Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On May 6, 2013, one day before the primary, Coughlin filed a nominating petition as a candidate the office of clerk of courts for the Stow Municipal Court in the November general election. Coughlin is a qualified elector and satisfies the statutory requirements to run for the Stow Municipal Court clerkship. On July 11, 2013, an elector, Nelsch, filed a protest, challenging Coughlin’s ability to run as either a nonpartisan or independent candidate by setting out Coughlin’s long history of association with the Republican Party. Coughlin responded in writing and at the board’s July 15, 2013 protest hearing. Coughlin argued that he was running as a nonpartisan candidate, not an independent candidate, and that the requirement of disaffiliation applies only to independent candidates. The board voted unanimously to sustain the protest and deny Coughlin’s petition. The Ohio Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus, holding that there is no statutory provision extending the disaffiliation requirement to candidates for nonpartisan office. View "Coughlin v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

On January 31, 2013, Yeager submitted a declaration of candidacy to the Richland County Board of Elections, to seek the Republican Party nomination to represent the 5th Ward in the Mansfield City Council. His petitions contained sufficient valid signatures. Yeager was the only person to file a declaration of candidacy. R.C. 3513.02 provides that if in an odd-numbered year, the number of declared candidates seeking a particular party’s nomination does not exceed the number of candidates that party is entitled to nominate, then no primary will be held, and election officials shall certify the declared candidate(s) for inclusion on the general-election ballot. The board of elections certified Yeager’s candidacy for the general-election ballot without a primary, at its March 14, 2013 meeting. On April 2, 2013, the board determined that Yeager was not a qualified elector in the 5th Ward and did not reside at 462 Lily Street, the address listed on his voter-registration form. On July 9, the board officially voted to remove Yeager’s name from the November ballot. The Ohio Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus, holding that the board, which had not received a written protest or held a hearing, acted untimely and in disregard of clearly-established law. View "Yeager v. Richland Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Harper, a known drug dealer, was robbed and murdered in his Sandusky residence. Police learned that immediately before his murder, Harper was to have participated in a drug deal. Cellphone records led them to Gipson, who was in custody in Canton, Michigan for his alleged involvement in another crime. Steckel, a Canton police officer, later testified that during a driving tour of the neighborhood, Gipson identified Ricks, who he knew as “Peanut,” as the other man involved in the murder. The judge instructed the jury that the hearsay testimony was not for the truth of the matter asserted, but to describe the investigation. Neither Gipson nor Ricks testified. Ricks was convicted. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed, holding that admission of the alleged accomplice’s statements through an investigating officer’s testimony violated Ricks’s (the defendant’s) right to confront the witnesses against him under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and the Ohio Constitution. Gipson’s out-of-court statements connected Ricks to Gipson and to the crime. The danger of unfair prejudice was amplified by further testimony that Gipson was upset and scared by seeing Ricks, which encouraged the jury to misuse the content of the out-of-court statement for its truth. View "State v. Ricks" on Justia Law

Snyder, admitted to the bar in 1996, allegedly committed 18 violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, including charging excessive and nonrefundable fees. Snyder operated SPLS, a foreclosure-defense firm with “of counsel” relationships with out-of-state attorneys. Snyder shared office space with PIC, a business that provided paralegal and support services for Snyder, including interacting with clients on the phone, compiling information, and contacting lenders regarding mitigation options. PIC contracted with a marketing firm that attracted potential clients by sending solicitation letters to homeowners who were behind in mortgage payments. Snyder would enter into an agreement with the client that provided for a flat fee that was deemed earned in full upon the opening of the file. The cost of representation ranged from $1,595 to $2,295; $200 to $500 would be sent to the attorney outside of Ohio who was listed as “of counsel.” Snyder retained $300 for each client, with the balance going to PIC for its services. A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline concluded that three violations had been proven and recommended dismissal of the others. The board adopted the panel’s findings and recommendation of a public reprimand. No objections were filed. The Ohio Supreme Court agreed. View "Geauga Cnty. Bar Ass'n v. Snyder" on Justia Law

Lowe sought, by writ of procedendo, to compel Judge Callahan, to issue a ruling on his motion in arrest of judgment, alleging that he filed his motion on August 10, 2012, and that Judge Callahan has not ruled on it. The court of appeals dismissed the matter as moot because the judge had ruled on Lowe’s motion on August 22, 2012. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. Lowe’s argument was not that the judge failed to rule on his motion but that she addressed the wrong issue in her ruling, an argument that should have been raised in an appeal of the ruling. View "Lowe v. Callahan" on Justia Law

In 2006, a jury convicted Appenzeller on18 felony counts. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 28 years in prison. The appeals court affirmed in part and remanded for merging of certain offenses and resentencing. The trial court again imposed a sentence of an aggregate term of 28 years in prison. The appeals court affirmed. Appenzeller unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief based primarily on a claim that he was denied due process and equal protection when there was a break in the chain of custody of the trial transcript in his direct appeal. The alleged break occurred when Appenzeller’s own appellate attorney checked out the transcript to prepare his brief. The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no violation of court rules or of constitutional rights. View "Appenzeller v. Miller" on Justia Law

Canton attorney Oberholtzer, admitted to the bar in 1989, was charged with client neglect in two family-law matters in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), 1.15(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(h). Oberholtzer was nonresponsive and failed to cooperate in the investigation of both matters. After a hearing, a panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommended dismissing a charged trust-account violation, but otherwise found violations and recommended suspension from the practice of law for 12 months, with the entire suspension if Oberholtzer fully cooperates with a monitoring attorney, appointed by disciplinary counsel, for the entire period of suspension, and completes a three-hour continuing-legal-education course on law-office management. Neither party filed objections. The Ohio Supreme Court adopted the recommendation. View "Disciplinary Counsel v. Oberholtzer" on Justia Law

Taubman, admitted to the Ohio bar in 1976, admitted to professional misconduct for negligently withdrawing settlement proceeds held in a client guardianship account for his personal use in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a) and 8.4(h). The parties stipulated that no aggravating factors existed and to the absence of a prior disciplinary record, a timely good-faith effort to rectify the misconduct, full and free disclosure to the board and a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, and Taubman’s good character or reputation. The parties agreed that a stayed six-month suspension was the appropriate sanction; the board recommended adoption of the consent-to-discipline agreement. The Ohio Supreme Court adopted the agreement. View "Disciplinary Counsel v. Taubman" on Justia Law

Miller filed a mandamus action, alleging that he sent a public-records request to the Ohio State Highway Patrol on September 9, 2011, seeking records relating to traffic incidents involving a particular trooper. The agency provided some records, but Miller claims that it withheld video and audio recordings and reports concerning the traffic stop and arrest of a particular person on July 15 or 16, 2011. The agency asserted the investigatory-work-product exception to the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43. The court found that Miller’s evidence had not been presented in a timely manner or in the required form, which mandates dismissal by local rule, but considered the evidence, which included a letter from the Highway Patrol establishing on its face that it refused to release certain documents requested by Miller. The court then dismissed for noncompliance with the rules. The Ohio Supreme Court remanded, holding that the Highway Patrol must support its contention that the withheld material falls under the “confidential law enforcement investigatory record” exception to the Public Records Act. View "Miller v. OH St. Hwy. Patrol" on Justia Law

In 2006, Dzelajlija was convicted of robbery, R.C. 2911.02. The court of appeals granted a new trial, finding that the trial court had admitted inadmissible and prejudicial evidence. In 2008, Dzelajlija was again found guilty and sentenced to concurrent seven-year terms. The appeals court reversed, finding that the indictment was defective for failing to state a culpable mental state for either offense. More than a year later, before a retrial, the Ohio Supreme Court decided State v. Horner, which overruled precedent relevant to the indictment being defective. The trial court determined that the grounds for reversal no longer existed and reimposed the sentence. The appeals court agreed, but nevertheless reversed, finding Dzelajlija’s argument regarding the manifest weight of the evidence, earlier declared moot, had never been resolved. On reconsideration, the appeals court held that the trial court erred in considering the matter as pending under the original indictment and vacated the convictions and sentences. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed and remanded: the sentences could not be reimposed, because there was an outstanding issue of whether Dzelajlija’s convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence, but the convictions were vacated based on cases that have been repudiated. View "State v. Dzelajlija" on Justia Law