Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this real-property-valution case, Owner sought to reverse the twenty percent increase in the value of his residential property that the auditor ordered for tax year 2007 as part of the sexennial reappraisal in that county. Owner did not attend the hearing before the board of revision (BOR). On appeal to the board of tax appeals (BTA), the BTA excluded Owner's testimony and two of his exhibits. It then held that Owner had not sustained his burden to show a value different from that found by the BOR. Owner appealed, arguing that he was not properly notified of the BOR hearing, that all the evidence he presented at the BTA hearing should have been considered by the BTA, and that he was entitled to a reduced valuation for tax year 2007. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA reasonably and lawfully upheld the county's valuation of Owner's property. View "Gaston v. Medina Cty. Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

In July 2010, a grand jury returned a 73-count indictment charging several current and former public officials and three organizations with criminal charges. In December 2010, the county court of common pleas judge granted the Cafaro defendants' motion to seal a bills of particulars and notices of intent to introduce "other acts" evidence. Relators, a newspaper and television station, filed this writ of mandamus to compel the judge to release all records in the criminal case and a writ of prohibition to vacate the December 2010 order. The Cafaro defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. In July 2011, the indictment was dismissed. In August 2011 the judge unsealed many of the sealed filings but granted the Cafaro defendants' motion to seal a discussion of facts in the state's memorandum in opposition to the Cafaro defendants' motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court granted the writ of mandamus to compel the judge to release all remaining records that were sealed and granted the writ of prohibition to compel the judge to vacate his December 2010 and August 2011 decisions and to prohibit him from issuing further orders presumptively sealing any documents or records in the criminal case. View "State ex rel. Vindicator Printing Co. v. Wolff " on Justia Law

Appellant worked in the classified position of human-services hearing manager with the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS). In December 2004, Appellant was assigned additional duties. Appellant was not informed that the assumption of these duties would move his position to the unclassified service. In December 2005, ODJFS suspended Appellant for violations of the code of conduct and subsequently removed him from his position. Appellant appealed his removal to the State Personnel Board of Review (SPBR), basing his appeal on Ohio Rev. Code 124.11(D), which grants state employees who move from classified positions to unclassified the positions the right to resume the classified position held before the appointment to the unclassified position. The SPBR found that Appellant was an unclassified employee when he was suspended and dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court of common pleas and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant was entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel ODJFS and its director to reinstate him to his previous classified position of human-services hearing manager or a substantially equal position, without the duties assigned to him in December 2004 that moved his position into the unclassified service. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Barley v. Dep't of Job & Family Servs." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing the petition of Appellant for writs of mandamus and procedendo to compel Appellees, the court of common pleas judge and the common pleas court, to issue a valid, final judgment in one of his criminal cases and to vacate his sentence in another of his criminal cases. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's sentencing entries constituted final, appealable orders; (2) the sentences Appellant challenged complied with Ohio R. Crim. P. 32(C) by specifying that Appellant was convicted upon his no-contest pleas; and (3) insofar as Appellant argued that one of his sentences was erroneous because there was no authorization for consecutive six-month jail sentences, Appellant had an adequate remedy by appeal to raise his claim of sentencing error. View "State ex rel. Culgan v. Common Pleas Court (Kimbler)" on Justia Law

Appellee, together with four codefendants, was indicted for murder, aggravated robbery, involuntary manslaughter, and theft. The defendants' initial convictions were reversed due to a Batson violation. On retrial, the trial court declared a mistrial. The state proceeded to retry three of the defendants, including Appellant, and a third jury returned verdicts finding them guilty of all charges. The court of appeals again reversed their convictions. In Appellee's case, the court held (1) the trial court should have declared a mistrial after the second trial because a statement of a state's witness from a previous trial, which had not been admitted into evidence, had inadvertently been submitted to the jury; and (2) double jeopardy barred retrial because there had not been a manifest necessity for the mistrial declared at the second trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals to the extent that it held the Double Jeopardy Clause barred retrial, holding (1) the trial judge erred during the second trial by improperly declaring a mistrial; and (2) the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the retrial of Appellee. View "State v. Gunnell" on Justia Law

In 2008, Craig Ali was a police officer for appellant, the village of Oakwood. That spring, his department assigned him to perform traffic-control duties on a highway-construction project overseen by appellee, Kokosing Construction Company, Inc. Ali was injured while performing those duties. At issue was which entity was Ali's employer for purposes of his workers' compensation claim. A district hearing officer with the Industrial Commission of Ohio found that Kokosing was Ali's employer at the time of injury. A staff hearing officer reversed, finding the correct employer was Oakwood Village. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the commission, when confronted with two potential employers, may, but is not required to, use any of the State ex rel. Lord v. Daugherty and Fisher v. Mayfield factors it believes will assist analysis; (2) therefore, the commission did not abuse its discretion by not directly discussing the three enumerated Lord/Fisher factors; and (3) the staff hearing officer's decision was supported by evidence in the record. View "State ex rel. Oakwood v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

This matter arose out of a controversy over a phrase in a trust. The language at issue established the calculation of the price of trust property offered for sale to certain trust beneficiaries. One of the trust beneficiaries filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, seeking judicial interpretation of the disputed provision. The trial court concluded that the disputed phrase was unambiguous and that the option price was the fair market value as determined by the appraisal. The court of appeals reversed after reviewing the trust document de novo, finding that the option language was susceptible to more than one interpretation and that the option price was the federal and/or Ohio qualified-use value. At issue on appeal was what standard of review an appellate court should employ in reviewing legal issues in a declaratory-judgment action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the de novo standard of review is the proper standard for appellate review of purely legal issues that must be resolved after the trial court has decided that a complaint for declaratory judgment presents a justiciable question. View "Arnott v. Arnott" on Justia Law

Appellee Trumbull Industries, Inc. was an Ohio corporation. Appellees Murray Miller and Sam H. Miller (Sam H.) were shareholders of Trumbull. Appellant Sam M. Miller (Sam M.) was also a shareholder of Trumbull. Murray and Sam H. filed a complaint against Sam M. for injunctive relief and damages arising from a business venture. Sam M. subsequently reimbursed himself for his legal expenses pursuant to an "undertaking" executed pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 1701.13(E)(5)(a) (the statute), which governs the advancement of litigation expenses by a corporation to one of its directors. The trial court held that Sam M. was entitled to the advancement of expenses. The appellate court reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) based on the unambiguous language of the statute, Trumbull was required by law to advance expenses to Sam M., as Trumbull's articles of incorporation did not state by specific reference that the statute did not apply to Trumbull; (2) thus, Appellees failed to show that Trumbull opted out of the mandatory advancement requirement; and (3) Trumbull's statutory duty to advance Sam M.'s fees arose upon receipt of Sam M.'s undertaking. View "Miller v. Miller" on Justia Law

The issue presented in this appeal was whether the filing of a pretrial motion to suppress by a co-defendant automatically tolls the time within which a defendant must be brought to trial. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions of aggravated robbery and felonious assault, concluding that Defendant was timely tried on those charges, as the time to bring Defendant to trial was tolled when his co-defendant filed a pretrial motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the time in which to bring Defendant to trial was not automatically tolled when his co-defendant filed pretrial motions to suppress. Remanded for the court of appeals to determine whether the setting of the trial date beyond the statutory time was reasonable. View "State v. Ramey" on Justia Law

Appellant, Rebecca Nelson-Miller, as administrator of the estate of Norman Miller, cross-appealed from a decision of the court of appeals that held that the 2005 agreed judgment entry of divorce between Norman and cross-appellee, Beth Miller, was void for noncompliance with Ohio R. Civ. P. 58(A) due to the trial court's improper delegation of its judgment-entry signatory duties to a magistrate. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the trial court's 2005 judgment entry decree of divorce, holding (1) where a court possesses jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter, mechanical irregularities regarding the trial court's signature render the judgment voidable not void; (2) therefore, the trial court's noncompliance with the signature requirement of Rule 58(A) caused the 2005 judgment entry to be merely voidable; and (3) because neither party sought any timely objection or appeal from the 2005 divorce decree, Appellee's attempted collateral attack on the trial court's voidable judgment entry in 2009 was untimely and improper. View "Miller v. Nelson-Miller" on Justia Law