Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A husband and wife met at a religious conference, began a relationship, and married after the wife made clear she would not have sex before marriage. After moving to Ohio, the husband began demanding sex more frequently than the wife desired, insisting she submit regardless of her wishes. The wife described a recurring pattern during their marriage in which “date nights” would end with consensual sex, followed by the husband engaging in nonconsensual vaginal intercourse or oral sex while she was asleep or otherwise unwilling. This pattern continued for several years, leading to the wife’s departure, her obtaining a protection order, and the husband’s indictment on three counts of rape, each tied to specific time periods.The case was tried before a jury in the Wood County Court of Common Pleas, which convicted the husband on all three counts. On appeal, the Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed the convictions and vacated them, finding the evidence insufficient to prove “sexual conduct” as defined by Ohio law for the charged periods. The appellate court reasoned that while the wife’s testimony about “date nights” included explicit descriptions of penetration, her testimony regarding the specific periods in the indictment did not explicitly describe penetration, and the use of phrases like “have sex” was deemed too vague to establish the statutory element.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that the wife’s testimony, including her explicit descriptions of vaginal intercourse and her use of the phrase “have sex,” was sufficient to support the element of “sexual conduct” under Ohio’s rape statute when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The court concluded that the appellate court erred by refusing to draw reasonable inferences in favor of the State and reversed the judgment, remanding the case for consideration of the husband’s remaining appellate arguments. View "State v. Coker" on Justia Law

The case involves a workplace accident where the decedent sustained severe head injuries, resulting in a persistent vegetative state and eventual death. The decedent's workers' compensation claim was allowed for several conditions, and he sought scheduled-loss compensation for the loss of use of his bilateral upper and lower extremities. The Industrial Commission of Ohio initially denied this claim, concluding that the loss of use was due to brain injury, not direct injury to the extremities.The decedent filed a mandamus action challenging the denial, but it was dismissed after his death. Subsequently, his surviving spouse, Byk, filed a motion with the commission for scheduled-loss compensation under R.C. 4123.57(B) and 4123.60. The commission denied this motion, stating that the decedent's entitlement to the loss-of-use award had already been determined and denied.Byk then filed a mandamus action in the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which granted a limited writ directing the commission to vacate its order and issue a new order adjudicating the merits of Byk’s claim. The commission and Republic Steel appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and reversed the Tenth District's judgment. The court held that Byk was not entitled to scheduled-loss compensation under R.C. 4123.60 because the decedent was not "lawfully entitled to have applied" a second time for the same scheduled-loss compensation that had already been denied. The court emphasized that the statutory language did not authorize an injured worker to reapply for the same compensation after a final denial. Consequently, Byk's request for a writ of mandamus was denied. View "State ex rel. Byk v. Indus. Comm." on Justia Law

Aarin Clinkscale was indicted in 2014 for his involvement in an armed robbery that resulted in two deaths. He pled guilty to aggravated robbery with a firearm specification and two counts of involuntary manslaughter. In 2016, the trial court sentenced him to a total of 14 years in prison, including a mandatory three-year term for the firearm specification. Clinkscale received 762 days of jail-time credit for time served prior to sentencing.Clinkscale filed his first motion for judicial release in June 2020, which the trial court denied, stating he would be eligible for release in October 2022. He filed a second motion for judicial release in October 2022. The State objected, arguing that Clinkscale was not eligible until November 2024, as he needed to serve the mandatory term and then wait five years. The trial court granted Clinkscale’s motion, and the State appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision, concluding that Clinkscale’s jail-time credit shortened the waiting period for judicial release.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and disagreed with the Tenth District’s conclusion. The court held that jail-time credit does not reduce the required five-year waiting period following the expiration of mandatory prison terms under R.C. 2929.20(C)(1)(d). The court emphasized that the five-year waiting period is fixed and begins only after the mandatory term is completed. Consequently, Clinkscale’s motion for judicial release was premature. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals and remanded the case for consideration of Clinkscale’s equal-protection argument. View "State v. Clinkscale" on Justia Law

Ricardo Dodson is serving prison sentences for convictions in two separate cases. In the first case, Dodson was indicted on multiple counts of rape, attempted rape, and kidnapping. The jury returned guilty verdicts, but the jury-verdict forms mistakenly listed his surname as Jackson instead of Dodson. The trial-court judge read the wrong name into the record and sentenced Dodson to consecutive prison terms for each count. In the second case, Dodson was indicted on another count of rape and kidnapping. He was found guilty and sentenced to serve this sentence consecutively to the sentences from the first case, even though he had not yet started serving those sentences.Dodson petitioned the Seventh District Court of Appeals for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the mistyping of his surname on the jury-verdict forms stripped the trial court of jurisdiction and that the sentences imposed were ambiguous. He claimed that the sentence in the first case should be considered concurrent due to the lack of specificity in the sentencing entry and that the sentence in the second case was ambiguous because it referred to a sentence "already being served" when he had not yet started serving the first sentence.The Seventh District Court of Appeals dismissed Dodson’s petition, determining that his claims were not cognizable in habeas corpus. The court found that the alleged errors did not affect the trial court’s jurisdiction and that Dodson had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law through direct appeal. Dodson appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Seventh District’s judgment, holding that the trial court had jurisdiction over Dodson’s case and that the sentencing entries were not ambiguous. The court concluded that Dodson’s arguments could have been addressed through direct appeal and did not warrant habeas corpus relief. View "State ex rel. Dodson v. Smith" on Justia Law

An inmate at Grafton Correctional Institution filed a mandamus action against the warden’s administrative assistant and public-information officer, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the production of public records and an award of statutory damages. The inmate had sent 13 electronic kites requesting copies of public records, focusing on seven kites sent between May 27 and June 2, 2024. The inmate claimed that the requested records were not provided in a timely manner.The case was initially filed in June 2024. The respondent acknowledged receiving the kites within four to seven days and provided some records on September 3 and others on September 5, 2024. The respondent argued that the delay was due to the volume of requests from the inmate, who had made over 50 public-records requests for more than 300 documents since May 2024. The lower court granted an alternative writ, setting a schedule for evidence and briefs. Both parties submitted their evidence and briefs, and the inmate filed several motions, including a motion to strike the respondent’s evidence and motions to proceed to judgment.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and found that the inmate’s mandamus claim was moot because he had received all the requested records. The court also determined that the three-month response time was reasonable given the volume of requests the respondent had to handle. Consequently, the court denied the inmate’s requests for a writ of mandamus and statutory damages, as well as all his motions. View "State ex rel. Robinson v. Wesson" on Justia Law

Kimani Ware, an inmate at the Richland Correctional Institution (RCI), sought a writ of mandamus to compel Doug Smith, identified as RCI’s Library Supervisor, to produce public records under Ohio’s Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43. Ware requested ten different documents related to the RCI library, including procedure manuals, monthly reports, advisory committee forms, logs of inmate library access, and various library schedules and notices. Ware also sought statutory damages under the Act.Ware filed the mandamus action after Smith allegedly denied his requests. Smith responded that he did not maintain the requested records and directed Ware to the librarian and library staff for assistance. Smith argued that Ware did not explicitly state his requests were public-records requests and that he believed Ware was asking for information rather than copies of documents. The RCI librarian confirmed that Ware had not asked her to print the requested documents and that she had complied with all previous printing requests from Ware.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and found that Ware did not meet the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Smith failed to comply with the Public Records Act. The court held that Smith’s direction to Ware to contact the librarian and library staff did not constitute a denial of the requests. Additionally, the court found that Ware’s reasons for requesting the records were irrelevant to his entitlement under the Act.The Supreme Court of Ohio denied Ware’s claim for a writ of mandamus and his request for statutory damages, concluding that Ware did not show that Smith failed to comply with an obligation under R.C. 149.43(B). View "State ex rel. Ware v. Smith" on Justia Law

An inmate, Kimani E. Ware, sent eight public-records requests to the Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, Michael C. O’Malley, between September and December 2023. Ware sought 21 categories of records, including personnel files and payroll records of O’Malley and two assistant prosecuting attorneys, as well as a list of cases assigned to an assistant prosecutor. O’Malley denied the requests, arguing that the records concerned criminal prosecutions and that Ware, as an inmate, needed to comply with R.C. 149.43(B)(8) before being entitled to the records.Ware filed a mandamus action in April 2024, seeking an order for the production of the records, statutory damages, and court costs. The Supreme Court of Ohio previously granted in part O’Malley’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, leaving nine records requests at issue. O’Malley argued that R.C. 149.43(B)(8) applied, which limits an inmate’s right to obtain records concerning a criminal investigation or prosecution without a judicial finding.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the personnel files and payroll records of the prosecuting attorneys did not fall under R.C. 149.43(B)(8) and ordered O’Malley to produce these records, subject to proper redactions. The court also ordered O’Malley to produce a list of cases assigned to Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Williamson in 1999 or certify that no such record exists. However, the court denied the writ for the requests seeking specific invoices or pay stubs for work performed by Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Van, as no such records existed.The court denied Ware’s request for statutory damages for the personnel files and payroll records but deferred the determination of statutory damages for the list of cases until O’Malley complied with the limited writ. The court awarded Ware $200 for court costs. View "State ex rel. Ware v. O'Malley" on Justia Law

Jadyn Logan was convicted of aggravated robbery in January 2018, a first-degree felony that prohibited her from possessing a firearm under R.C. 2923.13(A)(2). Later, a Cuyahoga County grand jury indicted her for having weapons while under a disability, improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle, and carrying a concealed weapon. Logan pleaded guilty to attempting to have weapons while under a disability with a one-year firearm specification, and the other charges were dismissed. The trial court sentenced her to one year for the firearm specification and two years of community control for the attempt offense.The State appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, arguing that R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) required a prison term for the attempt offense. The Eighth District affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the statute required a prison sentence only for the firearm specification, not the underlying felony offense. The State sought en banc consideration, which was denied, and the Eighth District maintained its position.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and determined that R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) mandates a prison sentence for any felony offense with a corresponding firearm specification. The court clarified that a firearm specification is a sentencing enhancement, not a separate offense, and that the statute's language requires a prison term for the underlying felony offense when a firearm specification is attached. The court reversed the Eighth District's judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing consistent with this interpretation. View "State v. Logan" on Justia Law

An inmate at the Richland Correctional Institution, Kimani E. Ware, sought a writ of mandamus to compel Richland County Sheriff Steve Sheldon to provide public records he requested, including a booking report, use-of-force reports, and policies on inmate grievances and use of force. Ware also sought statutory damages and court costs.Ware sent his public-records request in October 2022, and the sheriff's office responded in November 2022. However, there was conflicting evidence regarding the completeness of the sheriff's response. Ware claimed that the sheriff did not provide the inmate-grievance policy and use-of-force policy, and that the sheriff provided incident reports instead of the requested use-of-force reports. Ware filed his mandamus complaint in December 2023, and the sheriff moved to dismiss, which was denied by the court. Both parties submitted evidence, but only Ware filed a timely merit brief.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and found discrepancies in the evidence provided by Ware, suggesting that Ware may have altered the response letter from the sheriff's office. The court determined that Ware did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the sheriff failed to provide the requested records. Consequently, the court denied Ware's claim for a writ of mandamus and his requests for statutory damages and court costs. The court also denied motions from both parties for leave to file additional evidence. View "State ex rel. Ware v. Sheldon" on Justia Law

James P. Ellis, an inmate at Marion Correctional Institution, has been incarcerated since his 1995 convictions for aggravated burglary and aggravated murder. He contends that the Ohio Adult Parole Authority unlawfully corrected an error in his sentencing entry and has been using this correction in his parole hearings. Ellis sought a writ of prohibition from the Tenth District Court of Appeals to prevent the parole authority from conducting future parole screenings and to compel it to contact the sentencing court for corrective procedures.The Tenth District Court of Appeals dismissed Ellis's complaint. The court reasoned that Ellis did not sufficiently demonstrate that the parole authority lacked jurisdiction or relied on erroneous information. Additionally, the court noted that compelling the parole authority to contact a court is beyond the scope of relief provided by a writ of prohibition.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the Tenth District's dismissal. The court held that the parole authority has jurisdiction to hold parole proceedings for all parole-eligible inmates, including Ellis. The court found that Ellis's parole eligibility is determined by statute, and the parole authority's actions were authorized by law. Consequently, Ellis failed to prove the elements required for a writ of prohibition. The court also noted that Ellis's request to compel the parole authority to contact the sentencing court was not appropriate for a writ of prohibition, which is typically used to prevent unauthorized actions rather than to compel specific actions. View "State ex rel. Ellis v. Adult Parole Auth." on Justia Law