Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Between 1987 and 2007, Appellant was convicted six times for different offenses. In 2007, the Governor granted a pardon for four of those convictions. Appellant subsequently sought to seal the records of three of the pardoned convictions. The lower courts denied Appellant's requests. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Appellant was not entitled to have her record of conviction sealed solely by virtue of the pardon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in absence of a statutory provision requiring the sealing of a criminal record based on a pardon, a gubernatorial pardon does not automatically entitle the recipient to have the record of the pardoned conviction sealed. View "State v. Boykin" on Justia Law

Respondent, a candidate for county probate judge, was found to have violated former Jud. Cond. R. 4.4(E) for having received campaign contributions from judicial fundraising events during the judicial campaign that categorized or identified participants by the amount of the contribution made to the event. A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommended that no disciplinary sanction be imposed but that Respondent be ordered to pay the costs and a portion of the complainant's attorney fees. A commission of five judges appointed by the Supreme Court upheld that panel's judgment and ordered Respondent to pay a $1,000 fine, the costs of the proceeding, and a greater portion of attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Respondent did not knowingly violate Jud. Cond. R. 4.4(E) and, even if Respondent's conduct constituted a technical violation of the rule, no sanction would be warranted in this case. View "In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Stormer" on Justia Law

Darrita Davis, a qualified elector in Summit County and a resident of Akron Ward 10, submitted a nominating petition on July 2, 2013 to run as an independent candidate in the November 5, 2013 general election to represent Ward 10 on the Akron City Council. The Summit County Board of Elections determined Davis's petition to be invalid on the basis that Davis was not an independent because she failed to disaffiliate sufficiently from the Democratic Party. Davis sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Board to place her name on the ballot. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that Davis established her entitlement to extraordinary relief. View "State ex rel. Davis v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Billy Black was employed as a press operator for Park Ohio Industries, Inc. when he injured his back. Black subsequently retired, after which he did not pursue vocational training or seek other employment. Several years later, Black applied for permanent total disability (PTD) compensation. A hearing officer with the Industrial Commission denied the application on the grounds that Black's retirement was both voluntary and an abandonment of the entire workforce. The Tenth District Court of Appeals granted a limited writ of mandamus ordering the Commission to vacate its order denying PTD compensation to Black. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and denied the writ, holding that because the record contained some evidence to support the Commission's decision that Black's retirement was voluntary and not injury-induced, the Commission did not abuse its discretion in determining that Black was ineligible for PTD compensation. View "State ex rel. Black v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Ohio Rev. Code 9.86, which provides immunity to state employees unless the employee acts manifestly outside the scope of employment, with malicious purpose, or in bad faith. Michael McNew visited the Ohio State University Medical Center (Center) complaining of a painful hemorrhoid, nausea, diarrhea, and fatigue. McNew consulted with Dr. Syed Husain, a faculty member who was also employed by the school's nonprofit medical-practice corporation, but neither a medical student nor a resident was present during the treatment. Four days after McNew was discharged, he died from an undiagnosed cerebral hemorrhage caused by thromboytopenia. Plaintiffs brought this action against the Center in the court of claims. Plaintiffs also filed a civil action against Husain in the common pleas court, which the court stayed pending a determination by the court of claims regarding Husain's immunity from suit. The court of claims concluded that Husain was immune from suit under section 9.86. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in treating McNew, Husain served the interests of the Center and acted within the scope of employment. Therefore, Husain was entitled to personal immunity pursuant to section 9.86. View "Ries v. Ohio State Univ. Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

A manufacturer or alcoholic beverages (InBev) sold all of its rights relating to a particular brand of alcoholic beverage to a successor manufacturer (Labatt Operating). Under the Ohio Alcoholic Beverages Franchise Act, when there is a transfer of ownership, the successor manufacturer may terminate any distributor's franchise without just cause by giving the distributor notice of termination within ninety days of the acquisition and compensating the terminated franchisee. Appellant in this case was the exclusive distributor of Labatt brand products in a ten-county area of Ohio under a franchise agreement with InBev. After the sale, Labatt Operating notified Appellant that it intended to terminate Appellant's franchise to distribute Labatt brand products and that it intended to compensate Appellant. Appellant sued. The trial court granted summary judgment for Appellant and ordered Labatt Operating to continue to distribute its Labatt products through Appellant. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Labatt's termination of Appellant's franchise met the statutory requirements of the Act, and therefore, the court of appeals erred in granting summary judgment to Appellant. View "Esber Beverage Co. v. Labatt USA Operating Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant injured his knee while working and was awarded temporary total disability (TTD) compensation. Several years later, Appellant retired. The next year, Appellant underwent knee surgery and again filed for TTD compensation. A staff hearing officer denied benefits on the grounds that Appellant was ineligible because he had voluntarily retired and abandoned the workforce. Appellant subsequently filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, which the court of appeals denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Industrial Commission did not abuse its discretion in relying on the evidence that Appellant had voluntarily retired from the workforce and was no longer eligible for TTD compensation. View "State ex rel. Hoffman v. Rexam Beverage Can Co." on Justia Law

Wife was granted a domestic-violence civil protection order (CPO) against Husband. The trial court later dismissed the case and dissolved the CPO. Thereafter, Husband filed an application to expunge and seal the record of the CPO proceedings. The trial court denied the application. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court lacked statutory authority to expunge the CPO records. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in accordance with Pepper Pike v. Doe, a trial court has the inherent authority to grant an application to expunge and seal a record pertaining to a dissolved CPO in an adult proceeding when unusual and exceptional circumstances exist. View "Schussheim v. Schussheim" on Justia Law

After sustaining injuries while sledding in the City of Circleville's park, Jeremy Pauley and his mother filed a civil action against the City, alleging that the City acted negligently, recklessly, and wantonly in dumping debris in the park, which resulted in a physical defect that caused Jeremy's injuries. The trial court granted the City's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the City was immune from suit under Ohio Rev. Code 1533.181, the recreational user immunity statute. Plaintiffs appealed, contending that section 1533.181 does not apply when a property owner makes the property more dangerous "without promoting or preserving recreational activities." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Jeremy was a recreational user as defined in the statute, the City was not liable for his injuries. View "Pauley v. Circleville" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Morrow and Sherri Becker had two children. Morrow was ordered to pay $2,198 in child support per month. Morrow later moved to modify his child support payment. A magistrate determined that Morrow would owe $2,085 in child support per month but concluded that since the difference between that amount and the amount Morrow was currently paying was less than ten percent, Morrow's child support obligation would not be reduced. Morrow appealed, challenging the trial court's decision to include certain employer-paid benefits, such as a company car and cell phone, in Morrow's gross income to calculated his child support obligation. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in including the employer-paid benefits in Morrow's gross income when determining whether to modify Morrow's child support obligations. View "Morrow v. Becker" on Justia Law