellant subsequently filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals, alleging that the Commission had abused its discretion in denying TTC. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant could not credibly assert that he had lost income due to his industrial injury, and therefore, the Commission did not err in denying TTC. View "State ex rel. Corman v. Allied Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law