Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant, who was incarcerated, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming (1) the Adult Parole Authority improperly revoked his parole, and (2) the evidence obtained by his parole officer's search of his e-mail account constituted a criminal act, and the evidence obtained from the search could not be used to revoke his parole. The court of appeals dismissed Appellant's habeas corpus petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's parole was properly revoked; (2) the evidence obtained by Appellant's parole officer's search was lawfully obtained; and (3) habeas corpus is generally not available to challenge parole conditions that allegedly restrained a petitioner's liberty. View "Sullivan v. Bunting" on Justia Law

Appellant, a classified civil-service employee, filed a writ of mandamus to compel appellees, the Miami County Sheriff's Office and Sheriff Charles Cox, to reinstate him pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 145.362 to his previous deputy-sheriff position and salary or to a similar position and salary and to award him back pay and benefits. The court of appeals held that Appellant had an adequate remedy by way of a civil-service appeal to the State Personnel Board of Review (SPBR) from the sheriff's office's refusal to perform the requested actions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) classified civil-service employees like Appellant have an adequate remedy by administrative appeal to SPBR from an employer's refusal to reinstate them to their salaries and former positions; and (2) Appellant waived his claim that the collective-bargaining agreement between the sheriff's office and the employee union prevented him from instituting an appeal to SPBR. View "State ex rel. Byers v. Sheriff'Âs Office" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether a private sanitary landfill is a public utility that is exempt from township zoning regulations pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code. 519.211. The trial court concluded that the private landfill was a public utility not subject to the zoning restrictions of the township. The court of appeals held that the landfill was entitled to the trial court's declaration that it was a public utility for purposes of section 519.211. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a privately owned sanitary landfill cannot be a common-law public utility exempt from township zoning when there is no public regulation or oversight of its rates and charges, no statutory or regulatory requirement that all solid waste delivered to the landfill be accepted for disposal, and no right of the public to demand and receive its services; and (2) thus, the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court's declaration that the landfill was a public utility for purposes of section 519.211. Remanded. View "Rumpke Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Colerain Twp." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a habeas corpus action in federal district court, asserting that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at his criminal trial. Respondent, warden of the London Correctional Institution, countered that Petitioner's plea of no contest in the underlying criminal case constituted a waiver of his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Petitioner objected, arguing that under Ohio law, the state may not use his no-contest plea and resulting conviction against him, including using the plea as evidence that he waived his right to effective assistance. Finding there was no controlling precedent on the admissibility of a no-contest plea in a habeas proceeding, the federal district court certified a question for the Supreme Court's resolution. The Supreme Court answered by holding that Ohio R. Crim. P. 11(B)(2) and Ohio R. Evid. 410(A)(2), which prohibit the use of a defendant's no contest plea against the defendant in any subsequent civil proceeding, do not apply to prohibit the use of such a plea in a subsequent civil proceeding which is a collateral attack on the criminal judgment which results from the no contest plea, such as the current habeas corpus action. View "Hollingsworth v. Timmerman-Cooper" on Justia Law

Defendant, who was convicted for criminal offenses, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel Appellee, the county common pleas court judge, to issue a new sentencing entry. Defendant asserted that his current sentencing entry was not a final, appealable order because it did not contain a disposition concerning specifications that he was charged with but not convicted of. The Supreme Court affirmed and denied the requested relief, holding that the sentencing entry for Defendant fully complied with Ohio R. Crim. P. 32(C) and Ohio Rev. Code 2505.02 because it stated that he was convicted by a jury of specified crimes, set forth the sentence, was signed by a judge, and was entered upon the journal by the clerk of court. View "State ex rel. Duncan v. DeWeese" on Justia Law

Employee was injured while working for Employer. Five years later, Employee was fired for violating the company's attendance policy. Employee's termination was later the basis for the Industrial Commission of Ohio's denial of his request for temporary total disability compensation (TTC). The Commission found that Employee's discharge amounted to a voluntary abandonment because it was consequence of behavior that Employee willingly undertook. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the deliberate misconduct necessary to support a finding of voluntary abandonment could not be imputed to Employee. The Supreme Court affirmed and issued a limited writ of mandamus that vacated the Commission's order and returned the cause to it for further consideration, as the hearing officer did not carefully examine the totality of the circumstances in finding that a simple allegation of misconduct existed to preclude temporary total disability compensation. View "State ex rel. Brown v. Hoover Universal, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants here were property owners who alleged that a foreign municipality rezoned land that lay in the municipality but that was adjacent to their property in another municipality for the benefit of private enterprise rather than public health. The complaint sought both a declaratory judgment, alleging violations of due process and equal protection, and a writ of mandamus, alleging a regulatory taking for which Appellants were entitled to compensation. The trial court concluded (1) Appellants had standing to bring a declaratory-judgment action, but Appellants' constitutional claims failed; and (2) Appellants' takings claim failed. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the property owners lacked standing to bring their claims without distinguishing between the declaratory judgment and mandamus claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) consistent with the Court's holding in Clifton v. Blanchester, Appellants did not have standing to assert a mandamus claim for appropriation of land outside the territorial limits of municipality; but (2) Appellants did have standing to bring a declaratory-judgment action to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinances. View "Moore v. Middletown" on Justia Law

Appellant pled no contest to burglary and was sentenced accordingly. Appellant appealed, contending that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress and to dismiss. The court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) the arrest warrant pursuant to which Appellant had been arrested was invalid because the deputy clerk who issued the warrant impermissibly acted in a dual capacity; but (2) the invalid warrant led to no evidence subject to suppression. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) a person acting in the dual capacities of deputy sheriff for a county and deputy clerk for a municipal court located in the same county is not a neutral and detached magistrate for purposes of determining whether probable cause exists for issuing an arrest warrant; and (2) because the arrest was predicated primarily upon Appellant's pre-arrest confession, the issue of whether the exclusionary rule is an appropriate remedy for an invalidly issued arrest warrant was not properly before the Court. View "State v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

Appellants, Gregory and Jo Ellen Adkins, filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition to prevent Appellee, the county municipal court judge, from exercising any further jurisdiction in Smith v. Adkins. Appellants claimed the judge patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over the underlying municipal court case because a no-asset bankruptcy discharge in 2001 barred the action. The court of appeals dismissed Appellants' claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants could not establish that the municipal court judge lacked jurisdiction, as (1) the complaint in the municipal court case alleged a secured-debt claim, which would not be discharged by the bankruptcy; (2) the bankruptcy discharge specified that not all types of debts were discharge; (3) there was evidence that the parties to the underlying suit had an ongoing relationship that continued after the bankruptcy discharge was entered in 2001; and (4) Appellants may have waived their affirmative defense of discharge in bankruptcy by failing to raise it in the municipal court case in an answer or an amended answer. View "State ex rel. Adkins v. Mun. Court (Shanahan)" on Justia Law

Real property owners (Owners) sued Appellant, the county engineer, complaining that their property had been flooded for several years and the water caused damage to their property. Owners alleged that the draining system was improperly designed, constructed, or installed and pleaded that the court require Appellant to upgrade the system to prevent future flooding. The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that the county engineer was immune from litigation under Ohio Rev. Code 2744, which addresses political-subdivision liability for torts. Owners appealed, arguing that the design, planning, or construction of a sewer system is a proprietary function, which is an exception to political subdivision immunity. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because upgrading a storm-sewer system involves construction and design, such upgrading is a governmental, not a proprietary, function. View "Coleman v. Portage County Eng'r" on Justia Law