Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

East Bank Condominiums II, LLC began construction of a condominium complex in 2006. By the time the county auditor assessed the value of the condominium units in 2008, twenty-one units remained unsold and unfinished. The auditor determined the aggregate true value of the twenty-one units was $8,139,300. East Bank challenged the valuation. The county board of revision established the 2008 valuation in accordance with the property owner's evidence and concluded that the total fair market value of the twenty-one units was $3,100,000. The board of tax appeals (BTA) reversed the board of revision's adjustments and reinstated the auditor's valuation of the twenty-one units. The Supreme Court reversed and adopted the valuation of $3,100,000, holding that the BTA did not properly utilize the auditor's valuation of the twenty-one units when the only evidence in the record negated the auditor's determination. View "Dublin City Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Edward Verhovec filed a public-records mandamus action against the City of Marietta after the City failed to respond to Edward's public-records request. After the City provided Edward with the requested records, the trial court dismissed Edward's action. Meanwhile, Dorothy Verhovec also filed a public-records action to compel the City to release requested records. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City after the City provided her with the records. The City sought sanctions against both Edward and Dorothy for frivolous conduct. Before the trial court ruled on the motions, Dorothy and Edward petitioned for a writ of prohibition in the court of appeals. The court of appeals dismissed the prohibition actions. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments, holding that because the Verhovecs each had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to challenge any erroneous ruling in the trial court, the court of appeals was correct to dismiss both actions for a writ of prohibition. View "State ex rel. Verhovec v. Court of Common Pleas" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case were 100 current or former residents or owners of homes on State Road in Parma who sought damages caused by the continual flow of gasoline from a gas station's infrastructure into a sanitary sewer main located on State Road. Plaintiffs named as defendants various private and public entities, including Cuyahoga County. The County filed a motion seeking judgment on the pleadings on the theory that Plaintiffs' causes of action had not been filed within the two-year statute of limitations applicable to political subdivisions pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2744.04. The trial court denied the motion. The County appealed. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court's denial of the County's motion was not a final, appealable order over which the appellate court had jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the denial of a public subdivision's dispositive motion asserting a statute-of-limitations defense pursuant to section 2744.04 is not a final, appealable order. View "Riscatti v. Prime Props. Ltd. P'ship" on Justia Law

Relator sought a writ of prohibition to prohibit the Mahoning County Board of Elections from placing the name of Demaine Kitchen, an independent candidate for mayor of Youngstown, on the November 5, 2013 general election ballot, contending that Kitchen was actually a Democrat and that his profession of independence was not made in good faith. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Relator failed to satisfy his burden of proof, and therefore, the Board did not abuse its discretion by placing Kitchen's name on the ballot. In addition, the Court denied Relator's motion to strike the Board's answer on the grounds of improper service, as Relator failed to demonstrate any harm from the improper service. View "State ex rel. Monroe v. Mahoning County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Cincinnati for Pension Reform (CPR) qualified an initiative to amend the Cincinnati City Charter for the November 5, 2013 ballot. Because CPR objected to the ballot language adopted by the Hamilton County Board of Elections to describe the proposed amendment, it sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Board to adopt new ballot language and to compel the Secretary of State to approve the new language. The Supreme Court granted the requested writ in part and denied it in part, holding (1) the Board abused its discretion by adopting ballot language that omitted two key provisions of the proposed charter amendment; but (2) CPR did not establish entitlement to a writ against the Secretary of State. View "State ex rel. Cincinnati for Pension Reform v. Hamilton County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a complaint and amended complaint against the Ohio Edison Company, a public utility, alleging that Ohio Edison had unlawfully removed the electric meter from his property and disconnected his electric service. The Public Utilities Commission found that Ohio Edison was justified in removing the meter and terminating electric service where (1) Appellant had never made an application for new service under Ohio Edison's tariff and therefore was not a customer of Ohio Edison, and (2) Ohio Edison properly removed the electric meter without prior notice because the meter had been tampered with and was a safety hazard. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to demonstrate that the Commission erred in finding that (1) Appellant was not a customer of Ohio Edison at the property in question; and (2) Ohio Edison had lawfully disconnected electric service to the property. View "Smith v. Ohio Edison Co." on Justia Law

In 2003, Kyle Smith's parents sued Dr. Gary Huber and Qualified Emergency Specialists, Inc. for malpractice after Kyle sustained serious and permanent injuries from an epidural hematoma that Hubert failed to diagnose. Prior to trial, Plaintiffs voluntarily filed a notice of dismissal. Plaintiffs refiled the action in 2008 and eventually added Kyle as a party. The trial court awarded damages and prejudgment interest. In calculating prejudgment interest, the court applied the version of Ohio Rev. Code 1343.03(C) that existed at the time the complaint was filed, concluding that subsequent amendments to the statute applied prospectively only. The court of appeals affirmed the award of prejudgment interest but reversed the trial court's decision to suspend the accrual of prejudgment interest from the date of the voluntary dismissal to the refiling of the complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 1343.03(C) applies to tort actions filed after June 2, 2004, regardless of when the cause of action accrued; and (2) because the refiled complaint was filed after the legislation had gone into effect, the amended version of the statute applied in this case. View "Longbottom v. Mercy Hosp. Clermont" on Justia Law

Appellee was charged with a traffic offense, possession of drugs of abuse, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The drug charges were later dismissed. After Appellee applied to seal the records pertaining to the drug charges, the trial court ordered the records of the dismissed drug charges sealed, concluding that the conviction in the traffic case did not prevent sealing of records in the criminal case involving the drug offenses. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether records of a dismissed charge may be sealed if the offense arises from or is in connection with the same act that led to a conviction on an unsealable charge. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a trial court is precluded from sealing the record of a dismissed charge if the dismissed charge arises as the result of or in connection with the same act that supports a conviction that is exempt from sealing. Remanded. View "State v. Pariag" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with violating Ohio Rev. Code 4301.69(A), which prohibits the sale of beer to an underage person. At Defendant's trial, the State had difficulty proving what Defendant sold to an informant was beer as defined by statute. The court then took judicial notice that Bud Light was, in fact, beer. Defendant was convicted as charged. The court of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, concluding that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of a fact - the alcohol content by volume of Bud Light - that was not something that was "generally known." The Supreme Court reversed and vacated Defendant's conviction, holding that because there was no evidence admitted on the statutory element of the alcohol content of the substance sold by Defendant to the informant, there was insufficient evidence for a conviction, and double jeopardy barred a retrial. View "State v. Kareski" on Justia Law

Dean Sziraki was seriously injured in the course of his employment and spent the next sixteen years as a quadriplegic. After Sziraki died in 2007, his estate filed a claim for death benefits. The Bureau of Workers' Compensation (Bureau) awarded compensation, but the benefits did not include accrued compensation for scheduled-loss benefits pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4123.57(B) for the loss of use of Sziraki's arms and legs. The Industrial Commission awarded compensation for the total loss of use of Sziraki's four extremities for 850 weeks. The Commission, however, limited the amount payable to period of two years, the amount Sziraki would have been entitled to had he filed for compensation on the date of his death, due to the two-year limit on retroactive payment under section 4123.57(B). The court of appeals denied the estate's writ of mandamus requesting an order that the Commission award the full 850 weeks. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not abuse its discretion when it limited payment of the benefits to the two years preceding Sziraki's death; and (2) the court of appeals correctly concluded the Bureau had no duty to award the benefits during Sziraki's lifetime in the absence of an application. View "State ex rel. Estate of Sziraki v. Adm'r, Bureau of Workers'Â Comp." on Justia Law