Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellants requested a tax refund from the City of Worthington in connection with municipal income tax they paid on stock-option income earned from 2005 through 2007, as reported on Form 1040, Schedule C of their federal income tax return. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed the denial of Appellants' refund based on its view that Ohio Rev. Code 718.01 governed the case because the City's definition of net profits in former Worthington Codified Ordinance 1701.15, which defined net profit for purposes of the City's income tax for an individual taxpayer "as the individual's profit, other than amounts required to be reported on schedule C," contravened the statutory definition of net profits set forth in section 718.01(A)(7). The Supreme Court reversed and ordered the City to refund the municipal taxes paid by Appellants on Schedule C during the tax years at issue, holding that the decision of the BTA was unreasonable and unlawful because the General Assembly did not exercise its power to limit or restrict the municipal power of taxation through section 718.01, and therefore, the statutory provisions at issue did not preclude the refund. View "Gesler v. City of Worthington Income Tax Bd. of Appeals" on Justia Law

The Mount Vernon City School District Board of Education terminated Appellant for insubordination for refusing to remove religious displays in his classroom and injecting his personal religious beliefs into his pattern of instruction, all after being forbidden to do so. The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence in the record supported Appellant's termination for insubordination in failing to comply with the district's orders to remove religious materials from his classroom. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts did not err in affirming the termination, as there was ample evidence of insubordination to justify the termination decision. View "Freshwater v. Mount Vernon City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of failure to comply with a police officer and obstruction of official business. The trial court imposed separate sentences for the two offenses. Defendant appealed, arguing that the offenses should have merged at sentencing as allied offenses of similar import under Ohio Rev. Code 2941.25. The appellate court remanded for a determination as to whether the offenses were allied offenses under State v. Johnson, which instructs courts that a defendant's conduct "must be considered" when determining whether multiple offenses merge at sentencing pursuant to section 2941.25. The trial court determined that the offenses were not allied offenses of similar import and imposed separate prison terms for the two offenses. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Defendant's sentences merged under Johnson because they were based on the same conduct. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when deciding whether to merge multiple offenses at sentencing pursuant to section 2941.25, a court must review the entire record to determine whether the offenses were committed separately or with a separate animus; and (2) the court of appeals erred by relying on Johnson for the proposition that a court may consider a defendant's conduct only as it was described by the state's theory at trial. View "State v. Washington" on Justia Law

Appellant, who worked for Employer, filed a workers' compensation claim that was allowed for hypersensitivity pneumonitis and hypersensitivity-induced reactive upper-airway disease. Claimant returned to work, but after his symptoms returned, he stopped working in 2004. In 2005, a staff hearing officer with the Industrial Commission denied Appellant's request for temporary total disability compensation, concluding that Appellant's smoking-related disease caused his exacerbated symptoms. In 2007, a staff hearing officer awarded Appellant permanent total disability compensation. Employer filed a complaint for mandamus, which the court of appeals denied. The Supreme Court reversed and granted the writ, holding that because the Commission had conclusively established in 2005 that the exacerbation of Appellant's symptoms that forced him to stop working in 2004 was caused by smoking, not by the allowed conditions in his claim, the Commission erred by determining that Appellant's decision to stop working was not a voluntary abandonment of the workforce. View "State ex rel. Kelsey Hayes Co. v. Grashel" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased a 33,000-square-foot residential lot in 1974 that was adjacent to another lot owned by Plaintiffs upon which they had built their residence. In 2004, the village of Ottowa Hills denied Plaintiffs' request for a variance seeking to have the vacant lot declared a "buildable" lot because the zoning code at that time included a requirement that no structure could be built on a lot smaller than 35,000 square feet. This new size restriction was enacted in 1978. At the time Plaintiffs purchased the lot, the minimum buildable lot size was 15,000 square feet. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully appealed the village's decision to the Ottawa Hills Zoning Commission. The trial court upheld the Commission's decision, concluding that there was no regulatory taking. The court of appeals reversed. On remand, the trial court determined that a taking had not occurred because Plaintiffs had not taken any affirmative steps to build a house on the lot. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the analysis that is applicable to determining whether a variance should have been granted in this case, the appropriate result would have been to grant the variance. Remanded. View "Boice v. Village of Ottawa Hills" on Justia Law

After the person elected in 2012 to the office of County Sheriff could not assume the office for health reasons, County Commissioners appointed Relator as acting Sheriff until someone could be appointed to occupy the office. The County Democratic Central Committee (DCC) appointed Respondent to occupy the office. Relator filed this original action in quo warranto, claiming that Respondent did not meet the qualifications to assume the office of Sheriff. Relator asserted that he had standing to bring this action because he remained acting Sheriff. The Supreme Court granted the writ and reinstated Relator as acting County Sheriff until the DCC could appoint a qualified person, holding (1) Relator had standing to bring this action in quo warranto; and (2) Respondent failed to meet the statutory qualifications to be a County Sheriff. View "State ex rel. Swanson v. Maier" on Justia Law

As part of a negotiated agreement, Appellant pled guilty to robbery and was sentenced to six years' imprisonment. The sentencing court issued two nunc pro tunc orders to correct an error in the original sentencing entry. On appeal, Appellant argued, inter alia, that the sentencing court lacked the authority to issue the nunc pro tunc entries. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's claims were not cognizable in habeas corpus because (1) Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; (2) sentencing orders are, in general, not cognizable in habeas corpus; and (3) a nunc pro tunc order correcting a clerical error in a sentencing entry is not unlawful. View "Daggett v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

This appeal involved two separate actions that were consolidated. In the first action, a married couple raised allegations of fraud and other claims against Residential Finance Corporation (RFC), which had brokered two refinancings of the couple's residential mortgage. The first action was consolidated with a foreclosure case filed later against the couple. Appellant and RFC were named as third-party defendants in the foreclosure case. After consolidation, the case was bifurcated on the basis of subject matter for trial purposes and was scheduled to go to trial only on the refinancing issues. Judge Robert Nichols denominated Appellant as a codefendant in that trial. Appellant field an action for a writ of prohibition to prevent Nichols from requiring him to be a defendant in the trial. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant could not establish the elements for a writ of prohibition, as Appellant had an adequate remedy at law and Nichols did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over Appellant. View "State ex rel. Shumaker v. Nichols" on Justia Law

Michael Cullen sued State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company requesting class certification and a declaratory judgment that State Farm failed to disclose all benefits available to policyholders who made claims for damaged windshields. The trial court certified the class, concluding that Cullen and the class satisfied the requirements of Ohio R. Civ. P. 23. The court of appeals affirmed the order certifying the class but reversed the portion of the decision defining the class and remanded with instructions to the trial court to redefine it. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the declaratory relief at issue here was incidental to an individualized claim for monetary damages, Cullen failed to meet the requirement for certification set forth in Rule 23(B)(2); and (2) Cullen failed to prove that this action satisfied Rule 23(B)(3) because individual questions predominated over the questions common to the proposed class. Remanded. View "Cullen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Ramona Whitley and Debra Jones, teachers at a preschool day care, questioned three-year-old L.P. about an eye injury and marks on his face upon his arrival at the preschool. Whitley reported suspected child abuse after L.P. identified Defendant as responsible for his injuries. A grand jury subsequently indicted Defendant of several counts of felonious assault, endangering children, and domestic violence. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of all charges except one felonious assault count. The court of appeals reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the preschool teachers to testify regarding L.P.'s statements in violation of the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) statements elicited from a child by a teacher in the absence of an ongoing emergency and for the primary purpose of gathering information of criminal conduct and identifying the alleged perpetrator of suspected child abuse are testimonial in nature; and (2) therefore, the admission of L.P.'s statements violated Defendant's right to confrontation. View "State v. Clark" on Justia Law